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INTRODUCTION 
I'll give you a hint. Contradictions do not exist. Whenever you 
think that you are facing a contradiction, check your premises. You 
will find that one of them is wrong. I 
We have been haunted by the "countermajoritarian difficulty" far 
too long. At least since Alexander Bickel's The Least Dangerous 
Branch, 2 constitutional scholars have been preoccupied, indeed one 
might say obsessed, by the perceived necessity of legitimizing judicial 
review.3 The endeavor has consumed the academy and, as this article 
will argue, distracted us from recognizing and studying the constitu-
tional system that we do enjoy. 
The Constitution of the United States has been in force for over 
two hundred years, and judicial review has been a part of the working 
Constitution for almost all of that time.4 Granted, the nature of judi-
cial review has evolved over the course of our constitutional history, as 
have many other aspects of American constitutionalism. But judicial 
review has long been an integral part of our system of government, for 
better or for worse. In today's workaday political world, judicial re-
view seems both firmly entrenched and fully accepted. 
1. AYN RAND, ATLAS SHRUGGED 199 (1957). 
2. Al.ExANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). Although the 
countermajoritarian difficulty obviously predated Bickel, see James B. Thayer, The Origin and 
Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARv. L. REV. 129 (1893), the modern 
obsession with the countermajoritarian difficulty certainly dates to his discussion. 
3. See Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 
1013, 1016 (1984) ("Hardly a year goes by without some learned professor announcing that he 
has discovered the final solution to the countermajoritarian difficulty, or, even more darkly, that 
the countermajoritarian difficulty is insoluble."); Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing 
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 46 (1989) (noting that scholarly literature about judicial 
review has been dominated by the countermajoritarian difficulty for several decades). 
4. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1Cranch)137 (1803). Not until Dred Scott v. Sandford, 
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), did the Court strike down another act of Congress, but the Court 
sanctioned judicial review of, and struck down many, state actions during that time. See, e.g., 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 
(1816). Certainly "constitutional interpretation and enforcement have become [the federal 
courts'] primary role since the Civil War." Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 
227, 281·82 (1990). 
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Some might find it more than a little odd, therefore, that within the 
academy judicial review has been suffering a crisis of legitimacy for at 
least the past quarter-century. Nonetheless, scholarly work after 
scholarly work dealing with constitutional law and the Supreme Court 
begins by recounting in some fashion the problem of judicial legiti-
macy. 5 Almost inevitably this recounting is a prelude to a normative 
prescription regarding the role of courts - and particularly of the 
Supreme Court - that seeks to put the legitimacy problem to rest. 6 
Bickel certainly laid the groundwork. In The Least Dangerous 
Branch he put the problem bluntly: "The root difficulty is that judicial 
review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system."7 For Bickel, 
~nd virtually everyone who followed him, the bedrock premise of 
American political life is democracy, by which Bickel meant some sort 
of system of governance representative of the will of the people. 8 
When courts exercise the power of judicial review to overturn deci-
sions made by other branches of government, their acts appear to con-
flict with the bedrock premise of representative govemance.9 Thus, 
concluded Bickel - and for all its familiarity the startling nature of 
the conclusion cannot be avoided - "nothing ... can alter the essen-
tial reality that judicial review is a deviant institution in the American 
democracy."10 
Bickel's conclusion set him off on a search that has preoccupied all 
of us who walk in his footsteps - to define a normative theory of 
judicial review that somehow can reconcile the role of judicial review 
with its apparently undemocratic, and thus deviant, character.11 
Bickel set out to resolve the countermajoritarian difficulty by defining 
a function for courts that rested on their ability to define enduring 
5. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBrIT, CoNSTITUTIONAL FATE 3-5 (1982); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOC-
. RACY AND DISrRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 11-12 (1980); MICHAEL J. PERRY, 
THE CoNSTITUTION, THE CoURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS ix, 1-4, 9 (1982). 
6. All of the authors in the works cited supra note 5 pursue this end to a greater or lesser 
degree. 
7. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 16. 
8. See id. at 16-23; JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL PoLmCAL 
PROCESS: A FuNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 4-6 
(1980); see also ELY, supra note 5, at 5; PERRY, supra note 5, at 9-10. Some scholars seek, as I 
do, to integrate judicial review, but usually also by way of reconciling judicial review with 
majoritarian democratic concerns. See, e.g .. Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 74-77. Chemerinsky 
argues that democracy does not require pure majoritarianism and that our system was designed 
in many ways to avoid purely majoritarian outcomes. 
9. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 16-17. 
10. Id. at 18 (emphasis added). 
11. See BICKEL, supra note 2, at 23-24. For commentary on Bickel's view of judicial review, 
see Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bicke/'s Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567, 1573-
90 (1985). Kronman argues that Bickel's "deviant institution" discussion only serves as a start-
ing point for the more specific question of what role courts should perform. Id. at 1574-75. 
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values and principles that stood at risk in the immediacy of the every-
day political process but that courts, insulated from electoral politics, 
could define and protect.12 Ultimately, however, Bickel seemed to rec-
ognize his own failure to resolve the problem as he put it. 13 Since 
Bickel, others have offered numerous diverse theories in attempt after 
attempt at putting to rest the problem Bickel stated so forcefully.1 4 
This article does not seek to provide an overarching normative the-
ory of judicial review. Although captivated by the problem since my 
early exposure to it, and certainly no less interested than those who 
have preceded me in offering some solution, I have run into a stum-
bling block of insuperable difficulty. My difficulty is that the descrip-
tive starting ground for all such theories does not appear to me to 
describe accurately our constitutional system. Absent that familiar 
descriptive firmament, however, the normative task becomes an uncer-
tain one at best. 
This article argues that most normative legal scholarship regarding 
the role of judicial review rests upon a descriptively inaccurate founda-
tion. The goal of this article is to redescribe the landscape of Ameri-
can constitutionalism in a manner vastly different than most 
normative scholarship. At times this article slips across the line into 
prescription, but by and large the task is descriptive. The idea is to 
clear the way so that later normative work can proceed against the 
backdrop of a far more accurate understanding of the system of Amer-
ican constitutionalism. 
The theory of this article - if one can call a largely descriptive 
endeavor a theory - is that the process of constitutional interpreta-
tion that actually occurs does not set electorally accountable (and thus 
legitimate) government against unaccountable (and thus illegitimate) 
courts. Rather, the everyday process of constitutional interpretation 
integrates all three branches of government: executive, legislative, and 
judicial.15 Our Constitution is interpreted on a daily basis through an 
12. See BICKEL, supra note 2, at 23-33. 
13. See ELY, supra note 5, at 71 (explaining that Bickel gradually came to realize that there 
was no consensus upon which to rest a judicial value-imposition role and that members of the 
Court were simply imposing personal values (citing ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY 
OF CoNSENT 3-5 (1975) [hereinafter BICKEL, CONSENT]; ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 177 (1970) [hereinafter BICKEL, PROGRESS])). 
14. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); ELY, supra note 
5; PERRY, supra note 5. 
15. See Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A Pre-
liminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. 821, 866 (1985) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court's role must be assessed within our "dynamic and interacting and functioning 
governmental system"). 
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elaborate dialogue as to its meaning.16 All segments of society partici-
pate17 in this constitutional interpretive dialogue, but courts play their 
own unique role. Courts serve to facilitate and mold the national dia-
logue concerning the meaning of the Constitution, 18 particularly but 
not exclusively with regard to the meaning of our fundamental rights. 
This article provides a descriptive framework that is free from the 
constraints of the countermajoritarian difficulty for evaluating judicial 
activity. The article describes what courts actually do and how they 
actually operate in our constitutional system. This dialogic descrip-
tion integrates courts, rather than alienating them.19 The description 
. legitimates courts only by explaining that the never-ending attempts at 
legitimation are pointless and distract us from more practical and im-
portant questions. Like all the other segments of society, courts sim-
ply are, and will remain, participants in American political life.20 
Ironically, in fact, courts seem to participate with a good deal more 
popular approval (the views of the academy to one side) than the other 
branches of government.21 This article describes an America in which 
courts are a vital functioning part of political discourse, not some bas-
tard child standing aloof from legitimate political dialogue. 
This article proceeds in three separate parts. Parts I and II argue 
that the very premises of the countermajoritarian difficulty are faulty. 
Part I challenges the basic notion that courts are countermajoritarian. 
Part II rejects the underlying premises of the countermajoritarian ar-
16. This dialogue is, in part, similar to much of the modeling being done concerning the 
Supreme Court's and Congress' interaction in the area of statutory construction. See, e.g., Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights 
Game, 19 CAL. L. REV. 613 (1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Making the Deal 
Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modem Regulatory 
State, 8 J.L. EcoN. & ORGANIZATION 165 (1991); John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation 
of Statutes: Strategic Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 565 (1992). 
17. See BOBBITT, supra note 5, at 185 ("All constitutional actors participate in creating con-
stitutional decisions of principally expressive significance."). 
18. See Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REv. 
193, 208 (1952) (calling Supreme Court Justices "teachers in a vital national seminar"). 
19. Success, for me, would be a recasting of the way we describe and study the role of courts 
in society. The majoritarian-countermajoritarian debate is descriptively inaccurate, and it unnec-
essarily and inappropriately focuses discussion on the question of judicial legitimacy. We ought 
to view courts as equal partners in the American constitutional process, different in their own 
way, but certainly not illegitimate. Once we get beyond the majoritarian-countermajoritarian 
dichotomy we are likely to find courts in some ways more like the rest of government than we 
thought, and different in ways we failed to consider. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 41-44 (1966); Chemerinsky, supra note 
3, at 77-83. This, in turn, can only help advance our knowledge of how courts operate and free 
us to make a sensible stab at normative questions regarding how they ought to operate. 
20. Cf. Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1971, 1992 (1990) (arguing that 
minoriti~ should not be "distracted" by whether the system is fair; "[t]he process simply works 
the way it works"). 
21. See infra notes 234-35 and accompanying text. 
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gument. Part III is a redescription of the landscape of American con-
stitutionalism, one in which courts are seen as promoters of, and 
participants in, a national dialogue about the meaning of the 
Constitution. 
In Part I, I argue, contrary to Bickel and others, that courts are 
not systematically less majoritarian than the political branches of gov-
ernment. If being "majoritarian" is so important, this Part suggests, 
then courts are majoritarian too. Part I begins by establishing some 
measur~ of majoritarianism - such as polling data, the sources of 
judicial constitutional interpretation, and the process of selecting 
judges - and then examines those measures to prove that courts are 
not systematically less majoritarian than the political branches. This 
argument concededly is made with tongue partially in cheek: many 
undoubtedly would dismiss as fanciful the claim that courts are not 
less majoritarian than, say, Congress. But, aside from the powerful 
evidence to the contrary in Part I, I ultimately argue that, if the con-
clusion that courts are "majoritarian" seems troubling, perhaps it is 
because the entire concept of majoritarianism is sufficiently incoherent 
that it cannot serve as a useful basis for comparing courts to other 
governmental actors. 
Part II proceeds to the conclusion that the countermajoritarian dif-
ficulty itself is built upon faulty premises and thus fails as an accurate 
description of American constitutionalism. First, Part II argues that 
neither majoritarian government nor judicial review as we know it is 
necessarily what the Framers had in mind. Nonetheless, the two have 
matured together, checking and balancing one another, consistent 
with the Framers' broad theoretical design for our Constitution. Sec-
ond, Part II challenges two fundamental premises of the 
countermajoritarian difficulty, premises that seem to lie at the bottom 
of virtually all constitutional scholarship regarding the role of courts 
and judicial review. The first premise is that American constitutional-
ism is founded first and foremost on, to use Michael Perry's phrase, 
"electorally accountable policymaking."22 Electorally accountable 
policymaking means that the people make decisions of governance, 
either by direct vote or through electorally accountable representa-
tives. 23 The second premise is that courts, through the exercise of ju-
dicial review, depart in some significant way from the principles 
underlying the first premise and thus must be justified, or legitimated, 
by some principle that reconciles the apparently conflicting institu-
22. PERRY, supra note 5, at 4; see also ELY, supra note 5, at 4-7. 
23. PERRY, supra note 5, at 3-4. Perry draws his definition from the work of various polit-
ical' scientists and philosophers. See id. at 3-4 & n.16. 
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tions of democratic governance and judicial review.24 Part II demon-
strates that each of these premises rests on a highly contestable 
assumption. 
The premise of electorally accountable decisionmaking assumes 
there is such a thing as an identifiable majority will, when there is not. 
The premise of judicial interference assumes that judicial decisions are 
final, when they are not. Part II looks to set aside these faulty assump-
tions, replacing them with three actual facets of our constitutional sys-
tem - constituency representation, spaciousness of the constitutional 
text, and the dynamic nature of constitutional interpretation - that 
form the basis for a more accurate description of how courts actually 
operate in society. 
Part III then offers a very different description of American consti-
tutionalism, one that I believe mirrors reality far more than does dis-
cussion of the countermajoritarian difficulty. Part III relies upon the 
three facets identified in Part II to describe the actual role of judicial 
review. This role is dialogic: courts interpret the Constitution, but 
they also facilitate and mold a societywide constitutional dialogue. 
Through this societal dialogue the document takes on meaning. Part 
III describes how the dialogue operates, focusing on one particularly 
significant constitutional dialogue, the debate about abortion. Part III 
then identifies the specific role that courts play in fostering dialogue. 
Finally, Part III concludes with a discussion of the inevitability of dia-
logue and the internal systemic forces that constrain judicial behavior. 
Underlying much of the countermajoritarian difficulty is a concern 
about judicial constraint; but the normative theories that inevitably 
follow a discussion of the countermajoritarian difficulty do not, in real-
ity, constrain judges. There is constraint upon judicial behavior, how-
ever. Part III explains at some length how that constraint is inherent 
in our dialogic system, not external to it. 
Some deride the dialogic thread of some recent constitutional 
24. Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 46; Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensura-
bility in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL L. REv. 1441, 1513 (1990) ("In the received wisdom, judi-
cial review is seen as countermajoritarian because it invalidates the products of the majoritarian 
political process."). Professor Jan Deutsch identifies an imbedded tension in much of the think-
ing about courts. We do not want courts to shift with political winds, yet we express concern at 
their insulation from electoral decisionmaking. See Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and 
the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REv. 
169, 187 (1968) ("What we cannot do ... is have it both ways, simultaneously denying legiti-
macy to decisions of a politically unresponsive institution and to decisions of one that responds to 
shifts in political sentiment."). 
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scholarship.25 The notion of dialogue has been called "trendy,"26 and 
indeed it may be so. An idea is not wrong, however, simply because it 
is current. Prior attempts at resolving the countermajoritarian diffi-
culty on its own terms have obviously failed to persuade.27 Although 
one possibility is that the countermajoritarian difficulty simply is insol-
uble, another possibility is that none of the theories offered to address 
the countermajoritarian difficulty succeeds in persuading because the 
countermajoritarian difficulty and the premises supporting it do not 
rest upon an accurate portrayal of the constitutional system we actu-
ally enjoy.28 The theories often are· aspirationally useful, or instruc-
tive, but they do not mirror society. To persuade, a theory must fit the 
evidence it seeks to describe. 
Although mine is not the first work on constitutional interpreta-
tion and the role of courts to rely upon the idea of dialogue, this article 
is different in important respects. Much of the notion of dialogue dis-
cussed by others is normative and builds upon what I believe to be the 
descriptively inaccurate premises of the countermajoritarian difficulty. 
Bruce Ackerman's work provides a good example.29 Ackerman extols 
an America in which the Constitution "is the subject of an ongoing 
dialogue amongst scholars, professionals, and the people at large 
•••• " 30 But the America that Ackerman extols has a "rediscovered" 
25. See Earl M. Maltz, The Supreme Court and the Quality of Political Dialogue, S CONST. 
CoMM. 375 (1988); Robert F. Nagel, Political Pressure and Judging in Constitutional Cases, 61 
U. CoLo. L. REV. 685, 700 (1990); Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 
409, 434-37 (1990). 
26. See Nagel, supra note 25, at 700. 
27. See ROBERT F. NAGEL, CoNSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSE• 
QUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 2 (1989) (discussing a "parade of theories, each one brilliantly 
argued and each on~ profoundly unsatisfactory"). 
28. Ely's theory, for example, is normatively interesting but descriptively inaccurate. Ely 
argues that courts should defer to majoritarian decisionmaking unless judicial action is necessary 
to protect the functioning of the political process or to protect a minority group subject to preju-
dice in the political process. See ELY, supra note 5, at 102-03; John Hart Ely, Another Such 
Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World Where Courts Are No Different from 
Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REv. 833, 833 n.4 (1991). Courts obviously seem to do more than per· 
form the role Ely spells out for them, however. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992); 
cf. Lawrence G. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 893 (1990) (argu· 
ing that the Constitution "simply will not fit the discipline of the accounts commonly offered on 
its behalf"). 
Public choice theory actually presents the converse of this problem. Public choice theory 
seeks to be brutally honest about our political world, but in its brutality seems to miss some of 
the nobler - or at least more ideological - aspects of political life. See DANIEL A. FARBER & 
PHILIPP. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 23-33 (1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics 
Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. 
REV. 275, 276 (1988). 
29. See ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 5-7; see also Ackerman, supra note 3; Bruce Acker· 
man, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989). 
30. ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 5. 
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constitution set up along his own novel "dualist" theory.31 According 
to that theory, the people's voice is sovereign and can be heard in one 
of two ways: either through the operation of ordinary politics, or dur-
ing periods of extreme mobilization of the people. 32 Ackerman's view 
is that periods of extreme mobilization in effect amend the Constitu-
tion. 33 Thus, courts are justified in following the voice of the people 
over ordinary politics when - and only when - such extreme mobili-
zation occurs. In setting out his dualist theory, therefore, Ackerman 
reveals that he too is caught up in the need to legitimize courts and 
solve (or, as he says, "dis-solve")34 the countermajoritarian difficulty. 
The conclusions of this article deviate from such generally ac-
cepted theory and thought, as to both the role of constitutional courts 
and the nature of constitutional rights. Courts, as described here, do 
not stand aloof from society and declare rights. Rather, they interact 
on a daily basis with society, taking part in an interpretive dialogue. 
Rights, by the same token, do not override majority will. Rather, "the 
People" define and redefine their rights every day as the interpretive 
dialogue proceeds. 
At the close of this article, I discuss Antoine de Saint Exupery's 
Little Prince,35 who in his travels meets a king.36 What a peculiar 
king he is: "He tolerated no disobedience. He was an absolute mon-
arch. But, because he was a very good man, he made his orders rea-
sonable."37 So it is with our Supreme Court. Since Cooper v. Aaron, 38 
at least, the Court has pretended to absolute supremacy in interpreting 
the Constitution. Whatever the value of this pretense, which itself 
gives rise to the discussion of the countermajoritarian difficulty, the 
reality is quite different. Rather than declaring what the Constitution 
means and expecting obeisance, courts solicit opinions and discussion 
from the body politic as to constitutional meaning and integrate popu-
lar views into constitutional interpretation. This article is, above all 
else, about understanding the difference between the pretense and the 
reality of judicial review. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 6-7. 
33. For a description of the process of "higher lawmaking," see id. at 266-94. 
34. Ackerman, supra note 3, at 1016. 
35. ANTOINE DE SAINT ExuPERY, THE L:rrn.E PRINCE (Katherine Woods trans., 1971). 
36. Id. at 41. 
37. Id. at 42. 
38. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
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I. MAJORITARIAN COURTS? 
One thing is clear: courts are the bodies of government that seem 
to require explanation. Despite considerable scholarship questioning 
the extent to which much of our government is majoritarian or repre-
sentative, commentators continue to appear concerned that courts are 
the "deviant" institution that must be legitimated. 39 Although a great 
deal of work has been devoted in recent years to the notion that the 
legislative process is not as majoritarian as we idealize, little focus has 
been given to the other side of the equation.40 This section is devoted 
to challenging the notion that courts and judicial review are systemati-
cally less majoritarian than the "political" process. On close examina-
tion, one must question just how "countermajoritarian" courts are. 
The point of this Part is not to prove that courts are majoritarian. 
This would be a surprising conclusion, especially in light of the serious 
questions as to whether the rest of government is, strictly speaking, 
majoritarian. Rather, my more modest goal is to show that courts do 
not trump majority will, or remain unaccountable to majority senti-
ment, nearly to the extent usually depicted. Measured by a realistic 
baseline of majoritarianism, courts are relatively majoritarian. 
A. Defining Majoritarianism 
One might assume that legal commentators41 agree on precisely 
what "majoritarianism" encompasses. After all, majoritarianism lies 
39. Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 46 ("For several decades, the scholarly literature about 
judicial review has been dominated by a quest for objective constitutional principles and a con· 
viction that judicial review is a deviant institution in a democratic society."). 
40. Some exceptions (although not pursuing my dialogic theme) are Chemerinsky, supra note 
3 (arguing that courts properly are countermajoritarian); Spann, supra note 20 (questioning the 
extent to which the Court possibly could fulfill its "traditional" role of protecting minorities); 
Winter, supra note 24; Steven L. Winter, Tennessee v. Garner and the Democratic Practice of 
Judicial Review, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 679 (1986) [hereinafter Winter, Judicial 
Review]; Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 
TExAs L. REv. 1881 (1991) [hereinafter Winter, Upside/Down]. 
41. The discussion that follows draws primarily from legal scholarship. Another, and per-
haps more sophisticated, body of literature on majoritarianism is found in social science, and 
particularly political science, writing. That writing suggests an underlying problem with the 
entire structure upon which the countermajoritarian difficulty is built, the problem that the no-
tion of a majority of the people is a fiction in and of itself. See DoN HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A 
CRITIQUE OF CoNSENT THEORY (1989), and particularly id. at 206-14. I address this problem in 
Part III. Moreover, work on public choice draws heavily from the social sciences in addressing 
the other half of the countermajoritarian difficulty, asking how majoritarian the political 
branches are. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. Although footnotes throughout the 
article draw on this social science literature, my focus in defining majoritarianism is, again, legal 
scholarship. My reason for the focus is that this article is a response to the legal literature, not to 
the political scientists. Part of my point is that, just as public choice has helped us assess consti-
tutional theory regarding the political branches, we should question our assumptions regarding 
courts. 
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at the heart of the countermajoritarian difficulty. But beyond agree-
ment in the most general terms, commentators differ in their under-
standing of the countermajoritarian difficulty with judicial review in a 
system of ostensibly majoritarian governance. 
No one seems to go quite as far as Alexander Bickel in stating the 
problem. 42 Bickers concern was that courts overturned majority 
will.43 Majoritarianism was, for Bickel, the heart of democratic gov-
ernance. Without majoritarianism there was no consent, and without 
consent no legitimacy.44 Because courts interfered with the will of the 
majority,45 judicial review was a "deviant institution."46 Bickel was 
aware of all the difficulties with this argument, but he managed at bot-
tom to dismiss them and leave us with what might be called the purest 
form of the countermajoritarian difficulty.47 
Those who have followed Bickel seem unwilling to state the prob-
lem so forcefully. Most of their difficulty stems from the recognition 
that, although democracy has something to do with majority rule,48 in 
a representative system like our own majority rule is purely a question 
of degree.49 All evidence suggests the Framers of our Constitution did 
not intend to base the document upon the principle of majority rule. so 
42. Bickel's work - rather than just setting out the countermajoritarian difficulty - sought 
to solve it. Bickel did not suggest that judicial review was deviant and should be abolished. 
Rather, his goal was to justify the practice, which he did by extrapolating from the nature of 
courts as opposed to the other branches of government. Focusing in particular on the Supreme 
Court, Bickel concluded that, given its insular position, the Court could serve as an opinion 
leader, a "shaper and prophet" leading the people to higher and more enduring values. BICKEL, 
supra note 2, at 239; see also Kronman, supra note 11. 
43. See BICKEL, supra note 2, at 16-17 ("[T]he Supreme Court ... thwarts the will of repre-
sentatives of the actual people ••.. "). 
44. See id. at 20 ("[C]oherent, stable - and morally supportable - government is possible 
only on the basis of consent •... "). 
45. Id. at 16-17 ("[W]hen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act •.• it 
exercises control, not on behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it."). 
46. Id. at 18. 
47. See id. (discussing and dismissing difficulties). 
48. See Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 64 ("During this century, a definition of democracy as 
majority rule has emerged."); Jesse H. Choper, The Supreme Court and the Political Branches: 
Democratic Theory and Practice, 122 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 810, 810 (1974) ("[M]ajority rule has been 
considered the keystone of a democratic political system in both theory and practice."); see also 
ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRmcs 135 (1989) (describing strong and weak forms 
of majority rule; "virtually everyone assumes that democracy requires majority rule in the weak 
sense that support by a majority ought to be necessary to passing a law"). 
49. See Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 82 (arguing that political branches fall on a "contin-
uum" of relative majoritarianism); Choper, supra note 48, at 816 (noting that all branches of 
government have undemocratic aspects). 
50. See Ackerman, supra note 3, at 1015 (arguing that "[t]he historical truth is that the 
Constitution was a fundamentally anti-popular act" that "was not intended as a democratic char-
ter in the first place"); see also infra notes 191-201 and accompanying text (discussing Framers' 
intent). 
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Even if it was their intent, in reality the ideal seems unobtainable.51 
Thus, most commentators view the majoritarian problem as one of 
judicial interference with the actions of popularly elected bodies or 
those accountable to such bodies. 52 
It remains to explain, however, why judicial interference with 
popularly elected bodies and those accountable to them is problematic. 
What do courts lack that legislatures have? To this question there 
appears a host of answers; at the risk of inaccurate generalization a 
rough division is possible. 
One objection is substantive. The decisions that count in a democ-
racy are the ones that reflect majority will. In our system the best 
reflection of this majority will is thought to be legislative judgment.53 
If so, when courts overturn legislative judgments they are interfering 
·with the best assessment of majority will. 54 This is seen as particularly 
problematic when a judicial decision is constitutional, because consti-
tutional decisions are viewed as immune from popular overruling. 55 
The other objection is one of process. Whether or not any given 
legislative determination actually reflects majority will, democracy 
theoretically assures majority control. 56 The process for implementing 
this control is popular election. As the theory goes, legislators are sub-
ject to election, and other officials are at least subject to legislative 
51. See Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 78 ("research ••. has powerfully demonstrated that 
legislative action frequently does not reflect the sentiments of society's majority"); Larry 
Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263, 272 (1992) ("It is 
impossible to have government rule in a nation of this size under a system that requires every 
individual, or even a majority, to consent to every decision."); see also infra notes 307-08 and 
accompanying text (discussing public choice theory). 
52. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 2, at 17; Suzanna Sherry, Issue Manipulation by the Burger 
Court: Saving the Community from Itself, 10 MINN. L. REV. 611, 613 (1986) ("[W]hen the 
Court invalidates a statute, it is overturning the decision of a popularly elected body; in essence, 
it is enforcing its own will over that of the electorate."). 
53. See Ackerman, supra note 3, at 1035 ("[T]here is only one place in which the political 
will of the American people is to be found: the Congress of the United States."); Sherry, supra 
note 52, at 612 (noting that our representative democracy possesses a majoritarian structure). 
54. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 16-17; Sherry, supra note 52, at 613; Winter, supra note 24, at 
1513. 
55. Choper, supra note 48, at 811-12. See BICKEL, supra note 2, at 17 (arguing that democ-
racy means that a representative body has the power to reverse judicial decisions). The 
countermajoritarian difficulty undoubtedly is seen as most acute when courts overturn political 
decisions on constitutional grounds, the presumption being (as the cited sources suggest) that the 
judicial decision then removes the issue from the realm of political decisionmaking. In this arti-
cle I endeavor to show that such a judicial decision often has popular support or rests upon 
sources that reflect majority will. I also argue that even this notion of judicial finality is, at best, 
overstated. See infra notes 332-86 and accompanying text. 
56. See Henry S. Commager, Judicial Review and Democracy, 19 VA. Q. REv. 417, 418 
(1943) ("the one non-elective and non-removable element in the government rejects the conclu-
sions as to constitutionality arrived at by the two elective and removable branches"); Sherry, 
supra note 52, at 612 (stating that our representative democracy is majoritarian in structure). 
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control. 57 Thus, a rough chain of majority control constrains those 
who govern. 58 Judges stand in stark contrast to this model of govern-
ance. Judges, unelected and appointed for life, are unaccountable to 
the majority even though their decisions, like legislative and executive 
ones, impose rules upon the majority. 59 
From this discussion, it is possible to derive some benchmarks of 
majoritarianism against which judicial review can be measured. First, 
there is substance majoritarianism, which looks to determine whether 
judicial decisions interfere with or actually comport with majority 
rule. Substance majoritarianism in tum has two measures: results and 
sources. Result majoritarianism examines the actual results of judicial 
decisions in order to determine whether those results correspond with 
majority preferences. Because information is not always available to 
assess majority sentiment regarding judicial decisions, however, source 
majoritarianism looks to the sources of judicial decisionmaking, asking 
to what extent courts have turned to and relied upon evidence of pop-
ular will in deciding cases. 60 
Second, there is process majoritarianism. Process majoritarianism 
examines the extent to which the judiciary is accountable to majority 
57. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 19. 
58. See infra notes 295-301 and accompanying text (discussing chain of accountability). 
59. Louis M. Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1571, 1586 
(1988) ("Whatever else one believes the concept [of majoritarianism] includes; there is surely 
general agreement that it does not normally include substantive decisionmaking by officials who 
are deliberately shielded from any form of popular control."). Professor Seidman provides a 
particularly eloquent discussion of judicial accountability, demonstrating the nexus between 
source majoritarianism and process majoritarianism: 
Sometimes we say that persons are accountable when they are required to give an ac-
count of themselves - that is, to give reasons or justifications for conduct and to demon-
strate that such conduct is not the product of mere whim or caprice. If one uses the word in 
this sense, judges - at least most appellate judges much of the time - are accountable. The 
custom of judicial opinion writing is a highly developed system for providing accounts of the 
resolution of disputed questions. Indeed, when the word is used in this fashion, the main 
difficulty we face is explaining the absence of legislative, rather than judicial accountability. 
"Accountability" is also used in a second sense, however. We sometimes talk of persons 
being held accountable for their decisions - that is, being made responsible for them or 
being forced to bear the costs of a mistake. When the term is used in this fashion, the 
accountability of judges is more problematic, and it is this kind of judicial accountability 
that I will address in the remainder of this essay. 
Of course, the two meanings of the term are interrelated. One way that people are made 
accountable is by forcing them to give an account of themselves .•.. 
Id. at 1574. 
60. Source majoritarianism actually may be seen as related both to substance and to process. 
It relates to substance in that reliance on the sources that represent majority will may be intended 
to guarantee results consistent with popular preference. Reliance on sources that represent ma-
jority also may relate to accountability, however, in that one could argue that if judges do rely on 
such sources they are constrained by, and thus in a sense accountable to, the majority. Rigid 
categorization is unimportant: these definitions are useful only to the extent they organize a way 
of looking at judicial majoritarianism. I am, however, using the concept of source majoritarian-
ism more in the former sense, and I thus have included it in the discussion of substance. 
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will. As in the legislative realm, the inquiry here recognizes that all 
governmental decisions cannot actually depict majority will; thus, the 
question is whether, if the majority is unhappy with judicial decisions, 
it can influence who the judicial decisionmakers will be. 
B. Assessing Majoritarianism 
This section employs the measures of majoritarianism set out in 
the previous section to test the majoritarian nature of courts. With 
regard to substance majoritarianism, the section first examines sources 
of constitutional decisionmaking, finding that courts frequently draw 
upon evidence of majoritarian will in reaching decisions. Next, it ex-
amines polling data relating to some controversial judicial decisions in 
order to assess whether judicial results reflect majoritarian will. The 
answer is that quite often they do. Finally, the section turns to the 
question of process majoritarianism, examining whether the selection 
and accountability of judges somehow differs so significantly from that 
of other governmental officials as to account for the 
countermajoritarian label affixed to courts. The answer again turns 
out to be that there are accountability constraints on the judiciary. 
1. Substance Majoritarianism 
There are two measures of substance majoritarianism: sources and 
results. The following examination of source majoritarianism indi-
cates that courts often rely on majoritarian sources in interpreting con-
stitutional guarantees. The examination of result majoritarianism 
confirms that even the most controversial judicial decisions often enjoy 
popular support. 
a. Sources. The first task is to measure the ·sources of constitu-
tional interpretation, with an eye toward demonstrating just how 
majoritarian the sources are.61 Before tackling that task, however, a 
word regarding the essentially deferential nature of judicial review. 62 
i. An aside on the majoritarian nature of constitutional decision-
making. The entire pattern of judicial interpretation of constitutional 
rights is woven into a fabric of deference to the will of ostensibly more 
61. See Spann, supra note 20, at 1982 ("In many instances, the governing substantive princi-
ples of law themselves incorporate majoritarian values •••• "), 1984-85. 
62. See generally Richard Fallon, Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L. 
REv. (forthcoming 1993). In this piece, which follows his 1992 Sibley Lecture at Georgia Law 
School, Professor Fallon argues convincingly that rights are not conceptually independent "con-
straints on government, but are defined in terms of what powers it would be prudent or desirable 
for government to have." Id. (manuscript at 1-2). Fallon meticulously defends his thesis with 
numerous examples of rights defined with reference to government powers. 
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majoritarian branches. 63 True, a judicial decision that bucks what ap-
pears to be the trend often will receive great media and even scholarly 
attention. But the fact of the matter is that courts usually approve the 
work of legislative and executive officials. 64 
Judicial deference is built into the system of judicial review. 
Courts often make decisions about whether to trump government ac-
tion with a thumb on the side of the scale that represents the will of 
the ostensibly majoritarian branches. This is true, for example, of any 
form of tiered review, such as that used for equal protection and sub-
stantive due process claims.65 In tiered review, courts determine 
whether the challenged governmental rule or conduct passes means-
end scrutiny, which involves two or three or more levels.66 Courts 
view the vast majority of such governmental decisions through the 
prism of low-level, or rational basis, scrutiny.67 Implicit in low-level 
scrutiny is deference to the government's chosen course. 68 
63. Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 57 ("[O]ne obvious consequence of the Court's jurispru-
dence is that the government generally wins constitutional cases."); cf. Winter, supra note 24, at 
1475 ("[L]aw is nested in and entirely contingent on the wider social practices and understand-
ings that are sedimented in any culture."). Some evidence exists that the government's success 
rate has been unusually high in constitutional litigation under the Rehnquist and Burger Courts, 
but the Warren Court may simply have been aberrational in ruling against the government so 
frequently. Cf. Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 58 (presenting statistics regarding the govern-
ment's success rate under each Court). In this regard, Dean Stone has compiled some extremely 
valuable statistics. See Geoffrey R. Stone, O.T. 1983 and the Era of Aggressive Majoritarianism: 
A Court in Transition, 19 GA. L. R.Ev. 15, 16-17 (1984). Stone's point was that the Burger Court 
looked increasingly majoritarian if one studied the winners and losers in Supreme Court constitu-
tional cases. Although Stone's statistics do indeed show the Court increasingly rejecting consti-
tutional claims, those same tables also show a very limited period in which the Court actually 
decided in favor of the constitutional claimant more than 50% of the time. See id. at 16 (In chart 
showing five-year intervals, only 1963 and 1968 are periods with over 50% of the decisions favor-
ing a constitutional claim.). 
64. See Stone, supra note 63, at 16-17 (reviewing decisions of the Burger Court). 
65. See Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 73 (arguing that the Court has internalized the 
majoritarian paradigm; "[n]owhere is this internalization more clear than in the familiar 'tiered 
jurisprudence' employed in fundamental rights and equal protection cases"). 
66. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 532-33 (2d ed. 1991) (discuss-
ing tiered scrutiny in equal protection); see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (challenging Court's attempts to place equal pro-
tection cases into "two neat categories"). 
67. See Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 73 (noting that most cases are decided under low-level 
scrutiny under which "government almost always wins"). 
68. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 16-2, at 1440 (2d ed. 1988); 
Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 73; D. Don Welch, Legitimate Government Purposes and the En-
forcement of the Community's Morality, 1993 U. ILL. L. R.Ev. (forthcoming 1993) (manuscript at 
14) (discussing deferential low-level scrutiny test). The Court only extremely rarely strikes down 
government conduct when applying low-level scrutiny. See Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 73. In 
fact, in order to obtain high-level scrutiny in substantive due process cases, a litigant must con-
vince the Court that a right is "fundamental," a requirement that in turn has a majoritarian cast. 
See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986) (determining whether homosexual 
sodomy is a fundamental right by asking whether right is " 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history 
and tradition'" and examining state practices on subject); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 
U.S. 494, 503-05 (1977) (plurality opinion) (determining whether right for family members be-
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Sometimes the Court engages in balancing rather than tiered scru-
tiny. Rather than seeking to define the scope of the right in the ab-
stract, for example, the Court regularly defines the right by weighing 
the government's interests in regulation, or balancing the interests of 
the government in not recognizing the right, against the value of the 
right to the individual. 69 Although theoretically balancing need not 
favor one side of the rights-deference equation, in practice balancing 
tends to overweigh government interests. Judicial opinion after judi-
cial opinion demonstrates this, deferring to the "legitimate" or "sub-
stantial" needs of government to give content to a right. 7° Courts 
often fail to scrutinize seriously these claimed needs. 71 
Care must be taken, therefore, in jumping to conclusions of judicial 
countermajoritarianism. The following discussion takes up the task of 
demonstrating that, even when courts rule in favor of individuals in 
contexts that appear facially countermajoritarian, the courts nonethe-
less struggle to apply majoritarian sources of decision. But a necessary 
first step in this analysis recognizes that this is a relatively rare event. 
For the most part, courts defer to - indeed offer support to - the 
decisions of ostensibly majoritarian government. Courts have a built-
in mechanism to do so. 
ii. The sources of constitutional interpretation. The discussion that 
follows draws largely from U.S. Supreme Court cases interpreting the 
content of the right to trial by jury. The jury right plays a central role 
yond nuclear family to live together is fundamental by examining the "Nation's history and 
tradition" through census data, studies on family living patterns, and other evidence of American 
traditions). 
69. Fallon, supra note 62 (manuscript at 25-27). Balancing or weighing is familiar in crimi-
nal constitutional law decisions. See, e.g., Baltimore City Dept. of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 
493 U.S. 549, 555-56 (1990) (holding privilege against self-incrimination reduced in light of gov-
ernment's legitimate noncriminal regulatory needs); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 
368-76 (1976) (permitting inventory search of glove compartment; government interests in secur-
ing cars and contents outweigh intrusion of search); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 
(1967) (finding warrantless search of houses justified by exigencies of situation). Balancing is also 
prevalent in First Amendment cases. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Blee. Corp. v. Public Serv. 
Commn., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (In commercial speech cases, the Court asks, in part, whether 
government has a sufficiently substantial interest to permit regulation of speech that is not mis-
leading and concerns lawful activity.); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-51 (1978) 
(stating that government's interest in regulating airwaves may outweigh interest in broadcasting 
indecent, yet not obscene, speech); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-82 (1968) (stating 
that government's substantial interest in operation of Selective Service system may justify regula-
tion of conduct that includes "speech" and "nonspeech" elements). 
70. See supra note 69. 
71. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1983) (upholding inventory search, es-
chewing need to examine "less intrusive" means, refusing to "second-guess" police practices, and 
declining to require police to make "fine and subtle distinctions" between what can and what 
cannot be searched). See generally Barry Friedman, Trumping Rights, 27 GA. L. REV. (forth-
coming 1993) (discussing how notions of countermajoritarian difficulty cause courts, when bal-
ancing, to defer to assertions of government interests). 
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in the Bill of Rights. 72 Perhaps more important for present purposes, 
the jury cases are especially rich in their invocation of a variety of 
sources of decision. The argument does not rest solely upon the right-
to-jury cases, however; the section that follows briefly discusses the 
pervasive nature of the Court's majoritarian approach to defining con-
stitutional rights. 
The sources of judicial decision are discussed in the order that 
originalists would deem to be acceptable in judicial interpretation. 
Thus, I begin with the constitutional text, proceed to the intent of the 
Framers, and then move to increasingly less originalist sources. Ob-
serve in this ordering a wonderful irony: the very sources of interpre-
tation deemed most legitimate by originalists, textualists, and the like 
will prove the least majoritarian. Conversely, the sources deemed ille-
gitimate {and also the sources most often apparently determinative) in 
a judicial decision are the most majoritarian in nature. This discussion 
thus proceeds from least to most majoritarian sources. 
The obvious beginning point for defining the content of constitu-
tional rights is, of course, the text of the Constitution. 73 Although one 
could argue that textual reliance is majoritarian,74 the opposite argu-
ment seems more persuasive. 75 Most of the text is two hundred years 
old, and few of us alive today had any hand in changing the text to any 
significant extent. Moreover, to alter the text by formlill. amendment 
would require more than a majority of the citizenry. Reliance on the 
text of the Constitution therefore seems countermajoritarian. Perhaps 
this is why the Supreme Court often ignores the text, or at least fails to 
pay close attention to it. The jury cases provide a good example. The 
Court has struggled with the question of when a criminal defendant is 
entitled to a jury. The answer seems obvious enough from the text. 
The Sixth Amendment reads: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to ... an impartial jury .... " 76 But "all" 
72. See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1190 
(1991) ("If we seek a paradigmatic image underlying the Bill of Rights, we cannot go far wrong 
in picking the jury."). 
73. Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on Constitu-
tional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TExAs L. R.E.v. 1207, 1233 (1984) ("All constitutional 
theories are to some extent interpretivist, because all at least begin by interpreting the language of 
the written Constitution."). 
74. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L.J. 1, 6 (1971); see also Seidman, supra note 59, at 1579 ("[R]espect for the text and the inten-
tion of the framers serves [for originalists] as a functional substitute for political accountabil-
ity."); cf. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 288-89 (1977). 
75. See Seidman, supra note 59, at 1580-81. 
76. U.S. CoNST. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
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turns out not to mean all: it just means some. 77 
Reaching contratextual conclusions requires attention to sources 
beyond the text. The next obvious candidate is the Framers' intent. If 
courts do not know what the text means (or know but want to disre-
gard the text), they frequently turn to those who had a hand in draft-
ing or ratifying the words. The Framers can be cited on almost any 
subject, but such citation generally occurs at a level of generality use-
less to resolve a case.78 Thus, in Duncan v. Louisiana, 79 addressing the 
question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the 
right to jury trial, the Court stated: "The framers of the [federal and 
state] constitutions strove to create an independent judiciary but in-
sisted upon further protection against arbitrary action."80 Probably 
true enough, but those very same Framers also rejected a constitu-
tional amendment that explicitly would have applied the right to jury 
trial against the states. 81 The Framers' intent becomes increasingly 
less helpful as the question is framed with greater specificity, particu-
larly when the specificity includes conditions today that may differ 
dramatically from the time of framing. 82 Is reference to the Framers' 
intent majoritarian? To the contrary; it amounts to rule by the dead 
hand from the grave. 83 
Often the Framers failed to give us enough information to deter-
mine their intent, and so the Court turns to preconstitutional history, 
77. Having rejected the explicit language of the Constitution, the Court had to determine 
whether or not particular offenses implicated the right to jury trial. The Court has interpreted 
"crimes" and "criminal prosecutions" in Article III and the Sixth Amendment in light of the 
common law, under which petty offenses - as opposed to serious crimes - were not subject to 
jury trial requirements. See Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904); Callan v. Wilson, 127 
U.S. 540 (1888). In making such determinations, the Court has relied on several of the sources 
discussed below. See District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624-30 (1937) (relying on 
pre- and postconstitutional history, "polling," and whether the offense "so offends the public 
sense of propriety and fairness"); District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930) (charac-
terizing offense at issue as "petty" would "shock the general moral sense"). 
78. For problems with originalism generally, see DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, 
A HlsTORY OF THE AMERICAN CoN5TITUTION 376-85 (1990). On this specific point see id. at 
381-83; Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 51 
U. CHI. L. REv. 1057 (1990); cf. Chemerinsky, supra note 73, at 1241 (addressing problems with 
identifying who Framers were or what they intended). 
79. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
80. 391 U.S. at 156. 
81. See 391 U.S. at 153 n.20; see also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 92-99 (1970) (review-
ing the history of the adoption of the Sixth Amendment and concluding that "there is absolutely 
no indication in 'the intent of the framers' of an explicit decision to equate the constitutional and 
common law characteristics of the jury"). 
82. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 536-37 (1975) (noting that the justifications 
for excluding women from juries no longer exist). 
83. Chemerinsky, supra note 73, at 1228-30 ("Judges applying the framers' intent are striking 
down statutes enacted by popularly elected legislatures based on the desires of men who lived 
two centuries ago."). 
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the history of England, or the history of English-speaking peoples, 84 to 
divine the content of the right of jury trial. Thus, 'several jury cases 
recount the "frequently told" history of trial by jury, a history with 
"impressive credentials traced by many to Magna Carta."85 Like the 
Framers' intent, this appeal to history too seems countermajoritarian. 
By now a tremendous irony has presented itself. If one wants to 
show that judicial decisions are majoritarian, the constitutional text 
and its history and prehistory make for a bad start. The irony is that 
the sources discussed thus far are the very sources by which commen-
tators most concerned about the countermajoritarian nature of judicial 
decisions would have courts abide. 86 These are the sources that in the 
eyes of many properly constrain majority will. And yet these "legiti-
mate" sources seem plainly countermajoritarian. 87 
Interestingly, the Court rarely considers itself bound by the 
sources discussed thus far. The discussion regarding "all" in the text 
of the Sixth Amendment provides one example. 88 Another arises in 
the context of whether juries must number twelve and the impact of 
preconstitutional history on the question. In Williams v. Florida 89 the 
Court examined that history and, despite finding considerable evi-
dence of preconstitutional practice requiring a jury of twelve members, 
held that twelve jurors were not required. 90 Although historical prac-
tice was uniform, it was but a "historical accident."91 The number 
twelve, it turns out, was serendipity, and at best indicated "mystical or 
84. E.g., Williams, 399 U.S. at 86-99; Duncan. 391 U.S. at 151-54. One particularly wonders 
how relevant the history of "English-speaking peoples" (alone) will seem as less and less of the 
population is in fact descended from such people. 
85. Duncan, 391 U.S. 'at 151. 
86. See Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent and Economic Rights, 23 SAN 
DIEGO L. R.Ev. 823, 826 (1986) ("The only way in which the Constitution can constrain judges is 
if the judges interpret the document's words according to the intention of those who drafted, 
proposed, and ratified its provisions and its various amendments."); Edwin Meese III, Toward a 
Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 HAR.v. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 5, 10 (1988) (arguing that judges 
should construe Constitution in light only of text and original understanding). 
87. I am perfectly aware that the response of such scholars would be that sticking to these 
sources represents "legitimate" countermajoritarianism, in the sense that the courts' role is to 
enforce unequivocal constitutional commands. This response, however, presents at least two 
enormous problems. First, one might ask by what authority this countermajoritarianism is "le-
gitimate." What majority decided that rule? No one alive today was afforded the opportunity to 
sign on to the document. Second, the response rests on the notion that text, intent, and so forth 
are determinate, a notion even the Court seems to reject. See infra notes 370. 72 and accompany-
ing text. 
88. See supra note 77 and accompanying text; see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 
(1975) (discussing exclusion of women ·from juries). 
89. 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 
90. 399 U.S. at 86-103. 
91. 399 U.S. at 89. 
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superstitious insights into the significance of '12.' "92 
Things become increasingly majoritarian from this point forward. 
Let us next consider a complex of sources, all of which point to prac-
tices 'subsequent to ratification of the Constitution. Although the cate-
gories are somewhat pliable, two suggest themselves, each containing a 
host of specific sources upon which the Court relies. 
First, there is postconstitutional history. The Court apparently 
considers such evidence valuable because, "if they did X so soon after 
ratification, at the time of ratification the intent must have been X." 
Thus, while giving scant attention to the Senate's decision not to pro-
pose an amendment requiring trial by jury in the states, the Duncan 
Court gave weight to the fact that "[t]he constitutions adopted by the 
original States. guaranteed jury trial. Also, the constitution of every 
State entering the Union thereafter in one form or another protected 
the right to jury trial in criminal cases."93 This evidence is more 
majoritarian in nature, although one may question how well it stands 
the test of time. 
A close cousin to postconstitutional history is custom or practice. 
Thus, the Duncan Court continues its argument for imposing jury trial 
in criminal cases on the states: 
Jury trial continues to receive strong support. The laws of every State 
guarantee a right to jury trial in serious criminal cases; no State has dis-
pensed with it; nor are there significant movements underway to do so. 
Indeed, the three most recent state constitutional revisions . . . carefully 
preserved the right of the accused to have the judgment of a jury when 
tried for a serious crime.94 
This hardly is the language of a court rushing to impose its will on a 
resistant majority. Rather, the Court here is looking directly to major-
ity practice. 
History and practice refer to things that are measurable to some 
extent, but the Court is even more enthusiastically majoritarian when 
examining less tangible evidence. Whenever a principle presents itself 
for which the Court seems to lack hard evidence, it puts its finger on 
the American pulse. So it was in Taylor v. Louisiana, 95 in which the 
Court confronted the question whether the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments guaranteed a jury from which women had not been ex-
cluded. The Court described the "American concept" of a jury, which 
included an "established tradition" that the jury be "truly representa-
92. 399 U.S. at 88. 
93. 391 U.S. 145, 153 (1968). 
94. 391 U.S. at 154. 
95. 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
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tive of the community."96 Excluding particular groups would be "at 
war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representa-
tive government."97 Whether we see it as convincing the people or 
assessing their views, the Court is clearly attempting to tie itself to 
majority will. 
Most remarkable, perhaps, is the extremely majoritarian source to 
which the vast majority of the opinions ultimately lead. The Court 
turns time and again to a head count of states to discern the majority 
practice. My own name for this practice is polling, and it is a tech-
nique prevalent throughout constitutional cases. 98 Thus, in Duncan 
the Court concluded by assuring the states, albeit in a footnote, that its 
decision would have little impact because "most of the States have 
provisions for jury trials equal in breadth to the Sixth Amend-
ment .... " 99 In Williams v. Florida Justice Harlan, dissenting, ac-
cuses the majority of resolving the case ''based on a poll of state 
practice" saying "[t]his is a constitutional renvoi. "100 In Taylor v. 
Louisiana, the Court states that "women are qualified as jurors in all 
the States. The jury-service statutes and rules of most States do not on 
their face extend to women the type of exemption presently before the 
Court .... "101 
Polling is not the only way to assure that consensus supports .the 
Court's results. The Court similarly relies upon nationally recognized 
standards and even upon changing societal norms. Taylor stands out 
in this regard, for in deciding to invalidate Louisiana's then-existent 
96. 419 U.S. at 527. Justice Scalia's heavy use of tradition has prompted commentary on this 
aspect of constitutional interpretation. See David A. Strauss, Tradition, Precedent, and Justice 
Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1699 (1991). An excellent recent discussion of the use of tradition 
in interpreting the Constitution is Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight: A Theory of Cogni-
tive Interpretation (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Brown examines possible ra-
tionales for the use of tradition in constitutional adjudication and finds them generally wanting, 
at least to the extent tradition is deemed determinative. Rather, Brown argues, tradition plays a 
role because "[b]oth the constitutional interpreter and the document itself are creatures and cre-
ators of tradition, which they bring to the interpretative endeavor." Id. at 5. "Tradition must be 
neither defined nor deified." Id. 
97. 419 U.S. at 527 (quoting Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940)). 
98. I commend Steve Winter's excellent discussion of this majoritarian approach in Winter, 
Judicial Review, supra note 40. 
99. 391 U.S. 145, 158-59 n.30 (1968). 
100. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 122 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
101. 419 U.S. at 533 n.13; see also Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 138 (1979) (noting that 
only two states allow nonunanimous verdicts by six-member juries in trials of nonpetty offenses 
and stating that "this near-uniformjudgment of the Nation provides a useful guide in delimiting 
the line between those jury practices that are constitutionally permissible and those that are 
not"); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 70-73 (1970) (noting that almost all states provide a 
jury trial when the penalty exceeds six months and stating that "[t]his near-uniform judgment of 
the Nation furnishes us with the only objective criterion by which a line could ever be drawn -
on the basis of the possible penalty alone - between offenses that are and that are not regarded 
as 'serious' for purposes of trial by jury"). 
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rule requiring women to opt in for jury service, despite judicial ap-
proval of such a rule several years earlier, the Court went on at length 
to discuss the changing role of women in American society, complete 
with citations to federal Bureau of Labor Statistics reports. 102 
Of course, not all of the Court's bases for decision easily can be 
called majoritarian or countermajoritarian. The Court relies heavily 
on precedent (although it will abandon precedent when changing 
times require103 and will even cite precedent for abandoning prece-
dent).104 Whether or not precedent is majoritarian depends in part on 
what that precedent said. As Professor Luban recently observed, 
courts tend to cite newer precedent when possible, eliminating the 
problem of being controlled by decisions from the past.105 Similarly, 
parts of decisions built on reason or common sense present a difficult 
question - although, to the extent we presume the majority is ra-
tional, this appears to be an appeal to that majority's better 
judgment.106 
Actually, the latter point helps categorize a host of stray sources 
the Court uses in reaching decisions. The Court relies heavily in the 
jury cases upon expert opinions and experiments, for example to deter-
mine the size of a jury necessary to foster deliberation.107 The Court 
commonly will cite professionally recognized standards or statements 
102. 419 U.S. at 531-37 & n.17. 
103. See Williams, 399 U.S. at 90-93 (rejecting precedent requiring 12-person juries). A re-
cent thoughtful entry on the appropriate size of juries is George C. Thomas III & Barry S. 
Pollack, Rethinking Guilt, Juries, and Jeopardy, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1992) (arguing from an 
approach very different from the Court's that the Court's decisions on jury size are correct). 
104. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and 
Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 68, 76 (1991) (arguing that no clearly applicable precedent ever 
forced Court into a decision it did not want to reach). 
105. See David Luban, Legal Traditionalism, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1035, 1043 (1991); see also 
Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 
TEXAS L. REv. 1073 (1992). Professor Zeppos offers a comprehensive empirical study of the 
sources that courts actually rely upon in statutory construction cases. In that context precedent 
is the most dominant source of authority. Id. at 1093. A similar study in the arena of constitu· 
tional interpretation would be extremely useful. 
106. One "source"· possibly omitted from the above discussion is "reason," which some 
might also use to refer to moral philosophy. I have trouble ca11ing this a "source" of decision, 
perhaps because I agree with John Hart Ely that "reason alone can't tell you anything: it can 
only connect premises to conclusions." ELY, supra note 5, at 56. Ely goes on to argue that there 
is no more one correct moral philosophy than there is one right legal answer. Inevitably, then, a 
judge's own values become intertwined in reasoning. Whether reason is majoritarian or 
countermajoritarian ultimately will vary depending upon whether the judge's values track the 
majority's. See infra notes 185-88 and accompanying text. 
107. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 231-39 (1978) (citing empirical studies on the 
effects of jury size and stating that "[ w ]e have considered them carefully because they provide the 
only basis, besides judicial hunch, for a decision about whether smaller and smaller juries will be 
able to fulfill the purpose and functions of the Sixth Amendment"); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 
78, 101-02 (1970) (citing studies on the effects of jury size); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 
157 (1968) (citing study in defense of use of lay juries). 
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from professional organizations.108 These sources seem on their face 
neither apparently majoritarian nor countermajoritarian. When, for 
example, Hans Zeisel publishes a soon-to-be-famous study on jury be-
havior, 109 we do not necessarily have any clue what the majority might 
think of the study or his conclusions. Characterizing "expert" source$ 
requires us to understand that the majority of the people often will not 
have thought through a particular issue. When the Court is grappling 
with a technical issue unlikely to have seized clearly the interest of the 
majority, it does precisely what we idealize a legislature as doing: the 
Court turns to experts for advice. Thus, the Court reads and cites 
studies, standards, and experiments. Like a legislative committee, the 
Court engages the assumption that the majority would want a result 
based on study and reason. 
Even if one is skeptical about judicial assessment of majoritarian 
concerns, one simply cannot ignore the fact that judicial decisions are 
written for a public audience. Judicial opinions make clear that the 
Court perceives the need, if not to poll the majority, then at least to 
persuade it. The persuasion function explains the majoritarian nature 
of several aspects of the judicial opinion. Appeals to common sense 
and reason, discussed above, fit into this category. So too does fre-
quent citation to sources that are not thought of as typical judicial 
authority, such as expert analyses. 
But perhaps no part of an opinion is so easily overlooked as the 
statement of the facts. Review of the statement of facts suggests 
strongly a judicial effort to persuade a broad audience that it has 
reached the correct decision. In Duncan v. Louisiana, 110 for example, 
the Court imposed the right to trial by jury in criminal cases on the 
states; the facts underscore the need for jury review. The story in 
Duncan is about an older black cousin who seeks to intervene in a 
developing fracas between black and white youths. Duncan is ulti-
mately convicted for assault: the white youths claimed Duncan hit 
one of them, while the black youths claimed Duncan merely laid a 
hand on the victim's arm.111 Whose version is true is far from clear, 
but the Court's statement of the facts suggests to me that the Court 
108. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 141-47 (1973) (citing positions of medical and 
other professional organizations on abortion); see also LouIS FISHER, CoNSTITUTIONAL DIA-
LOGUES 23 (1988) (''The practice of citing professional journals goes back at least to Justice 
Brandeis in the 1920s."). 
109. Several jury cases rely on Zeisel's now-famous study with Harry Kalven, HARRY 
K.ALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966). See Ballew, 435 U.S. at 238; 
Williams, 399 U.S. at 101 n.49. 
110. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
111. 391 U.S. at 146-47. 
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doubts the result in the case and feels that jury factfinders chosen from 
the broad community can best avoid such dubious results (perhaps an 
overly optimistic conclusion). 
This persuasive function of opinions also comports with a 
majoritarian approach to resolving problems. Just as legislatures may 
turn to experts for information to resolve questions about which the 
majority may have no clear preference, so too the legislature may seek 
to persuade the majority of a certain course of action. Even taking 
into account current cynicism regarding the tendency of politicians 
simply to read polls to determine a course of action, 112 the more polit-
ical branches at times will inevitably lead by example. Looking to 
statements of facts, or reliance on experts, does not undermine the 
notion of judicial majoritarianism. Results are not majoritarian be-
cause reached solely with reference to majoritarian sources. Rather, 
judicial results are as likely as legislative ones to be majoritarian in 
part because they employ similar techniques for resolving questions. 
* * * 
Determining precisely why a judge, or even a court, decided a case 
in a particular fashion is, of course, extremely difficult. 113 Judicial 
opinions provide surprisingly little guidance in this inquiry. Few of 
them are models of clarity, and fewer still betray thoughtful organiza-
tion. Rather, the decisions tend to be a hodgepodge of a familiar series 
of arguments cast together in a somewhat loose form. 114 Any survey 
of the type I have engaged in is susceptible, therefore, to the claim that 
judicial opinions seldom betray the majoritarian or counter-
majoritarian nature of the true basis for judicial decision. Judicial 
opinions may be nothing more than post hoc rationalizations for judi-
cial imposition of the judges' own values. At the least, discerning 
which of the many arguments offered in an opinion proved determina-
tive generally is impossible. 
All this and more is true, and yet the preceding exercise is a telling 
one nonetheless. First, nothing said above particularly distinguishes 
courts from other governmental bodies such as legislatures. Likewise, 
112. See, e.g., Jonathan Peterson, Washing Our Hands of Politics, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 1992, 
at Al ("[T]he public's cynicism may come from the practice of modem politics, a dubious art 
that often seems driven more by opinion polls, money raising and manipulation than heartfelt 
leadership .••• "). 
113. STANLEY FlsH, DOING WHAT CoMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE 
PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 372-435 (1990); Zeppos, supra note 
105, at 1078-80; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1189 (1987) (arguing that judges and lawyers should 
employ a hierarchy of sources in addressing legal questions). 
114. See Fallon, supra note 113; Zeppos, supra note 105, at 1078-80 (discussing wide range of 
writing relied upon by courts in deciding statutory interpretation questions). 
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judicial opinions that appear to rest on majoritarian sources cannot be 
discounted simply because we are unsure which argument ultimately 
was persuasive to the court, or even if a written argument mattered to 
an individual judge at all. H the argument can be sustained on 
majoritarian terms - if it appears to respect majority will - it is 
majoritarian. At any rate, examining the sources of constitutional de-
cision makes increasingly apparent the extent to which judges seek to 
appeal to majoritarian values, if not to rely upon them entirely. 
iii. The pervasiveness of the majoritarian approach. The prior sec-
tion illustrated the wealth of judicial standards used to assess and 
write into law majoritarian preferences. The section relied heavily on 
Sixth Amendment jury trial cases, and one might object that the jury 
right by its nature seems majoritarian. Juries permit community val-
ues to play a role even in judicial decisions.115 Perhaps a more accu-
rate assessment of the majoritarian nature of judicial decisionmaking 
must confront some right with a less majoritarian cast. 
The dichotomy between the jury as a majoritarian right and other 
constitutional rights is, however, false. Although the jury right seems 
peculiarly addressed to majoritarian values, many of the rights in the 
Bill of Rights share this cast. Indeed, in a recent article Professor 
Akhi1 Amar makes just this point regarding the original intent under-
lying the Bill of Rights. Amar concludes that "[t]he essence of the Bill 
of Rights was more structural than not, and more majoritarian than 
counter."116 Amar saves for another day analysis of the extent to 
which modem interpretation has strayed from the original structural 
and somewhat majoritarian nature of the manifesto of popular limits 
on governmental power. The Bill of Rights as interpreted does differ 
from what those who framed or ratified the original constitutional 
amendments might have imagined. But it nonetheless is true - in-
deed it is evident from the text of those rights - that many of them 
were intended to be majoritarian or popular in nat~e. 
That the Court, in defining the nature of constitutional rights, 
often refers to majoritarian sources of decision should thus come as 
little surprise. As indicated earlier, many judicial decisions begin and 
end with the principle of deference to governmental decisions.117 
When deference is deemed inappropriate, the ccfurt turns to broader 
evidence of what majoritarian desire might be. This section briefly 
115. See Amar, supra note 72, at 1182-99. 
116. Id. at 1133. 
117. See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text. 
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tours some other rights in order to demonstrate the pervasiveness of 
the majoritarian approach. 
Perhaps the easiest example to illustrate my point that the 
Supreme Court defines much of the Bill of Rights from a majoritarian 
perspective118 is the Eighth Amendment. As judicially interpreted, 
the most majoritarian of all rights seems to be the Eighth Amend-
ment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.119 But the excessive 
bail provision of that same amendment also is interpreted from a 
majoritarian perspective.120 
The majoritarian approach similarly is evident in a less expected 
118. Several readers suggested that the majoritarian flavor I identify in Court decisions is 
primarily a phenomenon of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. Clearly those Courts have been 
reluctant to uphold claims of constitutional rights. See generally Sherry, supra note 52; Stone, 
supra note 63. Equally clearly this trend mirrors popular thought. See Stone, supra note 63, at 
22-23 ("The shift is due, in part, to a more general shift in our national politics and attitudes."). 
This evidence standing alone, however, supports my thesis. The remaining issue is whether the 
Court mirrored society at other times. I believe the breadth of sources I discuss suggests it did, 
although a definite answer would require an even more systematic comparison of judicial deci-
sions and popular views over time. The Court's practice, however, is generally to rule against 
claims of constitutional rights. See supra note 63 (discussing Dean Stone's study). 
119. The Court has held that punishments challenged under the clause are to be reviewed by 
applying "objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction." McCleskey 
v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). Rather 
than construing the clause solely with regard to punishments forbidden when the clause was 
ratified, the Court has utilized a "flexible and dynamic" interpretive technique, the keystone of 
which involves looking to the prevailing standards of "modem American society as a whole." 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989). The Court also has described its Eighth 
Amendment analysis as one "recogniz[ing] the 'evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.' " Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (quoting Trop 
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (Warren, C.J.)). 
The Court has used this approach to examine the constitutionality of a number of provisions 
under the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991) (holding 
that imposition of a mandatory life sentence without parole for possession of more than 650 
grams of cocaine does not violate the Eighth Amendment); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 
815 (1988) (plurality opinion) (holding that the death penalty is cruel and unusual as applied to 
an individual who was under age 16 at the time of the offense); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 
(1982) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of the death penalty upon one 
who neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take life); Coker v. Georgia, 433 
U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding that imposition of the death penalty for the rape of 
an adult woman constitutes cruel and unusual punishment). Polling generally is determinative in 
these cases. Indeed, the differing conclusions reached by majority and dissenting opinions, par-
ticularly in close cases, often tum on conflicting characterizations of the state statutes polled. See 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. at 370-71 n.2 (five-to-four decision); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 
487 U.S. at 829 n.29 (plurality opinion); 487 U.S. at 848 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Enmund v. 
Florida, 458 U.S. at 793 n.15 (five-to-four decision); cf Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 431-33 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (pointing out that, in relying on state legislation to prohibit execution 
of the insane, the majority fails to distinguish the Florida statute it invalidates from the majority 
of state statutes cited, which, like Florida's, leave insanity determinations to the executive branch 
or the prisoner's custodian). 
120. Bail is considered excessive if greater than necessary to ensure a defendant's presence at 
trial. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951). But that amount itself is considered against the norm 
of bail "usually imposed" for certain crimes. 342 U.S. at 6. But see United States v. Salemo, 481 
U.S. 739, 754 (1987) ("Nothing in the text of the Bail Clause limits permissible Government 
consideration solely to questions of flight."). 
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setting: in the guarantees of judicial process.121 Admittedly, the pri-
mary focus of the Supreme Court in cases that involve judicial process 
is upon the adversary system of justice and the system's goal of finding 
truth.122 In interpreting these guarantees, however, the Supreme 
Court frequently turns to highly majoritarian sources. In Maryland v. 
Craig, 123 for example, the Court faced the question whether the Con-
frontation Clause prohibited the state from employing a rule in a child 
abuse case that the victim witness testify outside the defendant's physi-
cal presence by one-way closed circuit television. In holding that the 
Confrontation Clause does not categorically prohibit such a rule, the 
Court analyzed what was required for "rigorous testing" of evidence 
in an "adversary proceeding."124 As part of its analysis of what the 
adversary system requires generally, the Court turned to the state's 
interest in its system.12s In validating the state's interest, the Court 
relied upon numerous expert and majoritarian sources, including the 
fact that "a significant majority of States has enacted [similar] stat-
utes,"126 a report of the Maryland-state Governor's Task Force on 
Child Abuse, 127 a brief for the American Psychological Association as 
amicus curiae, experts' opinions, and state court decisions.128 
Majoritarian sources stand at the heart of judicial interpretation of 
many other "judicial process" guarantees. The Court's double jeop-
121. See, e.g., U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI (confrontation); amend. V (double jeopardy); amend. 
VI (right to counsel). 
122. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (stating that, "in our adversary 
system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot 
be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him"); see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 
836, 845 (1990) ("The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of 
the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an 
adversary proceeding before the trier of fact."); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408-11 (1988) 
(characterizing the right to present witnesses as "an essential attribute of the adversary system" 
and balancing it against the need for procedural rules without which "[t]he adversary process 
[likewise] could not function effectively"); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 737 (1987) ("The 
right to cross-examination, protected by the Confrontation Clause, thus is essentially a 'func-
tional' right designed to promote reliability in the truth-finding functions of a criminal trial."); 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984) (holding that the standard for determining 
ineffective assistance of counsel is "whether ... the result of the particular proceeding is unrelia-
ble because of a breakdown in the adversarial process"); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 
(1972) (plurality opinion) (noting that only after indictment does a defendant need an attorney to 
contend with "our whole system of adversary criminal justice .... [and] the prosecutorial forces 
of organized society"). 
123. 497 U.S. at 840. 
124. 497 U.S. at 845. 
125. 497 U.S. at 852. 
126. 497 U.S. at 853. 
127. 497 U.S. at 854. 
128. 497 U.S. at 853-57; see also Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 57-60 (1987) (relying on 
state practices and expert opinions regarding the reliability of hypnosis); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 683, 689 (1986) (relying on "the statutory and decisional law of virtually every State in the 
Nation"). 
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ardy jurisprudence is almost completely majoritarian; a court first in-
quires whether the sentence or retrial is consistent with legislative 
intent,129 for the Double Jeopardy Clause is a bar on courts and prose-
cutors, not legislatures.130 Similarly, extension of the right to counsel 
to state proceedings in Gideon v. Wainwright 131 was premised in part 
on majoritarian arguments,132 and Gideon had the support of a great 
number of states as amici curiae.133 Subsequent to Gideon the Court 
assessed the breadth of the right to counsel with a careful eye on the 
costs associated with that right and the needs of state government.134 
The First Amendment may strike some as the most difficult 
amendment to frame from a majoritarian cast, 135 but even here we find 
several instances in which constitutional protections seem to derive 
from majoritarian sources or to take into account majoritarian prefer-
ences. The entire concept of permitting the regulation of obscenity is 
extremely majoritarian.136 Time, place, and manner regulation also 
129. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984) ("[T]he question under the Double Jeopardy 
Clause whether punishments are 'multiple' is essentially one oflegislative intent •••• "); Missouri 
v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983) ("[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent 
the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended."); see 
also Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340-42 (1981). 
130. As the court explained in Brown v. Ohio: 
Because it was designed originally to embody the protection of the common-law pleas of 
former jeopardy •.• the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy guarantee serves principally as a 
restraint on courts and prosecutors. The legislature remains free under the Double Jeopardy 
clause to define crimes and fix punishments; but once the legislature has acted courts may 
not impose more than one punishment for the same offense and prosecutors ordinarily may 
not attempt to secure that punishment in more than one trial. 
432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (citations omitted). Conversely, "[w]here ••• a legislature specifically 
authorizes cumulative punishment under two statutes ... the prosecutor may seek and the trial 
court or jury may impose cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single trial." Missouri 
v. Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368-69. 
131. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
132. For example, the Court noted that "[f]rom the very beginning, our state and national 
constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards 
designed to assure fair trials •... " Gideon, 312 U.S. at 344. 
133. Gideon, 312 U.S. at 345 (noting that 22 states supported the right to counsel in state 
criminal trials while only three states opposed). 
134. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (limiting the right to counsel to defend-
ants sentenced to actual imprisonment because "any extension would create confusion and im-
pose unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on fifty quite diverse states"); Argersinger v. 
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 n.7 (1972) (addressing and dismissing as unwarranted argument in 
concurrence that providing counsel to indigents facing imprisonment will strain state resources; 
counsel required to represent indigent misdemeanants far fewer than licensed attorneys in United 
States). 
135. In the First Amendment context, second perhaps only to small parts of equal protection 
jurisprudence, the Court most unabashedly seems to take on the majority in the name of minor-
ity rights. This is consistent with the general thrust of this article; all branches of government 
likely will be countermajoritarian in some instances. Indeed, the Court might confine its 
countermajoritarian activity to certain special cases, legitimating these with otherwise frequent 
reference to majority will. 
136. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957), overruled by Miller v. California, 
413 U.S. 15 (1973) (referring to the "universal judgment that obscenity should be restrained" and 
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contains its share of majoritarian analysis. Absent a claim that the 
speaker seeks to utilize a traditional "public forum" (itself a question 
resolved by reference to majoritarian sources), 137 the Court merely as-
sures itself that no content regulation is occurring and that the regula-
tion is "reasonable"138 - an approach highly deferential to 
government and highly majoritarian.139 
None of this suggests that all Supreme Court decisions are 
majoritarian, or even rely on majoritarian sources. The recent deci-
sions in the flag-burning cases140 appear to provide an example to the 
contrary. Although the Court relied on a number of sources to resolve 
the cases - including some that seem majoritarian 141 - evidence sug-
citing international, federal, and state prohibitions). The three-part test to determine whether 
expression constitutes obscenity asks 
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find 
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest •.. ; (b) whether the work 
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, 
artisti~political,orscientificvalue. 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (citations omitted). The first prong of the Miller test, 
calling for the application of "contemporary community standards," is patently majoritarian. In 
addition, the nature of the test as a question of fact means that majoritarian values will likely 
inform application of the test as a whole through the medium of a local jury. More recently, 
however, the Court has made clear that, unlike the inquiries under the first two prongs of the 
Miller test, the value of the work as a whole must be assessed under national and· not local 
standards. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987) ("The proper inquiry is not whether 
an ordinary member of any given community would find serious .•. value in allegedly obscene 
material, but whether a reasonable person would find such value in the material, taken as a 
whole."). One might question the degree to which a jury is capable of objectively evaluating a 
work's merit. See 481 U.S. at 504-05 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
137. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) 
(stating that traditional public fora are those that "by long tradition or governmental fiat have 
been devoted to assembly and debate."); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) ("Wherever the 
title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the 
public ...• "). 
138. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, (1989); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal 
Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 808 (1985) (''The Government's decision to restrict access 
to a nonpublic forum need only be reasonable .•.• "); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984) ("[R]easonable time, place, or manner restrictions on expres-
sion are constitutionally acceptable."). 
139. See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text (discussing majoritarian tilt to Court's 
approach to constitutional cases). Thus, in United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (plu-
rality opinion), the Court was asked to determine whether postal regulations forbidding the solic-
itation of funds on postal premises were "reasonable" time, place, and manner restrictions. The 
Court concluded they were, focusing on the recent history of such regulations, 497 U.S. at 731, a 
"common sense" analysis of disruption and delay attendant such solicitation, 497 U.S. at 732-35, 
and the postal service's "empirical" study of the impossibility of case-by-case regulation. 497 
U.S. at 735. 
140. United States v. ~ichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
141. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 408-10 (noting that no breach of the peace actually occurred 
and that the Court's opinion will not prevent states from preserving the peace); 491 U.S. at 411 
(noting that federal law permits burning the flag as a means of disposal). 
The Court, however, expressly disclaimed the relevance of majority opinion to its decision in 
Eichman: 
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gests that the decisions went against popular will. Alinost two thirds 
of society appeared to support a constitutional amendment to ban flag 
burning.142 
Even in cases such as this, however, care is required before labeling 
the result countermajoritarian. At the least, a more sophisticated view 
of majoritarianism, taldng into account the relative strength of prefer-
ences, is required. After the second flag-burning decision - striking 
down a congressional statute - there was a move in Congress to 
amend the Constitution to prohibit flag burning. The move ultimately 
died. Given the high profile of the debate, one suspects that congres-
sional action reflected the will of constituents, which in turn raises 
interesting questions about what was going on. Because proposing a 
constitutional amendment requires the assent of two thirds of the Con-
gress, one possibility is that, despite majority support for an amend-
ment, sponsors could not muster the necessary supermajority.143 
Second, the people may have initially believed flag burning outside the 
scope of constitutional protection, but changed their stance upon re-
flection and education. Thus the value of dialogue. Third, although 
many people may have disfavored constitutional protection for flag 
burning, their preference was perhaps weaker than the preference of 
those who favored constitutional protection.144 
At any rate, the Court undoubtedly will hand down 
countermajoritarian decisions some of the time: the question is, how 
We decline the Government's invitation to reassess [Johnson] in light of Congress' recent 
recognition of a purported "national consensus" favoring a prohibition on flag.burning •••• 
Even assuming such a consensus exists, any suggestion that the Government's interest in 
suppressing speech becomes more weighty as popular opposition to that speech grows is 
foreign to the First Amendment. 
496 U.S. at 31S (citations omitted). 
142. See GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1990, at 66 (1991) 
(showing that, in June of 1990, 66% favored a constitutional amendment to prohibit flag burn-
ing). Of course, this does not mean the majority necessarily disfavored the Court's result: the 
majority might have felt the Court correctly interpreted the Constitution but wanted to amend 
the Constitution for that reason. This seems unlikely, however. 
143. The vote in the House of Representatives, 254 in favor of the amendment to 177 against, 
was 34 votes short of the two-thirds majority of each house needed to approve a constitutional 
amendment. Steven A. Holmes, Amendment to Bar Flag Desecration Fails in the House, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 22, 1990, at Al. The amendment fell nine short of the necessary two thirds in the 
Senate, with 5S in favor and 42 opposed. Helen DeWar, Senate Follows House in Killing Flag 
Measure, WASH. POST, June 27, 1990, at AS. 
144. Many of the representatives whose votes helped to block passage of the amendment 
reported surprise at their constituents' apparent lack of interest. Holmes, supra note 143, at A14 
("Lawmakers and political strategists said mail and telephone calls in favor of the amendment 
were nowhere near as heavy as last year [following the Johnson decision]."); Tom Kenworthy & 
Paul Taylor, Opponents of Flag Amendment Seeking Quick Kill on House Floor. WASH. POST, 
June 19, 1990, at AS; Susan F. Rasky, For Flag Vote, History Won Over Political Risk, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 23, 1990, at A6. Of course, the decreased public clamor in favor of the amendment 
could reflect either a change in view or merely a loss of interest. 
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often?145 This abbreviated tour through parts of the Bill of Rights 
demonstrates that the Court often defines those rights from a highly 
majoritarian perspective. The Court's decisions are hardly always 
majoritarian. But employment of majoritarian sources is unquestiona-
bly common. 
b. Results. One might doubt the power of judicial use of 
majoritarian sources if courts systematically reached results contrary 
to popular will. That perception, indeed, is the basis for the 
countermajoritarian difficulty. Nonetheless, this easy assumption 
about judicial trumping of majority will may well be incorrect. Courts 
may reflect majority will more often than we think. As with legisla-
tures, precisely measuring the congruity between judicial and public 
views is difficult. Yet some measure is possible. Public opinion polls 
establish that, contrary to common thought, judicial decisions often 
garner substantial public support. A brief survey of fairly controver-
sial decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court reveals that although there 
may be sharp disagreement nationally on these issues - hence the 
controversy - a majority or a substantial plurality often favors the 
judicial outcome. 
The Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, 146 for example, is one of its 
most controversial. Before the Roe decision, in 1972, fully sixty-four 
percent of those polled agreed the decision whether to have an abor-
tion should be made solely by a woman and her physician.147 Since 
Roe, at least a plurality of those polled consistently favor the Roe re-
sult.148 Admittedly, the numbers are close. But close is not 
145. In this regard, see the opinion of Justice Kennedy, concurring in Johnson, hinting that 
the case presented a rare instance in which binding legal precepts overcame personal predilec-
tion. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420-21 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The hard fact is that some-
times we must make decisions we do not like. We make them because they are right, right in the 
sense that the law and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the result."). 
146. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
147. 1 GEORGE H. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1972-1977, at 54 (1978). 
Although I find these polling data intriguing and believe their general indication is telling, I share 
Professor Rosenberg's admonition that "[o]ne must be careful in evaluating poll results." GER-
ALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN CoURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 236 
(1991) (discussing difficulties with polling on abortion issue, including that "differences in ques-
tion wording and question order tum out to make a difference in responses"). 
148. See GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1986, at 49, 51 
(1987) (showing that, in 1974, 47% favored and 44% opposed Roe; in 1981, 45% favored and 
46% opposed Roe,· in 1983, 50% favored and 43% opposed Roe; and in 1986, 45% favored and 
45% opposed Roe); DENNIS A. GILBERT, CoMPENDIUM OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION 369-
70 (1988) (citing an ABC News/Washington Post poll showing that in 1985, 54% approved and 
38% disapproved of Roe); Louis HARius AND AssOCIATES, INC., THE HARRIS SURVEY YEAR-
BOOK OF PUBLIC OPINION 1973: A CoMPENDIUM OF CURRENT AMERICAN ATIITUDES 387 
(1976) [hereinafter HARius SURVEY] (showing that in 1973, 52% favored and 41 % opposed 
Roe). 
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countermajoritarian. The data on Brown v. Board of Education, 149 
though somewhat less clear, also show majoritarian support. Two 
Gallup polls, taken immediately after Brown, 150 show that over fifty 
percent of the population favored the result. Other polls show support 
slightly lower, but still above a plurality.151 The National Opinion Re-
search Center shows support for Brown today at ninety percent of 
those polled.152 
Of course, not all Supreme Court decisions garner majoritarian 
support, 153 any more than legislative or executive decisions do. 154 
Two areas in which controversial judicial decisions have not had 
majoritarian support, school prayer and capital punishment, actually 
confirm rather than undermine the conclusion that judicial review 
does not overrule majority preferences. The Court's decisions banning 
prayer in public schools always have been contrary to relatively sub-
stantial majoritarian will.155 What is interesting is the extent to which 
school prayer continues despite judicial approbation. As I and others 
have observed, when a majority strongly disagrees with a Supreme 
Court decision, defiance is the result. 156 With regard to the death pen-
alty, on the other hand, the Court seems to have followed the pub-
lic.157 The Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 15s essentially 
149. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
ISO. See 2 GEORGE H. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1935-1971, at 1250, 
1332-33 (1972) (showing public approval of the Brown decision of S4% in June 1954 and S6% in 
April 19SS). 
lSl. See GILBERT, supra note 148, at 266 (stating that in 1956, 49% of American public 
favored racial integration in schools); cf. Spann, supra note 20, at 2016 ("Brown and the cases 
implementing it can be understood as the product of a majoritarian coalition that advanced the 
immediate interests or racial minorities."). 
152. See GILBERT, supra note 148, at 266-67 (citing a CBS/New York Times poll for the 
proposition that 90% of Americans think "white students and black students should go to the 
same schools"). 
153. One interesting case in which a controversial decision did have majoritarian support 
was Bowers v. Hardwick. Polls suggest a majority favored the Court's result in Bowers, GALLUP, 
supra note 148, at 214 (showing that in July of 1986 Sl % approved of Bowers), but also indicate 
that prior to the AIDS epidemic the public's view might have differed. Id. at 215-16 (showing 
that coincident with growing public concern about AIDS the percentage of Americans favoring 
legalization of homosexual relations dropped dramatically from 45% in 1985 to 33% in 1987 and 
that in 1987, 37% of Americans claimed that their opinions of homosexuals had worsened as a 
result of the AIDS epidemic). 
154. See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text (discussing flag-burning cases). 
lSS. See GILBERT, supra note 148, at 312-13 (citing several polls showing substantial majori-
ties favoring prayer in public schools, ranging from 60% favoring prayer in public schools in 
general to 83% favoring voluntary silent prayers). 
156. See Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal Remedies, 65 
S. CAL. L. REv. 735, 768-71 (1992). 
157. See generally Winter, Judicial Review, supra note 40, at 686-89 (discussing Court's 
majoritarian approach to death penalty). 
158. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
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striking all state death penalty statutes, appears not to have garnered 
majority support. 159 Nonetheless, Furman was decided at a time 
when public support for the death penalty was near its lowest point 
ever.160 Furman thus kicked off an experiment - a test of American 
sentiment. As polls have increasingly showed stronger support for the 
death penalty, the Court has eliminated procedural hurdles to its 
imposition. 
The above information is neither perfect nor comprehensive. Yet, 
for all that, it is telling. Although these results do not reflect all judi-
cial decisions, they do track the decisions that give rise to the greatest 
complaints of countermajoritarian courts. As such, they suggest that, 
contrary to laments about the countermajoritarian difficulty, even con-
troversial judicial decisions often are majoritarian. 
2. Process Majoritarianism 
So far, we have seen that judicial review of ostensibly majoritarian 
decisions is extremely deferential, that judicial review itself often relies 
heavily upon majoritarian sources to determine the content of rights, 
and that polls suggest that even some of the most controversial judicial 
decisions comport with majoritarian will. All this, taken together, 
paints a picture of a judiciary far more majoritarian than generally 
described. Nonetheless, one further measure of majoritarianism has 
yet to be assessed. That is the process majoritarianism question of 
accountability. 
What distinguishes judges from other public actors in the minds of 
many is judges' lack of accountability to majoritarian concerns.161 In 
our idealized view of American constitutionalism, those who govern 
us represent us. Although representation is not a perfect mirror of 
majority will, the sense remains that executive and legislative officials 
are accountable to the electorate in ways that judges !ll"e not. But this 
is true only in the most formalistic and unanalytic of senses: on close 
examination the judiciary is much more accountable than it appears. 
159. I say appears because the polls asked about favoring the death penalty; Furman was 
about the process of imposing it. See 1 GALLUP, supra note 148, at 20, 74, 371; 2 id. at 754 
(showing majorities in favor of the death penalty for persons convicted of murder of 50% in 
March of 1972, 57% in November of 1972, 64% in 1974, and 65% in 1976); liARRis SURVEY, 
supra note 148, at 375 (showing that in April of 1973, 59% stated that they believed in the death 
penalty). 
160. Although the lowest percentage in favor of the death penalty recorded by a Gallup poll 
was 42% in 1966, compared to showings of 75% in favor in November 1985, the 50% in favor 
just prior to Furman was rather low. See GALLUP, supra note 148, at 57; GALLUP, supra note 
147, at 20. 
161. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. 
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Elections appear to be the key to the theory of accountability.162 
Because judges are not elected, they are not accountable to the electo-
rate. But both halves of this equation are debatable: some judges are 
elected, and elections do not appear to guarantee accountability. 
Many state judges, for example, are elected.163 While methods of 
election and retention may vary, a great number of judges charged 
with making constitutional decisions are nonetheless accountable to 
the electorate to some extent. Moreover, in the face of growing legisla-
tive incumbency rates, 164 it is at least worth questioning whether the 
requirement of standing for election has much at all to do with ac-
countability. The electorate increasingly feels it cannot control its 
elected officials in any meaningful sense. The numbers support the 
assertion: in many cases, despite the need to stand for election, legisla-
tors are serving every bit as long as unelected judges, and periodic 
elections do not appear to threaten this state of affairs significantly. 165 
Furthermore, the concern about legislative accountability is not 
based solely on incumbency. Rather, the entire notion of majoritarian 
representation is in a sense questionable. Legislative representatives 
make countless decisions every day, most of which are obscured from 
public view or buried in an avalanche oflegislative business.166 There 
are very few "big ticket" issues on which the electorate even could 
chart the performance of a representative and make an intelligent deci-
162. See MARK TusHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRmcAL ANALYSIS OP CoNSTITU· 
TIONAL LAW 121 (1988) ("Because legislators must seek reelection, they are more likely than 
judges to be sensitive to the ways in which laws - or the absence of laws when judges find some 
statutes unconstitutional - actually affect the lives of real people."). 
163. William K. Hall & Larry T. Aspin, What Twenty Years of Judicial Retention Elections 
Have Told Us, 70 JUDICATURE 340, 343 (1987) (noting that by 1976, 12 states used merit selec-
tion with retention elections); Norman Krivosha, In Celebration of the 50th Anniversary of Merit 
Selection, 74 JUDICATURE 128, 132 (1990) (sidebar) (noting that 33 states employ merit selection 
instead of popular election of judges). 
164. The recent drives to limit legislative terms illustrate this problem. See Charles 
Krauthammer, ••• and the Perils of Populism, WASH. Posr, Nov. 8, 1991, at A25 (citing polls 
showing 75% support for term limits among electorate; suggesting that support may collapse 
under scrutiny); A Wake-Up Call on Term Limits, CHI. TIUB., Nov. 10, 1991, at 3 (noting that 
term limitation measures graced ballot in 10 to 15 states; Washington State defeat of term limits 
was first after three victories). 
165. Richard Pierce, The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Go~·ern· 
ment, 64 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 1239, 1249 (1989) (noting that incumbents in the House ofRepresentn· 
tives enjoy a near 99% reelection rate and concluding that "House members today enjoy de facto 
tenure approaching that of judges - they are potentially removable only if their constituents 
believe they are involved in widespread illegal or unethical conduct"); see also Peter Bragdon, St. 
Germain Out, But Incumbents Still Strong, 46 CoNG. Q. 3266 (1988). 
166. Moreover, even if a legislator is following the will of her electors, low electoral partici-
pation may mean that she still may not be following the wishes of a majority of her constituents. 
See TusHNET, supra note 162, at 103 ("Participation in politics is so low as to raise questions 
about the representativeness of the process as a whole."). 
February 1993] Dialogue and Judicial Review 611 
sion at the ballot box regarding retention.167 Conversely, what "big 
ticket" issues there are may in fact distort the proces!i - single-issue 
and strongly ideological voters on issues such as abortion may over-
shadow the general question of representation.16s 
With such a low possibility for the electorate sensibly to monitor 
legislative performance, factors other than performance have over-
taken the election process, leading to the current level of incumbency. 
When performance becomes obscured, name recognition and money 
take over.169 Incumbents attract funds, which attract name recogni-
tion, and incumbency begets incumbency.170 The important point is 
that lengthening incumbency rates are a symptom of the loss of electo-
ral control, not a disease in and of themselves. Compared with the 
electoral control over legislatures, judges may not seem so relatively 
unaccountable. 
This may seem somewhat of a cheat, however. Just because one 
aspect of representative government has gone bad does not mean that 
another problem is acceptable. But even assuming that judicial ac-
countability is a "problem" (after all, the system has varied less here 
from original intent than in the case of the legislature), it still is un-
clear that the problem is anything but a myth. 
In this regard, it is profitable to examine the hardest case, that of 
the federal judiciary. Federal judges, unlike some of their state coun-
terparts, are not chosen by election,171 and they generally serve for 
many years. Surely on the federal bench, one might argue, there is an 
accountability problem. 
Before proceeding to explain why the federal judiciary is more 
majoritarian from a process perspective than we often believe, it is 
167. More than one scholar has suggested that the desire for reelection may lead legislators 
to spend their time on pork barrel legislation for their districts and on casework for their constit-
uents, rather than on addressing hard policy issues. See MORRIS P. FIORINA, CoNGRESS: KEY-
SIONE OF TIIB WASHINGTON EsrABLISHMENT 39-43 (2d ed. 1989); DAVID R. MAYHEW, 
CoNGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CoNNECTION 46-61, 81-158 (1974). 
168. "[I]n contrast to the direct or participatory democracy of the town meeting, it is inher-
ent in the system of representative government that the electorate must buy its political represen-
tation in bulk form." Choper, supra note 48, at 818. 
169. See FARBER & FluCKEY, supra note 28, at 23 ("Because voters don't know much about 
a legislator's conduct, elections may turn on financial backing, publicity, and endorsements."); 
Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 19 CoLUM. L. REv. 
847, 862-67 (1979). 
170. See supra note 165. 
171. Under the federal Constitution, the President appoints, with the advice and consent of 
the Senate, all Supreme Court Justices. U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Congress vested similar 
appointment powers in the President for federal circuit and district court judges. See U.S. 
CoNsr. art. III, § 1 (empowering Congress to establish lower courts); 28 U.S.C. § 44 (1988) 
(granting the President the power to appoint circuit court judges); 28 U.S.C. § 133 (1988) (grant-
ing the President the power to appoint district court judges). 
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worth acknowledging that most arguments offered to prove this point 
do not carry great weight. There is, for example, the option of im-
peachment.172 But the threat of impeachment is so small as to render 
it almost entirely meaningless for accountability. Likewise the possi-
bility of legislative control of federal jurisdiction;173 interesting as this 
puzzle is, with a few notable exceptions this power - if indeed it is a 
legislative power - has lain dormant for most of the nation's his-
tory.174 Finally, attempts at Court-packing are rare.m 
Somewhat more promising is the nature of judicial appointment. 
Although federal judges are not elected, they are appointed by Presi-
dents who stand for popular election. Judicial appointments often 
mirror the popular will that elected a President.176 This undoubtedly 
does assure some confluence with popular interests. Moreover, the 
confirmation process for federal judges seems designed to ensure that 
judges are in the mainstream of popular views, at least insofar as the 
legislature is representative of the mainstream, and also to "teach" 
judges what those views are.111 
Despite evidence that judges often mirror the views of the Presi-
dents that appoint them and that those views likely are consistent with 
popular will, one might respond that the aura quickly wears off: 
judges remain on the bench with no threat of removal to ensure ac-
172. The federal Constitution provides that federal judges "shall hold their Offices during 
good Behaviour." U.S. CoN~. art. III,§ 1. 
173. Article III of the federal Constitution provides that "[t]hejudicial Power of the United 
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish," U.S. CoN~. art. III, § 1, and that the Supreme Court 
"shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under 
such Regulations as the Congress shall make." Id. § 2. Scholars such as Michael Perry argue 
that "the legislative power of Congress ••. to define, and therefore to limit, the appellate jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court and the original and appellate jurisdiction of the lower federal courts" 
proteets majority rule. PERRY, supra note 5, at 128. On the debate over Congress' power to 
curtail federal jurisdiction, see Akhil R. Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article Ill· Separating 
the Tho Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985); Barry Friedman, A Different 
Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1990). 
174. See Friedman, supra note 173, at 9 ("Congress seldom has attempted a bald removal of 
federal jurisdiction . • • ."). 
175. See STONE ET AL., supra note 66, at 180-81 (discussing Court-packing plan). 
176. See Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 82 ("Presidential appointments assure that the 
Court's ideology, over time, will reflect the general sentiments of the majority in society."); Don-
ald R. Songer, Criteria for Publication of Opinions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals: Formal Rules 
Versus Empirical Reality, 73 JUDICATURE 307, 311-12 (1990) (significant evidence in study of 
unpublished decisions that appointees to U.S. Court of Appeals by Democratic presidents issue 
more liberal decisions than their Republican counterparts). 
177. See Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 82 (finding that "[t]he Senate's rejection of almost 
twenty percent of nominees for the Supreme Court in American history has served as another 
majoritarian influence"); David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and 
the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1516 (1992) (suggesting that, although commit-
ments made during confirmation hearings are not enforceable, they nonetheless will lead a Jus-
tice to "think twice" before violating them). 
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countability. This complaint, however, makes the fundamental mis-
take of assessing institutional accountability with reference to the 
selection and retention of individual institutional actors, rather look-
ing at the institution as a whole. When we discuss accountability we 
tend to compare like this: senators are elected every six years; judges 
are appointed for life; senators thus are accountable and judges are 
not. 178 But in terms of results, the accountability of the Senate- and 
the judiciary - is what is important, not that of individual members. 
Just as the Senate, rather than individual senators, makes decisions 
that affect us, so too with the judiciary. True, judges decide individual 
cases (just as senators make individually important decisions). But 
for matters of serious public moment, decisions are made by the judici-
ary as a whole. Matters of policy treated by the judiciary bubble up 
through a judicial system until agreement is reached. Really impor-
tant questions are decided not by one court, but by several - often 
many. As a question advances through tiers of review, the judicial 
bodies become less monolithic and more collegial, with individual dis-
trict judges giving way to appellate panels. Decisions depend not on 
one judge, but on a collection of "representatives." 
Viewed through the institutional prism, the judiciary is far more 
accountable than we often recognize. In my lifetime alone the judici-
ary has made two dramatic political shifts, to the political left and the 
political right.179 This level of responsiveness is rare in any legislative 
body. Perhaps more important, viewing the judiciary from an institu-
tional perspective suggests why and how it is accountable in ways that 
legislatures currently are not. Viewed from an institutional perspec-
tive, the power of presidential appointment is very important, and re-
tention accountability is far less so. The judiciary is inherently fluid in 
composition. The judiciary is a river, constantly moving. Judges are 
always leaving and new judges are always taking their places. Occa-
sionally the judiciary grows, and more room for change opens up.18o 
As vacancies occur, presidents fill them with judges whose views are at 
least somewhat similar to their own and, more important, to the views 
178. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 73, at 1212 (acknowledging that, if democracy is 
defined as a requirement that only electorally accountable officials may make decisions, then the 
Supreme Court is not a democratic institution because the Justices have lifetime appointments 
and are not directly accountable to the electorate); see also supra notes 40-43 and accompanying 
text. 
179. Compare the expansion of individual liberties under the Warren Court with their con-
striction under Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist's tenures. 
180. An example of this occurred with the Federal Judgeship Act of 1990, which created 85 
new federal district and appellate judgeships, all to be filled by the Bush administration's nomi-
nees. Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 201-206, 104 Stat. 5089, 5098-5104 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 44, 
133, 331 (Supp. 1991)). 
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of the people who elected them. 181 Thus, as the views of the electorate 
change, the change is reflected in the changing composition of the ju-
diciary. The mirroring process is, concededly, imperfect, but it is sub-
ject to continual modification. Besides, imperfection must be 
compared with the alternatives. 
Seen as an institution, the judiciary appears accountable. Natural 
attrition plays an important role in judicial accountability. 182 More-
over, results appear to favor the notion of judicial accountability. The 
character of the judiciary has changed, noticeably, to mirror shifts in 
societal attitude.183 Again, the argument is not that the judiciary is 
perfectly majoritarian or perfectly accountable. No branch of govern-
ment is. The judiciary as an institution does, however, appear respon-
sive to majoritarian will, not only with regard to substantive results, 
but from a process perspective as well. Indeed, we shall see that the 
judicial appointment process provides an important internal constraint 
on the judges in the dialogic system that we actually enjoy. 
C. The Difficulty with Majoritarianism 
Some undoubtedly will resist the characterization of courts as 
majoritarian and the propriety of understanding the rights courts de-
fine and protect as based on and subject to majority will, arguing that 
the Supreme Court's "recent" "majoritarian" streak is aberrational 
and inappropriate.184 The notion that a constitutional right is subject 
to majoritarian definition understandably seems antithetical to our 
ideal. Although this article primarily is directed to those who dwell 
on the countermajoritarian nature of the judiciary and view it as an 
argument for narrowing the scope of judicial review, some brief re-
sponse to this other group is appropriate. 
The idea of a branch of government charged with defining rights in 
aloof fashion, remote from the will and whim of popular politics, is an 
engaging one. It is a myth that could capture a nation's heart. On the 
other hand, one hardly could expect that mythic branch of govern-
181. See supra note 176. . 
182. As Bill Clinton's term began there were 100 judicial vacancies; 150 more are expected 
during his term. See Nan Aron, Clinton's First Picks for Judicial Vacancies, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 2, 
1993, at Al8. For what the comparison is worth, during the last election 122 Senate and House 
seats turned over - a very large number. Clifford Krauss, Political Mess; Vying for Committees, 
Freshmen Mimic Insiders, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1992, at All; see also Einer R. Elhauge, Does 
Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 83 n.195 (1991) 
(discussing debate about relative accountability of judges and legislators by measuring length of 
terms and likelihood of promotion; concluding differences in political accountability are "less 
than one might think"). 
183. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
184. See Chemerinsky, supra note 3; Sherry, supra note 52; Stone, supra note 63. 
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ment to exist. It is, for any number of reasons, simply inevitable that 
our rights should have a majoritarian cast. After all, judges are prod-
ucts of our society, as likely as not to impose our society's values on 
the rather broad text of the Constitution.185 This may give rise to seri-
ous objection that ours is not one monolithic society with one mono-
lithic set of values. But the point should not obscure the broad truth 
that the values that judges use to define constitutional rights will re-
flect the judges' own values.186 At some level those values are our 
values, or at least the values of some of us. Judges are products of the 
society in which they live and will turn to its values when they define 
constitutional rights. 187 Indeed, where else could they turn? 
When courts are discussed in countermajoritarian terms I often get 
a funny picture of judges as aliens come from Mars to impose Martian 
values upon an unwilling electorate. One cannot help but wonder who 
the academy believes these "countermajoritarian" outsiders are, who 
can define a set of values separate from the societal consensus. More-
over, if Martian (countermajoritarian) values are being defined, it 
seems it would take one awfully big Martian army to impose them; the 
very fact that no such force typically is needed to enforce constitu-
tional decisions suggests at least some level of approval of judicial de-
cisions. Unless constitutional rights find some level of acceptance in 
the body politic, those rights will not be enforced.188 
By the same token, I concede there is a real problem with the no-
tion that courts are majoritarian. The problem lies not, however, in 
the court-legislature dichotomy of the countermajoritarian difficulty 
- the idea that courts differ from other branches of government in 
that other branches follow majority will while courts trample upon it. 
Rather, the problem lies with the broader notion that there even is a 
majority will that legislatures mirror, and that courts trump or do not 
185. See Spann, supra note 20, at 1982 ("[J]ustices are socialized by the same majority that 
determines their fitness for judicial office .•.. "). This insight is central to much of Steve Win-
ter's excellent writing on courts and the countermajoritarian difficulty. See, e.g., Winter, supra 
note 24, at 1520-22 (discussing process of jurisgenesis in which judges, who are "situated" in 
society, probe society's norms); Winter, Upside/Down, supra note 40, at 1889 ('~udicial indepen-
dence is a matter only of formal institutional design. In a crucial[l]y important sense, however, 
judges are entirely dependent on the cultural understandings that make meaning possible"). 
Winter, however, adds a caveat: "[D]ominant conceptions are not the same thing as majority 
decisions." Id. at 1925-26. 
186. Winter, Upside/Down, supra note 40, at 1925. Professor Chemerinsky concedes this. 
Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 98-103 ("In almost all controversial cases, the decisions result 
from the Justices' value preferences."). 
187. Winter, Upside/Down, supra note 40, at 1925 ("[T]he mutual entailment of the episte-
mic and the political means that judges cannot even think without implicating the dominant 
normative assumptions that shape [our] society •.•. "). 
188. Friedman, supra note 156. 
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trump. As the next Part explains, our society is not mono- or even 
bilithic: thus, it becomes difficult to identify a "majority" whose will 
courts are trumping. The countermajoritarian difficulty simply is not 
rich enough in content to describe the complex society we are. The 
next Part takes up this real problem, which cuts to the very premises 
underlying the countermajoritarian difficulty. 
II. THE FALLACIES UNDERLYING THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN 
DIFFICULTY 
In this Part I argue that the countermajoritarian difficulty inaccu-
rately describes our constitutional system. As indicated earlier, most 
current normative theories of judicial review rest upon, accept, or seek 
to resolve the countermajoritarian difficulty. The problem is that no 
reason exists to begin a discussion of judicial review with the assump-
tions of the countermajoritarian difficulty; these assumptions are at 
best highly overstated, and at worst simply inaccurate. 
This Part's two· sections approach the inaccuracy of the 
countermajoritarian difficulty from different directions. The first sec-
tion questions why anyone would begin from the notion that our con-
stitutional system was intended to be majoritarian. To the contrary, 
the Framers were deeply troubled by such a system and designed our 
Constitution to avoid majoritarianism. This section explains how our 
Constitution has become more majoritarian, but it offers two caveats. 
First, as we shall see, the majoritarianism of our modem Constitution 
is not the same as the concept of "majoritarianism" that underlies the 
countermajoritarian difficulty. Our political process has become more 
inclusive, and even a bit more direct, but it has not in any fashion 
adopted the notion of "majority rule." Second, as popular democracy 
has been on the rise, so too has judicial review. As we shall see, these 
two elements of modem democracy have grown together, checking 
one another in a manner consistent with the Framers' original design. 
The second section challenges directly the twin assumptions of the 
countermajoritarian difficulty. The countermajoritarian difficulty as-
sumes, first, that there is a majority whose will courts are trumping 
and, second, that judicial decisions are sufficiently final to act as 
"trumps." I intend to show that neither of these assumptions is cor-
rect. While critiquing the countermajoritarian difficulty, I also seek to 
identify and describe actual aspects of our everyday constitutionalism 
that help explain the role of judicial review. In preview they are these: 
first, that popular democracy and judicial review have grown up as 
checks on one another; second, that, rather than a majoritarian gov-
ernment, we have a government of varying and shifting constituencies 
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that clamor to be heard; third, that our Constitution, rather than being 
determinate, is spacious and capable of varying interpretations; and 
finally, that judicial decisions are not final, but encourage a dynamic 
interpretation of the Constitution. All this leads to our government of 
dialogic constitutionalism, which I describe in Part III. 
A. The Framers' Constitution and Our Own 
This section contrasts our everyday Constitution with that of the 
Framers. First it illustrates that the Framers did not necessarily in-
tend either of the two aspects of our modem government that feed the 
countermajoritarian difficulty - majoritarianism and strong judicial 
review - to operate as they do.189 Second, and because of, not despite 
the dual growth of majoritarianism and judicial review, there is re-
markable adherence to the Framers' overriding theory of how the 
Constitution would operate. Writ large, the Framers' intent was to 
create a Constitution that separated and checked power. The Consti-
tution would protect liberty by requiring agreement among branches 
of government before government could regulate.190 Although the 
Framers perhaps did not intend majoritarianism and judicial review to 
operate precisely as they do, those institutions nonetheless have grown 
up one alongside the other, balancing power against power. Thus, the 
beauty of the system is that, although it has evolved considerably, its 
evolution has maintained the fundamental idea of checks and balances 
embodied in the Framers' plan. 
1. The Framers' Constitution 
The Framers would be surprised, one might speculate, at our cur-
rent obsession with majoritarianism. Their constitution was designed 
to prevent the control of government by faction, particularly by a ma-
jority faction. 191 Thus, time and again during the period of drafting 
and ratification of the Constitution, the Framers condemned the evil 
189. Speaking of the Framers' intent is a dicey business. See, e.g., BoBBITr, supra note 5, at 
9-24; Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204, 
209-17 (1980); Glenn H. Reynolds, Sex, Lies and Jurisprudence: Robert Bork, Griswold and the 
Philosophy of Original Understanding, 24 GA. L. REv. 1045, 1080 (1990). It is particularly dicey 
in the context of this discussion because, as Robert Burt observes, "the founders disagreed among 
themselves about how to design institutions so as to achieve or approach unanimity, and they did 
not resolve but rather implicitly embedded this disagreement in their constitutional scheme." 
ROBERT A. BURT, THE CoNSTITUTION IN CoNFLICT 46-47 (1992). 
190. See generally Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1513, 1531-40 (1991) (arguing that Framers intended to secure "ordered liberty" through 
structural arrangements); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. 
REv. 29, 38-45 (1985). 
191. Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 65 ("The framers' distrust of majoritarian politics is well 
documented."). 
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of faction and expressed fear of the tyranny of the majority.192 The 
concern about majority opinion was expressed most often, and per-
haps most eloquently, by Madison. Writing to Jefferson during the 
ratification period, and commenting on the need for a bill of rights, 
Madison stated: 
Repeated violations of these parchment barriers [the states' bills of 
rights] have been committed by overbearing majorities in every State .... 
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of 
oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of 
the Community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be appre-
hended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constit-
uents, but from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of 
the major number of the Constituents.193 
Although Madison was particularly strong-minded on the sub-
ject, 194 he was by no means alone. Over and over during the framing 
of the Constitution concern was expressed about factions' gaining con-
trol of the legislature or the tools of govemment.195 
While the fear of faction and majority tyranny was strongest 
among the Federalists, many anti-Federalists were of a like mind. 
True, some among the anti-Federalists supported pure democracy,196 
192. Many of the Framers were prepared to conclude that the great danger to republicanism 
was not magisterial tyranny or aristocratic dominance but majority faction, which is the majority 
"united and actuated by some common impulse or passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of 
other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." THE FEDERAL· 
IST No. 10, at 57 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). This "factious majoritarianism" 
was the focus of the Federalist perception of politics. GORDON s. WOOD, THE CREATION OF 
THE .AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 502 (1972). 
In the minds of the Framers, majority faction posed its greatest threat in the legislatures. 
Benjamin Rush commented: "In our opposition to monarchy, we forgot that the temple of tyr· 
anny has two doors. We bolted one of them by proper restraints; but we left the other open, by 
neglecting to guard against the effects of our own ignorance and licentiousness." Benjamin 
Rush, An Address (1787), quoted in FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 78, at 16. James McHenry 
agreed: "Our chief danger arises from the democratic parts of our constitutions. It is a maxim 
which I hold uncontrovertible, that the powers of government exercised by the people swallow 
up the other branches. None of the constitutions have provided sufficient checks against the 
democracy." 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoNVBNTION OF 1787, at 26-27 (Max Farrand 
ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND]. Elbridge Gerry noted that "[i]n England, the people will 
probably lose their liberty from the smallness of the proportion having a right of suffrage. Our 
danger arises from the opposite extreme: hence in Mass[achusetts], the worst men get into the 
Legislature." Id. at 132. 
193. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 1 THE CoNSTITU• 
TION AND THE SUPREME CoURT 122 (Louis H. Pollak ed., 1966). 
194. During the Federal Convention, Madison noted that, "where a majority are united by a 
common sentiment and have an opportunity, the rights of the minor party become insecure. In a 
Republican Govt. the Majority if united have always an opportunity." 1 FARRAND, supra note 
192, at 136; see also supra text accompanying note 193. 
195. See supra note 192; see also Sager, supra note 28, at 948 ("Publius, whoever happened to 
be driving, did not suffer from an excess of confidence in the body politic."). 
196. According to Gordon Wood, the populism of the anti-Federalists cannot be impugned. 
"They were true champions of the most extreme kind of democratic and egalitarian politics 
expressed in the Revolutionary era." WOOD, supra note 192, at 516. Philadelphiensis wrote, 
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and the chief focus of the anti-Federalists was government at a more 
local level, 197 where majority tyranny, although a concern, was ame-
liorated by the supposed similarity of views in the smaller body poli-
tic.198 Even so, many anti-Federalists spoke of the danger of majority 
rule.199 
Democracy was certainly on the Framers' minds and rightfully so 
given their recent experience with despotism. But they understood 
that despotism of the many could be as dangerous to government and 
to individual liberty as despotism of the few, and they designed their 
democracy to ensure against both evils.200 The Framers' fear of ma-
jority faction is evident: their constitution is countermajoritarian in 
numerous respects.201 The document clearly is founded in part on 
"America under [a government] purely democratical, would be rendered the happiest and most 
powerful nation in the universe ..•• " Essays of Philadelphiensis X, reprinted in 3 THE CoM-
PLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 99, 131 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). 
197. "[The anti-Federalists] were 'localists,' fearful of distant governmental, even representa-
tional, authority for very significant political and social reasons that in the final analysis must be 
called democratic." WOOD, supra note 192, at 520. 
198. The anti-Federalists were less likely than the Federalists to see majority faction as the 
most dangerous and likely evil of popular government. "They were inclined to think, with Pat-
rick Henry, that harm is more often done by the tyranny of the rulers than by the licentiousness 
of the people." 1 THE CoMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 196, at 40; see also 5 id. at 211-
20. Moreover, they believed in confronting any threat of licentiousness in the same way, funda-
mentally, as the threat of tyranny: by the alert public-spiritedness of the small, homogeneous, 
self-governing community. 1 id. at 40. 
199. "In general ... the Anti-Federalists acknowledged the possibility of majority faction 
and the need to guard against it .••. because it can lead to unjust deprivations of individual 
liberty." 1 THE CoMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 196, at 39-40. This was one of the 
reasons some of the anti-Federalists wanted a bill of rights. Agrippa wrote that a bill of rights 
"serves to secure the minority against the usurpation and tyranny of the majority .... [u]nbridled 
passions produce the same effect whether in a king, nobility, or a mob .•.. It is therefore as 
necessary to defend an individual against the majority in a republic[] as against the king in a 
monarchy." Letters of Agrippa XVI (Feb. 5, 1788), reprinted in 4 THE CoMPLETE ANTI-FEDER-
ALIST, supra note 196, at 111. A Maryland farmer made the point even more emphatically: 
Often the natural rights of an individual are opposed to the presumed interests or heated 
passions of a large majority of democratic government; if these rights are not clearly and 
expressly ascertained, the individual must be lost .... In such government the tyranny of 
the legislative is most to be dreaded. 
Essays by a Farmer (Feb. 15, 1788) reprinted in 5 id. at 15. At the Philadelphia Convention, both 
George Mason and Elbridge Gerry, later prominent anti-Federalists, admitted "the danger of the 
levelling spirit" flowing from "the excess of democracy" in the American republics. 1 FARRAND, 
supra note 192, at 48-49. 
200. See WOOD, supra note 192, at 598-600 (stating that the traditional colonial aversion to 
the executive and judiciary and the growing suspicions of the "unrepresentative" legislature 
guided the Framers in creating a government in which the three branches were "drawn from the 
same source •.• animated by the same principles,'' and directed to the same end - that of 
serving as the "limited agency of the sovereign people."). 
201. Indeed, as others have observed, adherence to the Constitution itself presents a difficult 
countermajoritarian problem. One of the most perplexing questions for constitutional theorists is 
the legitimacy of the Constitution itself. Often the Constitution is referred to as legitimate be-
cause it is founded on majority ratification. But even if one puts aside problems with this theory 
at the time of ratification, compare Ackerman, supra note 3, at 1013, 1017-23, 1058; John Leubs-
dorf, Deconstructing the Constitution, 40 STAN. L. R.Ev. 181, 187 (1987) with Akhil R. Amar, 
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permitting and expecting the populace to speak through its elected 
representatives. By the same token, the Constitution is shot through 
with provisions that in effect might defeat the decisions of a popular 
majority. To call the Constitution majoritarian, therefore, simply is 
inaccurate. Such a characterization certainly would have surprised 
the Framers. If one can imagine sitting down with some of the Fram-
ers and describing current notions of majoritarianism, one must imag-
ine hearing: "This is not the Constitution we gave you." 
2. The Rise of Majoritarianism ... 
Just because the Constitution the Framers gave us is not 
majoritarian does not mean our Constitution cannot be 
majoritarian. 202 One of the important lessons addressed here is that 
constitutions must change and grow to survive.203 Ours certainly 
has. 204 In fact, popular democracy has been on the rise since the time 
the Framers finished their work.205 The Framers' plan was for a 
highly representative democracy, with strict limitations on those who 
had a voice. 206 Our democracy has become much more inclusive and 
direct, with participatory rights accorded to a greater portion of the 
Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Anicle V, SS U. CHI. L. REv. 1043, 
1047-48 (1988), there is no reason to assume majority assent today. See Ackennan, supra note 3, 
at 1017, 1058; Richard S. Kay, The Illegality of the Constitution, 4 CoNST. CoMM. 57 (1987). 
Thus, even at the core level of constitutional legitimacy, a serious question exists whether majori-
tarianism is the governing principle. 
202. See ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 67 (discussing modern selection of presidency; 
"[w]hatever else is obscure about this modern system, one thing should be clear: it exists despite 
the contrary intentions of the Philadelphia Convention"). 
203. See infra notes 373-75 and accompanying text. 
204. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., & John Ferejohn, The Anicle I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. 
L.J. 523, 533 (1992) (''The world of the Framers is not our world," given the development of the 
modern administrative state.). 
205. Robert Burt makes just this point. See BURT, supra note 189, at 35-36; see also Chemer· 
insky, supra note 3, at 67-68 (stating that, as belief in natural law waned, majoritarian concept of 
democracy expanded). Chemerinsky argues that during the Progressive Era democracy began to 
become an end in itself. Id. at 67. 
206. Madison called representation - "the delegation of the Government • • . to a small 
number of citizens elected by the rest" - "the pivot" on which the unique American system 
moved. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 62 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); Wooo, 
supra note 192, at 596-97. The franchise, however, was limited to a relatively small number of 
people. Though the requirements varied somewhat, the states maintained that voters had to be 
free white male citizens, id. at 167-70, and "all of the states required some sort of tax-paying or 
property qualification for the suffrage." Id. at 168. The point was to ensure that only those free 
from influence and knowledgeable of the consequence of their trust could vote. Id. at 167-70. 
The Framers did not undertake the difficult and controversial task of setting unifonn standards 
for the suffrage because "the qualifications for voting so differed in the various states that [doing 
so] .•• might have disenfranchised previously qualified citizens in some states." FARBER & 
SHERRY, supra note 78, at 142. The Framers did agree, though, that the rule of representation 
for the legislature would be according to "the whole number of white and other free citizens and 
inhabitants" and "three-fifths of all other persons ..• except Indians not paying taxes." Id. at 
121; see U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 2; see also BURT, supra note 189, at 50: "[T]he founders did not 
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populace. In this specific sense our government has become more 
majoritarian. 
Perhaps the most significant structural move toward this majori-
tarianism in the Constitution was the Seventeenth Amendment, pro-
viding for direct election of senators. 207 Likewise, the franchise 
explicitly has been extended to broad segments of society. 208 The Fif-
teenth Amendment forbids denying the franchise based upon race.209 
The Nineteenth Amendment extended the franchise to women.210 
The Twenty-sixth Amendment extended the franchise to those citizens 
eighteen years and older.211 In addition, the Twenty-fourth Amend-
ment abolished poll taxes,212 and the Twenty-third Amendment gives 
citizens of the District of Columbia electors for (at least) the election 
of President of the United States.213 In fact, seven of the fourteen 
amendments enacted since the Civil War explicitly extend the 
franchise or remove obstacles to its exercise. Thus, the majoritarian 
strain has grown increasingly prominent in our Constitution. 
Not only the Constitution has become more majoritarian, how-
ever; so has the society that document governs. Indeed, it is some-
times difficult to tell which transformation has caused the other. We 
have .become a society enamored of the accouterments of popular gov-
ernance. We revel in national polls; every day we devour media re-
ports on what the polls say we think.214 Our presidential candidates 
promise national electronic town meetings.215 We vote with television 
and telephone on 1-900 numbers,216 and even if the votes do not count 
expect that the direct commandatory voice of the sovereign People would be heard very often in 
the daily affairs of governance." 
207. U.S. CoNST. amend. XVII, cl. 1; see Stewart A. Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh 
Amendment, 48 U. CoLO. L. REV. 139, 178 (1977) (describing the Seventeenth Amendment as a 
"blow to formal federalism"). 
208. See ELY, supra note 5, at 7. 
209. U.S. CoNST. amend. XV,§ 1. For a discussion of the historical background, enactment, 
and ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, see PAGE SMITH, THE CoNSTITUTION: A Docu-
MENTARY AND NARRATIVE HISTORY 452-53 (1978). 
210. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIX, cl. 1. 
211. U.S. CoNST. amend. XXVI, § 1. For a discussion of the extension of majority rule 
through Amendments Fifteen, Seventeen, Nineteen, and Twenty-six, see FARBER & SHERRY, 
supra note 78, at 339-42. 
212. U.S. CoNST. amend. XXIV, § 1. 
213. U.S. CoNST. amend. XXIII, § 1. 
214. Andrew Mollison, Keeping You Up to Date: Too Much Power for Polls?, ATLANTA J. & 
CoNST., May 26, 1992, at A6 (stating that polls are more important than ever to voters). 
215. See Edward Epstein, Perot's Go-It-Alone Candidacy Breaks with History, S.F. CHRON., 
June 8, 1992, at AS (detailing Ross Perot's promise of national electronic town meetings to 
resolve important policy matters). 
216. See, e.g., Susan Gilmore, Polling Firm's Abortion Flier Hit, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 10, 
1991, at B4 (describing poll in which Seattle residents call a 1-900 number and vote on the 
abortion issue). Nova Scotia liberals can now vote for a party leader by calling a 1-900 number. 
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in a formal sense they surely have their impact. One of the primary 
complaints of modem politics, although it may challenge an inevitabil-
ity, is that politicians fail to lead and simply follow the polls.217 We 
have become a people accustomed to speaking our minds, and having 
our opinions heard. 
Ironically, one great engine of majoritarianism, both in reality and 
in rhetoric, may have been the Supreme Court. Such was the view of 
Alexander Bickel, and there is much truth in what he said.218 Bickel 
believed that the Court bad created a "leveling" majoritarian furor by 
a number of its decisions, most notably the "one person, one vote" 
rule of the apportionment cases.219 Bickel decried this "[p]opulist ma-
joritarianism, not some complex checked and balanced Madisonian 
adjustment among countervailing groups and factions .... "220 He 
warned that "[m]ajoritarianism is heady stuff. . . . The tide could well 
engulf the Court itself also."221 
3. . .. And of Judicial Review 
But Bickel was wrong on that final point. In reality the Court of 
today bas a stature and importance in the public eye perhaps unparal-
leled during any other time in history. 
The judicial power was central to the Framers' Constitution. 
Scholars debate the extent to which judicial review was intended to 
limit government, and on this as on so many matters the minds of the 
Framers undoubtedly differed. Nonetheless, the original Constitution 
had three great articles, creating not two but three branches of govern-
ment, one of which was the judiciary. Thus, Jefferson argued to 
Madison that the Bill of Rights would be another quiver in the judici-
ary's bow: "In the arguments in favor of a declaration of rights, you 
omit one which has great weight with me, the legal check which it 
puts into the hands of the judiciary."222 
Mark Blanchard, Canada's Home Voting Network: ''Dial-a-Leader" Gives New Meaning to Vot-
ing the Party Line, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, Sept. 1992, available in LEXIS, CMPGN Li-
brary, C & E File. 
217. See Dan Baiz & Richard Morin, A Tide of Pessimism and Political Powerlessness Rises, 
WASH. Posr, Nov. 3, 1991, at Al, A16. 
218. Ely built a theory upon this notion. Ely argues that a primary role of the Supreme 
Court is ensuring the free operation ofmajoritarian politics. See ELY, supra note 5, at 105-34. 
219. See BICKEL, PROGRESS, supra note 13, at 108-09. 
220. Id. at 110. 
221. Id. at 111-12. 
222. Thomas Jefferson's reply to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), in THE CoNsrJTUTION 
AND TIIE SUPREME CoURT, supra note 193, at 121-22. As Robert Burt points out, Madison was 
not a particular fan of judicial review. See BURT, supra note 189, at 64. Yet, as Burt also makes 
clear, Madison's view of how judicial review should operate was similar to the dialogue I describe 
here (and to Burt's own view): "His first principle was that constitutional interpretation takes 
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Nonetheless, the Court in its early days bore little resemblance to 
the Court of today. Not only did the Framers call the Supreme Court 
the "least dangerous" branch, 223 but its prestige seemed to mirror this 
assessment of its power. It was not easy to get people to serve as 
Supreme Court Justices.224 The very reason Marbury v. Madison is 
viewed as such a coup is that the fundamental power of the third 
branch-the exercise of judicial review-was not a given.225 Today 
few scholars seriously argue that judicial review by the Court of con-
gressional decisions was unintended, and fewer still (if any) argue that 
Marbury was incorrect.226 But at that time, the matter was not free 
from doubt. 
The rise of the Supreme Court and of the judiciary as a whole rep-
resents a gradual accretion of power. Perhaps one measure of that 
power is the frequency with which the Court overruled the national 
legislature and the legislatures of the states, measured against popular 
acceptance of such overruling. The next overruling of Congress after 
Marbury was some fifty years later, in the infamous Dred Scott deci-
sion. 227 Supreme Court decisions overruling state legislatures reached . 
their greatest frequency during the Lochner era, 228 yet another low 
place over time, not in a single instant at a fixed and privileged institutional locus of interpreta-
tive authority." Id. at 68. For my description of why judicial review is dynamic, not static or 
final, see infra notes 332-86 and accompanying text. 
223. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 522 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
Hamilton reasoned that the judiciary, as opposed to the other branches of government, 
has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of 
the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to 
have neither Force nor Will but merely judgment ..•• 
This simple view of the matter •.. proves incontestably that the judiciary is beyond 
comparison the weakest of the three departments of power . . • . It equally proves, that .•. 
the general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter ... so long as 
the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislature and executive. 
Id. at 523. 
224. See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 
1, 3. 
225. ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 63 ("[O]nly during the middle republic did the Court 
begin to review the constitutionality of national legislation on a regular basis •..• "). 
226. See infra note 237. 
227. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (invalidating federal statute that 
prohibited slavery in the Louisiana Territory). 
228. From the decision in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), to the mid-1930s, the 
Court relied on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate approxi-
mately two hundred state economic regulations. The decisions centered primarily on labor legis-
lation, the regulation of prices, and restrictions on entry into business. See, e.g., New State Ice 
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (invalidating law prohibiting any person to manufacture 
ice without first obtaining a certificate of convenience and necessity); Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 
273 U.S. 418 (1927) (invalidating law regulating price of theater tickets), overruled by Olsen v. 
Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating 
law establishing minimum wages for women), overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 
U.S. 379 (1937); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), and Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 
(1908) (invalidating, respectively, state and federal legislation forbidding employers to require 
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point in the Court's history.229 Siinilar overruling of national deci-
sions arguably sealed the fate of the New Deal Court.230 The fact that 
overruling of national and state legislative decisions once marked the 
low points for judicial review simply may be coincidence. A decision 
similar to Dred Scott may have hurt the Court whether or not a con-
gressional statute was involved. But today's Court seems to be able to 
overrule both Congress and the state legislatures with relative 
impunity.231 
Bickel and his contemporaries were sure that judicial activism 
would sink the Court.232 For them, judicial legitimacy was a fragile 
reed that required tending and nurturing. They believed judicial inter-
ference with political decisions might spell the end of popular adher-
ence to judicial decisions. 233 If anything, however, the opposite seems 
to be true. 234 Opinion polls suggest that the public perceives the Court 
more favorably than it perceives the other two branches of govem-
ment. 235 The public takes interest in Supreme Court decisions and 
appears widely to accept the role of the judiciary in resolving constitu-
tional disputes.236 In this context, judicial overruling of national and 
employees to agree not to join a union), overruled by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 
(1941). 
229. See GERALD GUNTHER, CoNS11TUTJONAL LAW 453-54 (11th ed. 1985). 
230. The Hughes Court invalidated several New Deal measures as exceeding the power given 
Congress in the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) 
(striking down the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, which established price and labor 
rules for coal mines); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (striking down 
the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 
U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating the National Industry Recovery Act's labor rules for the New York 
poultry market). Such activity led to Franklin Roosevelt's Court-packing plan. GUNTHER, 
supra note 229, at 128-29. 
231. I stress relative. See Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public 
Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. Sci. 635, 660 (1992) ("[T]he bolder the Court is 
in confronting the policies of Congress, the less confidence citizens bestow it as an institution."). 
232. See Chemerinsky, supra note 73, at 1254 nn.303-04, 306. 
233. See Carter, supra note 15, at 843 (describing this argument: "[T]he ultimate brake on 
the courts is the judges' fear that if they go too far they will be ignored"). 
234. See Chemerinsky, supra note 73, at 1254-55 & n.309 (concluding that the Court has 
retained its legitimacy and increased its power despite its exercise of judicial review). See gener-
ally Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral 
Principles. 96 HARV. L. REv. 781, 807 (1983) (describing two distinct meanings of judicial 
legitimacy). 
235. See THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 138-42 
(1989) (stating polls consistently show Supreme Court outscoring Congress and the Executive 
branch with regard to public confidence); Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 231, at 640-41, 659 
(noting public's support for Court not conditioned on basic support for its policies); see also 
Philip B. Kurland, Curia Regis: Some Comments on the Divine Right of Kings and Courts "To 
Say What the Law Is," 23 .ARiz. L. REv. 581, 583 (1981) ("I venture that no governmental body 
in history has maintained so unblemished an escutcheon, free of venality, and personal vindic-
tiveness, as the Supreme Court of the United States."). 
236. Professor Rosenberg obviously disputes the extent of public attention to Supreme Court 
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state legislative decisions is relatively frequent and has become an ac-
cepted fact of American governance. 231 
None of which is to say that this state of affairs is permanent or 
unquestioned. Critics of the Court, among them a former Attorney 
General of the United States, regularly attack the Court for creating 
rights rather than simply "finding" those rights the Framers put into 
the Constitution.238 Moreover, the Court has been an issue in the last 
several elections, and the abortion debate suggests the trend is on the 
rise. If the Court ever deviates significantly from the public's views, it 
may face substantial opposition again. 
The present point, however, is that the role of judicial review has 
grown alongside the rise of majoritarianism. Neither of these elements 
held primacy in the early days of the Framers' Constitution. But like 
majoritarianism, judicial review has become a strong and established 
aspect of modern constitutionalism. 239 
4. Reprise: The Framers' Constitution 
The Framers created a system of government.240 They spelled out 
many particulars but left others to history. Over time the Constitution 
has changed. History has filled in some of the gaps, and even many of 
the particulars operate differently than in the Framers' time. Witness, 
for example, the growth of the commerce power. Despite these 
changes, the most enduring legacy of the Framers has been the theory 
of their Constitution. While particulars have changed, the Framers' 
theory is what holds our Constitution together and what ties our Con-
stitution to theirs. The Framers' theory was that a constitution must 
divide and balance power to protect liberty.241 The Framers imple-
decisions. See ROSENBERG, supra note 147, at 229-35 (suggesting controversy about abortion 
actually lower after Roe than before it). 
237. See Carter, supra note 15, at 844 ("For better or worse, generations of Americans have 
been socialized into accepting the interpretive authority of the legal community."); Chemerinsky, 
supra note 73, at 1209 ("None of the critics of the Supreme Court's activism suggests that all 
judicial review should be eliminated."); Winter, Upside/Down, supra note 40, at 1924 (The ideas 
that ·~udicial review is undemocratic" and "should stop" are "unthinkable."). 
238. See Edwin Meese III, Address to the D.C. Chapter of the Federalist Society Lawyers 
Division (Nov. 15, 1985), in Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 23, 28 (1985); 
see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE PoLmCAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW 143 (1990). 
239. See Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 36 (1979); 
Winter, Upside/Down, supra note 40, at 1923 (noting that no one in the legal academy is ready to 
give up on judicial review or declare Marbury wrongly decided). 
240. See Carter, supra note 15, at 847. 
241. See Brown, supra note 190, at 1534 ("separation of powers aimed at the interconnected 
goals of preventing tyranny and protecting liberty"). The Framers may have harbored a secon-
dary concern for greater efficiency in government, but clearly the doctrine of separation of pow-
ers was adopted to "preclude the exercise of arbitrary power." Id. at 1534; see also FARBER & 
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mented that theory by creating a government of separated powers.242 
Accompanying the separated powers was a complicated system of 
checks and balances.243 The magic of the Constitution is that the in-
terlocking, interdependent, interwoven, and mutually checking bodies 
of government could for two hundred years counterbalance one an-
other, preserving the Union and with it liberty.244 
Many of the forces the Framers thought would serve as checks and 
balances have not operated precisely as intended. For example, the 
Framers envisioned that Congress would be the strongest branch, and 
they set up elaborate checks upon it.245 Either because the Framers 
overestimated Congress' power or because their checks worked too 
well, the Executive has been, at least in the past quarter century, the 
strongest of our elements of governance. As power has shifted to the 
Executive, Congress has struggled to develop new ways to balance that 
power.246 But the Framers' broad theoretical view has continued to 
SHERRY, supra note 78, at 51-145, 175-218 (giving an overview of the Framers' proposals and 
debates on the powers granted to each branch and the limitations imposed on each in order to 
protect liberty and avoid usurpation of power, especially by the legislature); Spann, supra note 
20, at 1975 & n.11 (stating that Framers sought to establish government that would check incli-
nation of factions to benefit themselves). 
242. ''The principle of separated powers is a prominent feature of the body of the Constitu-
tion, dictating the form, function, and structure of a government of limited powers." Brown, 
supra note 190, at 1513; see Woon, supra note 192, at 604 (stating Framers expanded and exalted 
the "libertarian doctrine of separation of powers" to the "foremost position in their constitution-
alism"). Actually, the Framers' system of dividing and checking power is much more elaborate 
than just separation of powers along the horizontal of the national government. The Constitu-
tion also established the vertical division of federalism and numerous other structural checks. 
See Sunstein, supra note 190, at 44. 
243. "[T]he Constitution had 'so contriv[ed] the interior structure of government ••• that its 
several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in 
their proper places.' " BURT, supra note 189, at 60 (quoting Madison in THE FEDERALIST No. 
51); see also Brown, supra note 190, at 1531-32. 
244. See BOBBITT, supra note 5, at 182 (suggesting that a test for whether a Constitution 
works is whether it encourages "collaboration and harmony" among constitutional institutions). 
245. During the discussion over whether the national judiciary should be associated with the 
executive in the revisionary power, Madison noted: 
It was much more to be apprehended that notwithstanding this co-operation of the two 
departments, the Legislature would still be an overmatch for them. Experience in all the 
States had evinced a powerful tendency in the Legislature to absorb all power into its vortex. 
This was the real source of danger to the American Constitution; & suggested the necessity 
of giving every defensive authority to the other departments that was consistent with repub-
lican principles. 
2 FARRAND, supra note 192, at 74; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison); THE 
FEDERALIST No. 49 (James Madison). 
This sentiment was also expressed during the debates over the Senate's impeachment power. 
Charles Pinckney did not approve of the measure because it would render the President "too 
dependent on the Legislature. If he opposes a favorite law, the two Houses will combine 
ag[ain]st him, and under the influence of heat and faction throw him out of office." 2 FARRAND, 
supra note 192, at 551. Though Gouverneur Morris thought the Senate could be trusted, he 
called legislative tyranny "the great danger to be apprehended.'' Id. 
246. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 960 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (discussing 
enactment of legislative veto for this purpose). Bill Eskridge and John Ferejohn offer a strong 
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operate, despite deviation from the way they intended the particulars 
to function. The system of checks and balances simply has taken on a 
life of its own.247 
The lesson here is that majoritarianism and judicial review have 
grown to be precisely the kind of checks and balances the Framers 
favored. These two forces, much changed since the framing, nonethe-
less have grown up together, both fostering and checking one an-
other. 248 As majoritarianism and judicial review have achieved some 
primacy, they have fit into the mold of the Framers' original design 
and reinforced the design in the face of change. 
5. All Checks and No Balances? 
We should therefore not try to legitimize courts in a manner differ-
ent than the other branches of government, for they simply are a fact 
of our constitutional system; rather, we should study the more practi-
cal question of how judicial review actually operates as a check and 
balance.249 Many of the checks and balances in the Constitution are 
fairly specific, with power checking power; for example, the Presi-
dent's veto power is set out quite clearly, as is Congress' override 
power.250 Judicial review appears problematic to many because they 
believe that, once a court reaches a constitutional decision, that deci-
sion flat-out trumps majority action. When the Supreme Court finds 
critique of the Supreme Court's decisions regarding the lawmaking process. They argue that the 
Court has failed to adjust originalist views for the emergence of the modern administrative state 
and that the individual decisions of the Court frustrate, rather than further, the Framers' inten-
tions regarding checks and balances in the lawmaking process. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra 
note 204. In essence, Eskridge and Ferejohn argue that the Court should permit the develop-
ment of interbranch structures that fulfill the underlying intentions of Article I, § 7. The shift in 
interpretation they champion would be similar to the evolution of majoritarianism and judicial 
review as checks and balances. See also Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 16, at 167 (discussing 
legislative veto and need to "restor[e] something of the original constitutional balance between 
presidential and congressional lawmaking powers"). 
247. "We do well to remain attached to institutions that are often the products more of 
accident than of design, or that no longer answer to their original plans, but that challenge our 
resilience and inventiveness in bending old arrangements to present purposes with no outward 
change." ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, REFORM AND CONTINUITY: THE ELECTORAL CoLLEGE, 
THE CoNVENTION, AND THE PARTY SYSTEM 3 (1971); see also Kramer, supra note 51, at 285 
("Indeed, the best reading of the framers' intent with respect to separation of powers may be that 
they wanted to see how things went while retaining enough flexibility to develop appropriate 
institutional responses."). 
248. Spann, supra note 20, at 1978 (arguing that, as "structural safeguards diminished in 
importance, the significance of Supreme Court protection increased"); see also BURT, supra note 
189, at 29 (claiming that to call judicial review "deviant" is misleading; rather, it is "logical 
response" to contradiction "between majority rule and equal self-determination"). 
249. Carter, supra note 15, at 865 (asserting that theorists should focus on system of checks 
and balances, and the role of the Court in that context, rather than on the Court's interpretive 
norms). 
250. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
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merit to a plaintiff's claim of constitutional right, for example, that 
seems to end the matter: 1-0, Court wins. Isn't this all check and no 
balance?251 
Discussion of the countermajoritarian difficulty arises from this ap-
parent constitutional imbalance. Judicial review can be and is used to 
check the actions of wayward majorities. But exactly how one checks 
the judges is unclear. Judges therefore are seen as possessing a huge 
amount of power, and the rules for exercising that power are 
uncertain. 
The typical scholarly response is to offer a normative theory of 
constitutionalism and judicial review that contains a set of rules 
designed to constrain judges. Such constraint arguably would limit 
the power of judges, providing some sort of internal check on the use 
of the judicial review power. The obvious problem is that, however 
many theories one might spin, judges seem neither to adopt these theo-
ries nor to be constrained by them. The apparent lack of judicial con-
straint gives rise to invariable and strident criticism. 
This entire concern with constraining judges, however, does not 
rest on an accurate description of our constitutional system. Judicial 
review appears to contain all checks and no balances only if one ig-
nores important facts about our American brand of both "majoritari-
anism" and judicial review. As the next section explains, the 
countermajoritarian difficulty does ignore these essential facts. 
B. The Faulty Premises of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty 
The countermajoritarian difficulty rests on two premises: that the 
bedrock principle of constitutional government is accountability to the 
people, and that judicial review conflicts with this principle. 252 
Although each of these ideas contains some truth, both are seriously 
flawed as foundations for the countermajoritarian difficulty. Each 
rests on an assumption that is highly contestable. These assumptions 
are, respectively, that there exists a "majority" whose will is repre-
sented by government decisions and that judicial decisions are "final" 
251. A number of constitutional devices often are noted at this point in the argument to show 
where balance lies. For example, the Senate has the power of advice and consent with regard to 
judges, U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, and Congress can impeach errant judges. U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 3. Yet the former has the most impact on the front end of a judge's career, and the latter is so 
rare as to be meaningless. Standing alone, these devices appear to be of little use in resolving 
problems posed by the countermajoritarian difficulty. Indeed, one of the most powerful argu-
ments made in support of Congress' power to control federal court jurisdiction is the absence of 
other effective checks. See PERRY, supra note 5, at 126-28. Yet this check too rarely is utilized, 
and it is of dubious constitutionality in certain contexts. See Friedman, supra note 173, at 57 
(discussing uncertainty regarding Congress' power to control federal jurisdiction). 
252. See supra notes 15-17; BICKEL, supra note 2, at 16. 
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and thus trump the will of that majority. This section seeks to replace 
these faulty assumptions with three ideas of constitutional government 
that do comport with reality and begin to explain the judicial role. 
The three ideas are that government operates not to represent a major-
ity but to hear and integrate the voices of many different constituen-
cies; that the constitutional text is spacious enough to accommodate 
the several interpretations inevitably offered by shifting constituencies; 
and that the process of constitutional interpretation is dynamic, not 
static, giving primacy to different interpretations at different times. 
These three ideas undergird the vibrant national dialogue on constitu-
tional meaning that goes on every day. As Part III will explain, this 
dialogic view describes the workings of our constitutional government 
much better than does the countermajoritarian difficulty. 
1. Electoral Accountability 
a. The faulty assumption of a "majority." The first premise upon 
which the countermajoritarian difficulty rests is that decisions in ·our 
government must be made in electorally accountable fashion, either by 
the people themselves or by their representatives. According to a fa-
miliar statement of the countermajoritarian difficulty, the problem 
with judicial decisions is that they often "thwart" the will of popular 
majorities. 253 The decisions of the other branches, or of state and local 
governments, ostensibly represent popular will. 254 Courts, on the 
other hand, are undemocratic. When a court finds in favor of a party 
asserting a constitutional right to be free from some government ac-
tion, the court interferes impermissibly with majority will.255 The as-
sumption underlying this premise goes to the very heart of the 
countermajoritarian difficulty. Those who worry about the 
countermajoritarian difficulty favor decisions made by branches other 
than courts because such decisions ostensibly represent the will of the 
"majority," while courts' decisions do not. This view, however, de-
pends for its coherence on the assumption that there is an identifiable 
majority whose will can be assessed.256 
253. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text; Sherry, supra note 52, at 613. 
254. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 17. 
255. Id. at 16-17; see Winter, supra note 24, at 1513 ("In the received wisdom, judicial re-
view is seen as countermajoritarian because it invalidates the products of the majoritarian polit-
ical process."); supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. 
256. Pluralism rests on the notion that public good can be determined by an aggregate of 
individual preferences. Sunstein, supra note 190, at 32-33. Even Mark Tushnet falls into the 
assumption that there is a majority whose will could govern. See TusHNE.T, supra note 162, at 16 
("In general the choice made by a majority is to be respected, but on some issues and in some 
contexts majoritarian decisions may be overridden."). 
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Those enamored of the countermajoritarian difficulty might de-
mur, arguing that what is important is that courts overturn the will of 
representative branches. The Constitution does not rely upon popular 
majorities, the argument goes; rather, it establishes a system of repre-
sentative government, with the representatives accountable to the peo-
ple. 25' Thus, the difficulty arises whenever courts overrule 
representative decisions. 
This argument, however, cuts loose the countermajoritarian diffi-
culty from the claim of legitimacy that moors it. The 
countermajoritarian difficulty posits that the "political" branches are 
"legitimate" because they further majority will, while courts are ille-
gitimate because they impede it. Part I already has suggested some 
empirical difficulty with this argument. But once one disclaims reli-
ance on the argument that legislatures actually represent majority will, 
or that courts actually override it, the countermajoritarian difficulty 
loses its force. Absent a claim that legislative acts actually represent 
majority will, one only has an argument about the relative legitimacy 
- without regard to actual majority support - of each branch of 
government. But that is silly: the Constitution creates three "legiti-
mate" branches of government, one of which is the judiciary.258 Aca-
demic constitutional theory, and not constitutional text, deems two of 
the branches "legitimate," but not the third. Moreover, this argument 
merely raises the countermajoritarian difficulty to another level of ab-
straction: to whom are the executive and legislative branches account-
able?259 The countermajoritarian answer must be "majority will." 
Thus, countermajoritarian theory rests explicitly on the notion that 
the other branches of government "represent" majority will in a way 
the judiciary does not, which in turn rests on the assumption that 
there is a majority will. 
The premise that government operates in an electorally accounta-
ble fashion is seriously flawed. As the examples that follow make 
clear, there is room to question whether the "accountable" branches of 
government represent majority will. Beyond that, however, lies the 
even broader question whether there is such a thing as "majority will" 
to be ascertained. 
Courts are supposedly at their countermajoritarian worst when 
257. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 17. 
258. See Amar, supra note 201, at 1085 (recognizing that all three branches represent the 
people); cf. Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 77 (section aptly titled "The Three Branches of 
Democracy"). 
259. On the concept of and problems with "representation," see HANNA F. PITKIN, THE 
CoNCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967); HANNA F. PITKIN, REPRESENTATION (1969). 
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they strike down congressional enactments. 260 These enactments, af-
ter all, have garnered the support of a majority of both houses of Con-
gress and have either avoided an Executive veto or mustered the two-
thirds majority necessary for an override. Nonetheless, for courts to 
overturn congressional statutes on constitutional grounds may not be 
countermajoritarian at all. Consider United States v. Jackson, 261 
which involved a challenge to the Federal Kidnapping Act on the 
ground the Act impermissibly burdened the right to a jury trial. The 
Act provided that a kidnapper who harms her victim "shall be pun-
ished ... by death ... if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or 
... by imprisonment ... ifthe death penalty is not imposed."262 The 
lower court had found that, because death could not be the penalty 
absent a jury trial, accused kidnappers could waive their right to a jury 
and plead guilty or accept a bench trial to avoid the possibility of 
death. 263 This opportunity in turn unconstitutionally burdened the 
right to trial by jury.264 The Supreme Court agreed and struck down 
the capital punishment provision of the Act.265 The Court concluded, 
however, that Congress would have wanted the Act to remain in effect 
even if the penalty provision was struck,266 and so the Court severed 
the unconstitutional penalty provision and preserved the Act, albeit 
with no death penalty.267 
Was the Court's action countermajoritarian? Perhaps it was. 
Where previously there had been a legislatively mandated death pen-
alty for kidnapping, there was no more. Even at this level of general-
ity, however, the countermajoritarian character of the Court's decision 
is dubious. Whether a majority of citizens, or even a majority of Con-
gress, really favored the death penalty for kidnapping is difficult to 
know.268 As the Court's opinion makes clear, the Senate opposed the 
260. Charles Black takes the view that such enactments are the only ones that raise "the 
philosophy or the political problems of Marbury v. Madison." CHARI.ES L. BLACK, JR., DECI-
SION ACCORDING TO LAW 70 (1981). 
261. 390 U.S. 570 (1968). 
262. 18 U.S.C. § 120l(a) (1964), as amended by 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a), (Supp. II 1970). 
263. 262 F. Supp. 716, 718 (D. Conn. 1967). 
264. 262 F. Supp. at 718. 
265. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 585. 
266. 390 U.S. at 585-91. 
267. 390 U.S. at 591. 
268. One empirical study compared the views and voting records of 116 members of Con-
gress in 1958 with the views of their constituents. The study found a dishearteningly low rela-
tionship between the majority view in each district on issues of social welfare and foreign policy 
and what that district's representative thought was the district's majority view. Warren E. Miller 
& Donald E. Stokes, Constituency Influence in Congress, 51 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 45, 51 (1963). 
A much stronger relationship did exist between the representatives' perceptions and their constit-
uents' actual majority view in the area of civil rights, arguably the dominant issue of the time. 
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death penalty provision even after a conference and ultimately capitu-
lated' in a vote tak~n without debate.269 The history of other statutes 
demonstrates that this capitulation could have been part of a deal in 
which senators opposed to the provision conceded the issue in order to 
obtain something that mattered more.270 They may even have capitu-
lated because they did not know what they were voting on when they 
approved the penalty.211 
But this level of generality, at which countermajoritarian problems 
tend to get examined if they get examined at all, does not accurately 
state the problem. The real question is whether a majority of citizens, 
or even Congress, favored the particular penalty provision that Con-
gress actually enacted and that the Court subsequently invalidated. 
Once the problem is stated properly, assuming that the Court acted in 
a countermajoritarian fashion becomes increasingly difficult. There 
was no evidence that even Congress favored giving accused kidnappers 
the choice of a jury trial with the possibility of death or a bench trial 
with the lesser sanction. Everyone concerned with the case seemed a 
bit squeamish about the "statute as written.272 Most likely Congress 
never considered the problem.273 Once we acknowledge that Congress 
Id.; see ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CoNFLICT AND 
CONSENT 134 (1967); Choper, supra note 48, at 820-21, 838-39. More recent studies suggest a 
closer tie between constituent preferences and the votes of members of the House of Representa-
tives. See Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: 
Testing far Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions, 33 J.L. & EcoN. 103 (1990). 
269. The Act as originally enacted in 1932 contained no capital punishment provision. See 
Jackson, 390 U.S. at 586. Although a majority of the House of Representatives had favored the 
death penalty, they feared that an attempt to persuade the Senate to include the provision would 
delay, or even defeat, passage of the bill. Not until 1934 was an amendment authorizing capital 
punishment enacted, and then only after a conference committee reported the amendment out 
after initial disagreement in the Senate. See 390 U.S. at 586-90 & nn.29-36. Whether the Sena-
tors initially opposed the death penalty provision because they disagreed with capital punishment 
or because they disagreed with placing the capital punishment decision within the discretion of 
the jury, rather than the trial judge, is not clear. 
270. See Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 78-79 & n.158. 
271. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a 
Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 16 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1311-12 & nn.63-64 (1990) 
(noting that enacted bills alone in an average Congress total over 7000 pages and suggesting that 
this volume, combined with the hectic schedules of members of Congress, prohibits legislators 
from reading all bills proposed). 
272. The government, for example, maintained that Congress' failure to enact a capital pun-
ishment provision that addressed defendants who pleaded guilty or waived jury trial "was no 
more than an oversight that the courts can and should correct." Jackson, 390 U.S. at 578. 
273. In fact, Congress initially created the same problem in another, later-enacted statute but 
corrected it upon urging of the Department ofJustice, who by that time had been schooled in the 
difficulties of the Kidnapping Act. See Jackson, 390 U.S. at 578 n.15 (citing 70 Stat. 540 (1956), 
18 U.S.C. § 34, which prohibited the wrecking of aircraft and provided that violators whose 
conduct caused death "shall be subject ••• to the death penalty . . • if the jury shall in its 
discretion so direct, or, in the case of a plea of guilty, or a plea of not guilty where the defendant 
has waived a trial by jury, if the court in its discretion shall so order." (emphasis in Jackson)). 
During the same session in which Congress enacted the aircraft-wrecking statute, Congress ad-
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probably goofed, the countermajoritarian nature of the judicial action 
in Jackson is dubious at best.274 
But, one might protest, Jackson is an odd case. It is an old case. It 
cannot be taken as the norm when congressional statutes are over-
ruled. The problem, however, is not that Jackson cannot be taken as 
the norm, but that there is no norm. Courts overrule statutes under 
numerous circumstances. Few of these statutes are of such moment 
that one can say the public's will was embodied in the statute. The 
public undoubtedly has little cognizance of many statutes, 275 and 
when it does its reaction is uncertain. Indeed, the voting representa-
tives themselves have little cognizance of many statutes, instead fol-
lowing the lead of floor leaders and committee chairs. 276 These people 
often are captured by special interests. 277 On some occasions judicial 
striking of congressional statutes certainly appears to thwart majority 
ded a technical amendment to the Kidnapping Act but neglected to add a similar provision on 
the death penalty. 390 U.S. at 579 n.15. 
274. Statutory interpretation teachers would have a heyday with this case. The government 
urged the Court to save the statute by making the jury's recommendation in jury cases advisory 
only, putting sentencing in the hands of judges (something Congress seems explicitly to have 
rejected), and then permitting judges also to empanel advisory juries in cases of bench trials and 
guilty pleas. 390 U.S. at 572-73. Alternatively, the government argued that all defendants 
should be forced through jury trials even if they wished to plead guilty. 390 U.S at 584. The 
dissent argued that the statute should be upheld only after giving trial judges instructions to 
ensure that jury waivers were not encouraged by the statutory provision. 390 U.S. at 591-92 
(White, J., dissenting). The defendant, freedom in sight, argued that Congress would not have 
wanted any kidnapping statute if there were no death penalty provision. 390 U.S. at 589-91. The 
appellees argued that, without its capital punishment provision, the Act would fail to distinguish 
the penalties for kidnappers who harmed their victims and.those who did not. The appellees 
claimed that Congress would not want the Act to stand absent such a distinction. 390 U.S. at 
590. Even this argument had some support in the record. The argument was that states already 
had kidnapping provisions; the advantage of a federal act was the additional penalty, which 
would not depend on state law. One congressman stated as much, arguing in favor of the death 
penalty. See 390 U.S. at 586-87 & n.31. The Court observed that only one congressman made 
the argument, 390 U.S. at 587; but how many others nodded their heads in silent agreement and 
voted for the death penalty? 
275. See CHOPER, supra note 8, at 31; see also Guido Calabresi, Foreword: Antidiscrimina-
tion and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores}, 105 HARV. L. 
R.Ev. 80, 88 n.1 (1991) ("The precise language used in statutes ••• is rarely the product of 
representative democracy, but rather of chance, hired drafters, or of arbitrarily selected 'commit-
tees on style.' "). 
276. Legislation often results from the individual desires of party leaders. Moreover, con-
gressional committees have enormous power in determining whether legislation is passed, regard-
less of the desires of a majority of Congress. This power is focused more acutely in the hands of 
the committee chairpersons, who set the agendas for consideration of bills. Finally, members of 
the conference committees, appointed to reconcile different versions of legislation passed by the 
House and Senate, have enormous power in writing the legislation that ultimately goes to the 
President. See Choper, supra note 48, at 821-30. 
277. See Richard Briffault, Distrust of Democracy, 63 TExAs L. R.Ev. 1347, 1361 (1985) 
(book review) ("Private wealth and special interests dominate the financing of candidate elections 
as well as initiative petition drives and ballot proposition campaigns."); Ray Forrester, The New 
Constitutional Right to Buy Elections, 69 A.B.A. J. 1078, 1078-79 (1983) (describing the depen-
dence of political candidates on large campaign budgets and the possibility of undue influence of 
contributing interest groups); Marlene A. Nicholson, Compaign Financing and Equal Protection, 
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will.278 But judicial striking of congressional statutes is surely not al-
ways countermajoritarian. 219 
Of course, the vast majority of judicial overruling of governmental 
activity is concerned not with statutes or actions of the legislature, or 
even the chief executive,280 but with the work of administrative offi-
26 STAN. L. RBv. 815 (1974) (arguing that the inequities that result from the financing of cam-
paigns through large private contributions compels campaign finance reform). 
278. One example is the case offlag burning. See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text. 
279. Of course, this discussion deals with the national legislature. The problems are com-
pounded when state or local legislative activity is at issue. This is a point the purveyors of major-
itarianism often overlook. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 2, at 33 (criticizing Court's overruling of 
state legislation). But see CHARI.ES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND TIIE CoURT: JUDICIAL 
REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY 120-55 (1960) (arguing that Supremacy Clause offers clear legitima-
tion of judicial overruling of state legislative decisions). 
When a court strikes down a state statute as countennajoritarian, there is an additional prob-
lem beyond those posed by judicial review of congressional statutes. That is the problem of the 
relevant majority. Consider Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), in which the Supreme 
Court held states may not execute insane individuals and invalidated Florida procedures for 
determining whether a person is insane. 
Ford carries with it all the problems with labeling judicial invalidation of any statute 
countennajoritarian. First is the problem of generality: Did the Florida citizens really prefer 
Florida's chosen procedure? Second is the "as applied" problem: perhaps the people favored the 
statutory provision but would not have approved of the Governor's interpretation of it. If indeed 
the people did not want insane individuals executed, the Court's decision might have been 
majoritarian in furthering popular will rather than approving the work of elected representatives, 
whose decisions perhaps would result in the execution of an insane person. But third, what the 
people wanted is difficult to know. Did they really care about executing insane people? If not, 
the Court's entire decision rested on a countennajoritarian premise, although the Florida statute 
did appear to prohibit execution of the insane and thus also was "countennajoritarian." 
Beyond all this, however, is the problem of relevant majorities. Even if the majority of Flor-
ida citizens favored this particular procedure, implemented as the Governor did, is that the rele-
vant majority? After all, this case implicates a right included in the federal Bill of Rights. One 
could argue that the relevant majority is therefore national. Perhaps a majority of U.S. citizens 
disfavored Florida's procedure. If the national majority was the relevant one, again the Constitu· 
tion might have proved majoritarian. 
Thus, pinning the countennajoritarian label on the Court is particularly difficult in cases 
involving state statutes. Even if one overcomes all the difficulties inherent in an assumption that 
statutory choice reflects popular will, such a state statute really represents a clash between princi· 
ples of federalism and the concept of a national Bill of Rights. That, however, presents not a 
countennajoritarian problem, but a problem of relevant majorities. Yet, as the debates over 
abortion and the death penalty demonstrate, the rhetoric of countennajoritarianism is often most 
heated with regard to overturning state legislative judgments. 
280. Perhaps the best case for the countennajoritarian difficulty is not the overruling of stat· 
utes, but judicial invalidation of executive action. After all, the President, more than anyone else, 
has a true national constituency. See Choper, supra note 48, at 846-47 (finding the President 
"the single federal official with a nationwide constituency" and concluding that the presidency 
"comes closer to the majoritarian ideal than practically any other national office in the modern 
western democracies"). Even a quick glance at the history books proves this argument over-
stated, however. The most famous overrulings of executive action involve situations in which the 
President's popular or congressional support was questionable at best. See, e.g., United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974) (holding that presidential privilege must yield to the public's 
interest in criminal justice); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637, 639 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting that Congress had enunciated three statutory policies 
inconsistent with the President's action). In these situations, there is a good argument the 
Court's actions may well have been majoritarian. Moreover, the famous examples are typical. 
Rarely can a court go head to head with a popular President and survive very long. Witness the 
New Deal and Roosevelt's Court-packing plan. See STONE ET AL., supra note 66, at 180-81. 
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cials, from the loftiest cabinet officer281 to the lowest administrative 
actor.282 The actions range from administrative policymaking to ap-
plication of administrative rules. In these cases making the 
countermajoritarian difficulty stick is extremely difficult. 
Rust v. Sullivan 283 provides one telling example. Rust involved the 
decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services to withhold 
federal family planning funds from any program that provided "coun-
seling concerning the use of abortion as a method of family planning" 
or "referral for abortion as a method of family planning. "284 The reg-
ulations promulgated to implement this policy were challenged on a 
number of constitutional grounds.285 The Supreme Court found the 
challenges meritless and upheld the regulations.286 That a majority of 
Congress, let alone the people, favored the Court's result in Rust is 
anything but clear. The Court said of the statute, "we agree with 
every court to have addressed the issue that the language is ambigu-
ous. "287 Similarly, "the legislative history is ambiguous and fails to 
shed light oil relevant congressional intent."288 So much for knowing 
Thus, courts usually do not trump popular presidential decisions. At the least, it is once again 
difficult to maintain that, when they do, a countermajoritarian Court is overruling a majoritarian 
President. 
281. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 480 (1978) (suit against, inter alia, Secretary 
of Agriculture). 
282. See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 848 (1985) (suit against low-level Immigration 
and Naturalization Service officials). 
283. 111 s. Ct. 1759 (1991). 
284. Grants for Family Planning Services, 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(l) (1991). The regulations 
also prohibited funded projects from engaging in any activities to "encourage, promote or advo-
cate abortion as a method offamily planning." 42 C.F.R. § 59.lO(a) (1991). 
285. Grantees of the federal funds and doctors who supervised the funds sued on behalf of 
themselves and their patients. They claimed that the regulations were not authorized by Title X 
of the Public Health Service Act, 84 Stat. 1506 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300a-6 
(1988)), and that they facially violated the First and Fifth Amendment rights of Title X clients 
and the First Amendment rights of Title X health providers. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1766. 
286. The Court first found that Title X authorized the regulations. 111 S. Ct. at 1768. The 
authorizing language stated only that "[n]one of the funds appropriated under this subchapter 
shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning." 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 
(1988). The Court concluded that it was "unable to say that the Secretary's construction of the 
prohibition in § 1008 to require.a ban on counseling, referral, and advocacy within the Title X 
project, is impermissible." 111 S. Ct. at 1768. 
The Court next addressed the constitutional claims. The Court found no merit to the First 
Amendment claim, stating that "the general rule that the Government may choose not to subsi-
dize speech applies with full force." 111 S. Ct. at 1776. The Court disposed of the Fifth Amend-
ment claim by reaffirming earlier cases' holdings that the government need not fund abortions 
and findings that "Congress' refusal to fund abortion counseling and advocacy leaves a pregnant 
woman with the same choices as if the government had chosen not to fund family-planning 
services at all." 111 S. Ct. at 1777 (citing Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 
(1989)). 
287. 111 S. Ct. at 1767. 
288. 111 S. Ct. at 1768. The Court continued: "At no time did Congress directly address the 
issues of abortion counseling, referral, or advocacy. The parties' attempts to characterize highly 
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what Congress wanted when it passed on authority to the agency. 
Moreover, congressional activity since Rust suggests the Secretary's 
action was not consistent with the wishes of subsequent Congresses.289 
As for the body politic, polls suggest that its will, while not clear, is 
largely opposed to the agency's decision.290 
Rust is an atypical case because the regulation at issue received 
tremendous public scrutiny. The vast majority of administrative ac-
tions are not as public and do not touch matters of such broad public 
concern. Rust is telling for just that reason: if we cannot tell whether 
judicial review is majoritarian or countermajoritarian in such a promi-
nent case, we likely will have little basis for making such a determina-
tion in the ordinary case. 
In Rust, the Court concluded that, in the absence of knowing what 
Congress wanted, it should defer to the agency's interpretation.291 
This is consistent with the general rule regarding judicial review of 
agency action.292 On its face such a rule might appear majoritarian. 
The alternative, after all, is to have Article III judges decide all the 
rules. Reviewing the rationales offered by the Court and academy for 
such· deference is instructive, however, for they indicate that deference 
to agency decisionmaking hardly can be called majoritarian. 
Sometimes deference to agency decisions is justified on the grounds 
of agency expertise.293 Putting aside whether such deference is war-
generalized, conflicting statements in the legislative history into accurate revelations of congres· 
sional intent are unavailing." 111 S. Ct. at 1768. 
289. President Bush vetoed legislation designed to overturn the gag rule, and Congress could 
not override the veto. Maria Puente, Abortion Counseling Ban Upheld, USA TODAY, Nov. 20, 
1991 at lA. Subsequently the Bush administration amended the gag rule to permit doctors to 
give abortion advice, but public reaction has been critical because in publicly funded clinics most 
counseling is done by nondoctors. See, e.g., Ellen Goodman, Abortion Doublespeak. BOSTON 
GLOBE, Mar. 26, 1992, at 17 (editorial criticizing wavering by White House on whether gag rule 
should be changed at all); Mixing Up the Signals, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1992, at B7 (calling 
President Bush's latest amendments to gag rules his "most cynical"). 
290. The Rust decision triggered a flurry of polling activity, including conflicting polls com-
missioned by Planned Parenthood Federation of America and the National Right to Life Com-
mittee. Except for the latter, the polls showed very strong public opposition to Rust. See Helen 
Dewar, Hill Moves Briskly on Abortion Bills, WASH. POST, June 4, 1991, at AS (reporting a 
Washington Post-ABC News Poll's finding that 63% support legislation to overturn Rust); Renu 
Sehgal, Abortion Groups, Pro and Con, Report Differing Poll Results, BOSTON GLOBE, June 25, 
1991, (Metro/Region) at 5 (reporting that although a Louis Harris Poll, commissioned by 
Planned Parenthood Federation of America, found 74% opposed to the Rust decision, a Richard 
B. Wirthlin Poll, commissioned by the National Right to Life Committee, found 48% opposed to 
and 48% in favor of the decision). 
291. 111 S. Ct. at 1769. 
292. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842-43 (1984) (announcing that, if a statute is "silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible con-
struction of the statute"). 
293. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 
U.S. 87, 103 (1983) ("[A] reviewing court must remember that the Commission is making predic-
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ranted, expertise does not speak directly to the majoritarian problem; 
expertise is not the same as accountability. Deferring to agency deci-
sions on the grounds of expertise is no more or less majoritarian than 
deferring to the courts on those grounds - or to a queen, for that 
matter.294 
Sometimes, however, deference is grounded on arguments of ac-
countability.295 Perhaps Bickel put it best: "[these officials] are most 
often responsible to officials who are themselves elected and through 
whom the line runs directly to a majority ... ~ [S]o long as there has 
been a meaningful delegation by the legislature to administrators, 
which is kept within proper bounds, the essential majority power is· 
there .... "296 This "chain-of-accountability" argument only is as 
strong as its weakest link, and any observer knows just how weak the 
links are. The delegation doctrine is exceedingly broad.297 Political 
oversight may or may not be effective,298 and, perhaps more impor-
tant, commentators suggest that oversight in itself may not be particu-
larly majoritarian.299 Moreover, many of the decisions reviewed by 
tions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science. When examining this kind of 
scientific determination, as opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing court must generally 
be at its most deferential."). 
294. Actually, deferring to expertise may be majoritarian in the sense that the people, too 
busy to bother with all the details or lacking in the expertise themselves to decide, might well 
choose to defer to experts. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text (discussing judicial 
deference to experts). 
295. See, e.g., Chevron: 
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is 
entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices 
- resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not re-
solve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of 
the statute in light of everyday realities. 
467 U.S. at 865-66. 
296. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 19, 20; see supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
297. The delegation doctrine requires that "Congress clearly delineate[] the general policy, 
the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority." Mistretta 
v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372-73 (1989) (quoting American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 
U.S. 90, 105 (1946)). The Supreme Court has struck down only two delegation statutes under 
the doctrine, both in 1935. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373 n.7 (citing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)). 
For an in-depth review of the history of the delegation doctrine, see HAROLD H. BRUFF & PE· 
TERM. SHANE, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 64-88 (1988). 
298. A primary vehicle for congressional control of agency action was the legislative veto, see 
Harold H. Bruff & Ernest Gellhom, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A 
Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1369, 1372-73 (1977), but the Supreme Court 
invalidated the use of such vetoes in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). The executive branch 
has formal oversight authority under Executive Order Nos. 12,291 and 12,498, but "QSe of this 
oversight is controversial. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 
78 GEO. L.J. 353, 399 & n.270 (1989). 
299. See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
THEMES FOR THE CoNSTITUTION's THIRD CENTURY (forthcoming 1993) (discussing how focus-
ing oversight in smaller units of Congress can encourage and further rent-seeking activity). 
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courts inevitably are not subjected to particular efforts at oversight or 
granted any approval of a majoritarian nature. Rust again is instruc-
tive because it is atypical. Rust involved regulations approved at the 
highest level of the executive branch and subjected to careful scru-
tiny. 300 Accountability should have been at its highest in Rust. Even 
so, Secretary Sullivan's action may well have been countermajoritarian 
in a popular sense and likely was contrary to the will of Congress.301 
Public choice theory has raised important questions about the ex-
tent to which the representative branches of government do in fact 
represent majority will, whether a voting process can ascertain the ma-
jority view, or even whether there is such a thing as a "majority" 
view.302 The preceding examples drew in part from that critique. But 
beyond the critique lies a far broader problem with the idea that non-
judicial actors are majoritarian or that their actions represent majority 
will. The erroneous assumption, which pervades the 
countermajoritarian difficulty, is that such a thing as "majority will" 
exists to legitimate decisions of the "representative" branches. No 
such majority will is identifiable. Rather, majorities come and go as 
the public engages in debate. At best there is a constantly shifting tide 
of public opinion. 
The countermajoritarian difficulty ultimately fails because it sees 
the majority and majority will as static, when in reality the viewpoint 
of the populace is :fluid and dynamic. The concept of majoritarianism 
sees government as an institution designed simply to aggregate prefer-
ences. 303 Government is one big ballot box, and when the results are 
in no court ought to tamper with them. 304 This overstates the 
countermajoritarian difficulty's simplistic view of public choices, but 
not by very much. In the world of the countermajoritarian difficulty, 
mustering a "majority" viewpoint is possible because choices are bi-
300. The regulations were adopted by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human 
Services in 1988, President Ronald Reagan's last year in office. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 
1764-65 (1991). 
301. See supra notes 287-90 and accompanying text. 
302. For a good summary of the public choice arguments and a careful analysis of these 
arguments that raises questions of how they should be interpreted, see FARBER & FRICKEY, 
supra note 28, at 38-62. See also WILLIAM N. EsKRJDGB, JR. & PHILIPP. FRICKBY, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 49-51 
(1988). 
303. JOHN ELSTBR, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 33 
(1983) (noting argument of some that only role of State is to create mechanism to aggregate 
preferences); TusHNBT, supra note 162, at 70 ("Just as the market for goods aggregates con-
sumer choice through the mechanism of demand and supply, the market for public policy aggre-
gates citizen choice through voting."). 
304. Or courts should tamper with them only under specified circumstances. See Elhauge, 
supra note 182, at 44-48 (discussing proposals for greater judicial review in light of the public 
choice critique). 
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nary. We are either for something or against it. Yet in real life 
choices arise on a continuum. We must rank our preferences and then 
determine how important they are and what we reasonably can hope 
to a.chieve. 305 In reality, our preferences are extremely malleable, rela-
tive, influenced by choices stacked against them, 306 and changed by 
discussion. 307 They vary depending upon whom we are talking ·to, 
what we are being asked to decide, when we are asked to decide it, and 
what information is available at that time. Yet the 
countermajoritarian difficulty does little to account for the chimerical 
nature of public opinion. 
Public choice literature establishes how this type of analysis causes 
problems in the context of aggregating preferences on a societal level. 
The work of Kenneth Arrow, for example, suggests that the idea of a 
majority is incoherent because of the problem of cycling. 3os Simply 
put, if three people have three separate preferences, the outcome of a 
"majoritarian" process will depend upon the order in which the votes 
are taken, not on what a majority might want. 309 
Similar problems present themselves at the level of individual deci-
sionmaking. First, individual decisions tend not to be binary (Do you 
favor abortion rights?). Rather, many questions arise, such as whether 
we would permit abortion in any situation, just in cases of rape or 
incest, without public funding, and so on.310 Important policy issues 
are too complex for our governmental system ordinarily to pose 
choices in a way that lets us express what we really feel. 
Second, agenda setting is a problem, for individuals as well as in 
the public sphere. Some people feel so strongly about issues such as 
abortion that they choose their representatives on that basis alone.311 
For many of us, however, representatives represent a variety of views, 
305. See BICKEL, supra note 247, at 16-17 (discussing the role of intensity of preference in 
majoritarian politics); TusHNET, supra note 162, at 79-80 ("People who care deeply about an 
issue regularly have a larger influence in the legislative process than their numbers alone would 
suggest."); Elhauge, Sllpra note 182, at 50, 65 (arguing that voters properly register intensity of 
preference in the political process). 
306. See ELSTER, supra note 303, at 109-24 (discussing counteradaptive preferences). 
307. See ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS: A THEORY OF NORMATIVE 
JUDGMENT 247 (1990). 
308. KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 46-60 (1951). 
309. Thus, Einer Elhauge argues that by identifying cycling problems Arrow perhaps made 
the case against a political process that would simply value ordinal preference rankings (i.e., pure 
majoritarianism) without regard to intensity of views, agenda-setting, and the like. Elhauge, 
supra note 182, at 103-04. On the public choice critique generally see FARBER & FRICKEY, supra 
note 28; Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 91 YALE L.J. 1539, 1545-46 (1992). 
310. See infra notes 439-40 and accompanying text (discussing polling data on abortion 
choices). 
311. Elhauge, supra note 182, at 41 n.41. 
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and we vote on the bundle.312 We may be willing to give up things 
about which we have an opinion, but which matter less than other 
issues. When the candidate-turned-representative votes on matters 
about which voters disagreed with her, however, there is no represen-
tation, at least not in the sense of majority will.313 
Third, because our individual preferences change constantly in re-
sponse to a number of factors,314 societal preferences also are con-
stantly in flux. Change can occur because of new information315 or 
simply because someone we respect expresses a different view. A good 
example is the transformative effect the discovery that Magic Johnson 
had tested positive for the HIV virus had on our view of AIDS. Sud-
denly the airwaves were flooded with information, people were more 
concerned, AIDS had gained in importance,316 and the stigma of hav-
ing AIDS probably decreased.317 When one sudden event can have 
such an impact on the populace, the notion of a static majority will 
becomes ephemeral. 
Finally, accommodation to the views of others is integral to all 
aspects of social existence.318 Sometimes we are persuaded. Some-
times we decide to accept the second best because it is all we can get, 
or we believe it is all we can get.319 Sometimes we decide we have to 
live with something we do not like because accommodation is easier 
than other alternatives. 320 Sometimes others' views are imposed upon 
us and we feel we have no choice.321 
In a sense the countermajoritarian difficulty treats popular will as 
the aggregation of fixed exogenous preferences,322 when preferences 
312. CHOPER, supra note 8, at 13 ("[T]he electorate must buy its political representation in 
bulk form."); Elhauge, supra note 182, at 41 & n.41. 
313. CHOPER, supra note 8, at 13 ("Hardly ever will a candidate share all the preferences of 
an individual elector."). 
314. See, e.g., Seidman, supra note 59, at 1596 ("tastes depend upon context"). 
315. EI.STER, supra note 303, at 81, 113 (questioning preferences shaped with incomplete 
information); GIBBARD, supra note 307, at 230 ("Sometimes judgments of competence lead us to 
revise judgments we started out accepting."). 
316. See Anne Michaud, Home HIV Test Kit May Soon Be on Market, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 
1992, at D7 (noting that since Magic Johnson announced that he was HIV positive the public is 
"newly concerned" about AIDS); Dave Raffo, Leaming the Value of a Dollar, FIN. POST, Apr. 
27, 1992, § 5, at 51 (finding that the Magic Johnson story had "a big influence" on 85% of those 
surveyed). 
317. See Jim Clardy, Ashe Pays Visit to His Hometown, WASH. TIMES, May 7, 1992, at B3. 
318. This idea is central to the notion of "sour grapes." EI.STER, supra note 303, at 22; see 
id. at 109 ("[W]hy should the choice between feasible options only take account of individual 
preferences if people tend to adjust their aspirations to their possibilities?"). 
319. GIBBARD, supra note 307, at 241. 
320. The slavery clauses in the Constitution likely offer an example of this. See id. at 238-41. 
321. Id. at 236-37. 
322. See TusHNET, supra note 162, at 46 (stating that liberal tradition "tend[s] to treat each 
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necessarily are shifting and endogenous. 323 Preferences are continu-
ally shaped and reshaped by public opinion. 324 Every minute is an 
ordering and reordering for each of us about what we want and care 
about. The assumption that there is a "majority" whose "will" is em-
bodied in governmental decisions is, at best, overstated. Decisions 
must be made at specific times.325 At best, there may be one brief 
moment when a governmental decision does represent majority will, 
though that moment may come and go in an instant as views and 
choices change.326 The political process cannot possibly reflect indi-
viduals' and society's constantly changing preferences. More likely, a 
governmental choice is the result of structured decisionmaking that 
represents "majority will" only after ruling out many choices many 
people would have preferred. 
In this sense, the countermajoritarian difficulty fails even to de-
scribe the "majoritarianism" that, as discussed in the last section, has 
evolved in our constitutional system. True, the franchise has been ex-
tended to many people, and democracy has become more direct and 
less representative. But neither of these actual changes in our system 
has anything to do with the existence of an identifiable majority 
will.327 
Thus, the first premise of the countermajoritarian difficulty - that 
of us as an autonomous individual whose choices and values are independent of those made and 
held by others"); cf. EI.SrER, supra note 303, at 121 (arguing that standard theory of social 
choice sees preferences "as given independently of the choice situation." The alternative "is to 
see preferences as causally shaped by the situation."); Cass R. Sunstein, Republicanism and the 
Preference Problem, 66 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 181, 184 (1990) ("[W]hen preferences are a function 
oflegal rules, the rules cannot, without circularity, be justified by reference to the preferences."). 
323. This is an important foundation of neorepublican thought. See Richard A. Epstein, -
Modem Republicanism - Or the Flight from Substance, 91 YALE L.J. 1633, 1642 (1988) ("In 
one sense" it "has to be correct" that preferences are not exogenous.); Sunstein, supra note 190, 
at 82 ("Preferences adapt to available options; they are not autonomous .•.. [P]olitics properly 
has, as one of its central functions, the selection, evaluation, and shaping of preferences ..•• "); 
Sunstein, supra note 309, at 1541-43; see also EI.STER, supra note 303, at 34-35 (discussing idea 
that political system could be geared to changing preferences, rather than aggregating them). 
324. See GIBBARD, supra note 307, at 247 (noting that discussion leads us "to accept certain 
norms of accommodation"). 
325. See EI.SrER, supra note 303, at 38 (noting that decisions must be made at a specific time, 
even if disagreements are not worked out). 
326. Robert Dahl observed in his now-famous article that over half of the Supreme Court 
decisions striking down congressional legislation occurred more than four years after the legisla-
tion was passed. DAHL, supra note 268, at 157 (adapted from Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making 
in a Democracy: The Role of the Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 
(1957)). Where legislation was overruled in less than four years, Dahl found that Congress' 
policy view generally won out, albeit after a struggle. Id. at 158-63. 
327. See also BURT, supra note 189, at 100-01 (describing how the view of those who pro-
mote countermajoritarian difficulty resembles Stephen Douglas' view that the slavery question 
should be resolved by majority rule: "But Lincoln also understood - as Madison had grasped in 
more hopeful times - that if we abandon the effort to persuade one another, then we will have 
embraced the tyranny of some over others."). 
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there is an identifiable majority will - simply fails to describe accu-
rately the vitality of the American electorate. More significant for the 
focus of this article, the transient nature of majoritarian preferences 
calls into question the notion that courts are countermajoritarian. 
Courts cannot trump majority will where no static, identifiable major-
ity exists. One may disapprove of what courts do, but the basis for 
that disapproval must be something other than the counterma-
joritarian difficulty. 
b. Contrast: the idea of constituency. Experience suggests that, 
rather than having an identifiable majority, we are a nation best de-
scribed as comprised of coalitions and constituencies, all clamoring to 
be heard. Here I use constituency not in the sense of a fixed interest 
group, although that would not be completely inaccurate. Rather, a 
constituency is a body of support for one or another position on an 
issue before the body politic. Constituencies rise, fall, and shift as is-
sues come before the polity. 
Although the precise system of government the Framers estab-
lished was largely a product of compromise, the Framers nonetheless 
ended up with a system that permits varying, often overlapping, repre-
sentation of different constituencies.328 Although the system may dif-
fer today from what the Framers intended, their grand design is 
preserved. Members of the House of Representatives represent rela-
tively small populations, likely to be relatively homogeneous. They 
are elected every two years and thus are likeliest among elected offi-
cials to be in touch with the people. Senators originally represented 
state legislatures and now represent broader state land areas; six years 
in office gives them a broader perspective. The President's constitu-
ency is the widest, and the President's term intentionally rests between 
the length of the other two. 329 The Framers' design of multiple con-
stituencies stretched to state and local governments, each with its own 
representative systems. 
Each of the governmental units grants voice to a constituency in 
debates over matters of national import. This is true not only of the 
branches of government at the national level but also of the countless 
328. See TusHNET, supra note 162, at 9-10 ("[T]he framers created a federal structure that, 
as a practical matter, requires the concurrence of many representatives with substantial local 
constituencies before the national government can act."). Constituency representation may not 
·today occur as the Framers envisioned it. See id. at 13 ("Much of what we know about contem-
porary politics belies" Framers' assumptions about representation.). 
329. This description of constituencies does differ from the Framers' design. The Senate, 
chosen from state legislatures, was thought to represent parochial interests. See Akhil R. Amar, 
Article Ill and the Judiciary Act of 1789: the Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
138 U. PA. L. REv. 1499, 1512 (1990). The House would be more national in perspective. The 
President, of course, would be chosen not by the people but by independent electors. 
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governmental bodies at the state and local levels. Moreover, our gov-
ernmental system allows for numerous nongovernmental ad hoc inter-
est groups, further giving voice to constituencies. 33o Rather than 
majority aggregation, then, we have a debate among constituencies. 
Babble is perhaps a more accurate word. Government cannot simply 
follow majority will, because none is readily identifiable. Govern-
ment's job is to find guidance and direction in the babble nonetheless. 
Given that no static majority exists, courts must be doing some-
thing in this system other than tivmping majority views. What courts 
do is similar to the task performed by other governmental bodies -
they give voice to constituencies under certain circumstances. More-
over, with regard to issues of constitutional interpretation, courts play 
a unique role of reaching into the body politic and thrusting one c~m­
stituency's view to the fore, making it - at least for a short while -
the focus of a discussion that many call dialogue.331 This role of 
courts is spelled out in detail in Part III. 
2. Judicial Intelference 
a. The faulty assumption of judicial ''finality. ,, The second prem-
ise of the countermajoritarian difficulty is that judicial decisionmaking 
conflicts with the first premise, because electorally unaccountable 
judges thwart the will of the majority.332 Lurking in this argument is 
the implicit assumption that judicial decisions are final - that when a 
court, or at least the Supreme Court, determines a claim of right to 
have merit, a judicially made choice is substituted for a democratically 
made choice. The "people" have made a choice, but the courts have 
330. See Sunstein, supra note 190, at 43-45 (describing Framers' scheme for constituting 
government as series of interlocking constituencies). Frank Michelman describes this most 
vividly: 
The full lesson of the civil rights movement will escape whoever focuses too sharply on the 
country's most visible, formal legislative assemblies - Congress, state legislatures, the coun-
cils of major cities - as exclusive, or even primary, arenas of jurisgenerative politics and 
political freedom. I do not mean that those arenas are dispensable or unimportant. Rather 
I mean the obvious points that much of the country's normatively consequential dialogue 
occurs outside the major, formal channels of electoral and legislative politics, and that in 
modern society those formal channels cannot possibly provide for most citizens much direct 
experience of self-revisionary, dialogic engagement. Much, perhaps most, of that experience 
must occur in various arenas of what we know as public life in the broad sense, some nomi-
nally political and some not: in the encounters and conflicts, interactions and debates that 
arise in and around town meetings and local government agencies; civic and voluntary organi-
zations; social and recreational clubs; schools public and private; managements, directorates 
and leadership groups of organizations of all kinds; workplaces and shop floors; public events 
and street life; and so on. Those are all areas of potentially transformative dialogue. 
Frank Michelman, Law~ Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1531 (1988) (emphasis added). Nonethe-
less, Michelman insists at times that only judges write the story. 
331. See infra note 388. 
332. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
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trumped that decision. 333 Courts apparently get the last word. 
This notion of "judicial finality" seriously overstates the impact of 
a judicial decision, however, even a decision by the Supreme Court. A 
judicial decision is an important word on any subject. But it is not 
necessarily the last word. 334 Because the judicial word is not the last 
word, the countermajoritarian difficulty loses force. 
There are two ways in which a judicial decision might mistakenly 
be considered the last word. The first is that a court's word in any 
given case dictates action to resolve that case. The other, far more 
important for the purposes of this article, is that a court's word -
particularly the Supreme Court's - on any given issue constitutes the 
final say on that issue. 
Although the latter sense of finality will play a larger role here, it is 
useful to begin by observing that a court's word is not even necessarily 
final in the context of a case. We all have been cautioned, and prop-
erly so, not to minimize the impact of a judicial decision. Most nota-
ble perhaps is Robert Cover's admonition that judicial decisions are 
not like other literary texts, in that they deal "pain and death. "33S 
Judges decree things, and they happen.336 But Cover was well aware 
333. Robert Burt refers to the general phenomenon of'~udicial supremacy," and the primacy 
object of his recent book is to argue for replacement of notions of judicial supremacy with "an 
egalitarian conception" of judicial review. BURT, supra note 189, at 6; see generally id. at 103· 
268 ("Judicial Supremacy in Practice"). Burt's view is that judicial supremacy is as troubling as 
tyranny of the majority. Id. at 102. My own view is that, despite the rhetoric of today's politics, 
we largely have the system Burt wishes. Burt does not necessarily see it that way, largely because 
he fails to see that even judicial inaction is action, and also because he overstates the "finality" of 
judicial action. For example, Burt condemns the Supreme Court for its hurried schedule in the 
Nixon Tapes Case. Id. at 319-20. But given the Special Prosecutor's request of the Court, id. at 
318-19, a decision not to move quickly would have been perceived as some sort of statement in 
Nixon's favor. Everything the Court does is a statement, but Burt, as this section argues, over-
states the chilling effect of judicial action. Indeed, Burt seems at times to deviate somewhat from 
his own principles, though perhaps this only underscores that, as appealing as his general princi-
ples are, they are sometimes difficult to apply. Burt, for example, seems to favor a greater judi-
cial role in banning the death penalty on the ground that the death penalty is "so grossly 
subjugative that it violates the core values of the democratic equality principle." Id. at 343. But 
in light of Burt's own evaluation of national sentiment in favor of the death penalty, id. at 330-31, 
this would seem the height of judicial supremacy. 
334. Commenting on Justice Jackson's famous statement that "[w]e are not final because we 
are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final," Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 
(1953) (Jackson, J., concurring), Louis Fisher rejoins: "As the historical record proves over-
whelmingly, the Court is neither final nor infallible." FISHER, supra note 108, at 244. 
335. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986); see also 
Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 1'ExAs L. REv. 373, 386 (1982) ("As Chairman Mao 
pointed out, a revolution is not a tea party, and the massive disruption in lives that can be 
triggered by a legal case is not a conversation."). My own response to Levinson is that it can be 
both. 
336. See Cover, supra note 335, at 1613. Cover's central point was that "[t)he practice of 
constitutional interpretation is so inextricably bound up with the real threat or practice of violent 
deeds that it is - and should be - an essentially different discipline from 'interpretation' in 
literature and the humanities." Robert M. Cover, The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation: Of 
February 1993] Dialogue and Judicial Review 645 
that, although the bond between decree and enforcement is close, the 
two are not the same thing. 337 One reasonably expects that, in a soci-
ety governed by the rule of law, enforcement will not often tarry far 
behind a judicial decree. 338 But enforcement is by no means 
automatic. 
Indeed, there is a continuum of nonenforcement of judicial de-
crees. At one end of the continuum are the instances in which nonen-
forcement is legitimate in every sense because, as societal mechanisms 
are structured, the court does not really have the "final" word. In the 
context of Cover's own discussion, for example, executive clemency is 
always a possibility even after the opportunity for legal appeals has 
run its course in a death penalty case. 339 Such clemency is not com-
mon, but it does provide an entirely lawful, noncontroversial step be-
tween judgment and enforcement. At the other end of the 
continuum340 is open defiance. Judicial orders ultimately depend upon 
acceptance outside the judicial realm for enforcement, and sometimes 
the lack of acceptance thwarts enforcement altogether. A familiar his-
torical example is President Lincoln's failure to comply with Justice 
Taney's decree in Ex Parte Merryman. 34 1 An example of more wide-
spread and popular interference with judicial orders is the footdrag-
ging that accompanied federal court school desegregation decrees. 342 
I do not mean to suggest even remotely that defiance of judicial 
decrees is a good or appropriate thing. Defiance poses a real threat to 
the rule of law, and those who defy judicial decrees ought to pay the 
price. Sometimes they do and sometimes they do not. The fact simply 
is that in many instances judicial decrees do not constitute the final 
the Word, The Deed, and The Role. 20 GA. L. REv. 815, 816 (1986). I believe the dialogic story 
I tell here is quite compatible with Cover's point. 
337. See Friedman, supra note 156, at 753-67 (discussing techniques judges must use to ob-
tain majority acceptance of decrees, and thus enforcement). Sadly, "pain and death" are part of 
the dialogue. Precisely because enforcement is not automatic, our commitment to rights is tested 
by the extent to which decision triggers activity. See Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An 
Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1894 (1987). 
338. Cover, supra note 335, at 1613 ("[J]udges' words ... serve as virtual triggers for 
action."). 
339. Cover actually relies upon the "almost stylized" process of death penalty appeals. See 
q<>ver, supra note 335, at 1622-24. 
340. In between, no doubt, is postjudgment settlement of disputes. 
341. 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9485). Compare the remark attributed to 
President Jackson in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 
(6 Pet.) 515 (1832): "John Marshall has made his law, now let him enforce it." Charles F. 
Wilkinson, The Impact of Indian History on the Teaching of American History, Occasional Pa-
pers in Curriculum Series of the Newberry Library, D' Arey McNickle Center for the History of 
the American Indian, No. 2, at 111 (Chicago Conference, 1984). 
342. Friedman, supra note 156, at 765-67 (discussing Supreme Court "toleration" of defiance 
of judicial decrees). 
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word in a case. 343 
Far more important for present purposes, however, is the extent of 
:finality accorded the lawsaying344 function of the courts.345 When 
commentators complain about thwarting popular will, one gets the 
sense they are not complaining about what happens to a party in a 
given case. For example, a court may arouse ire in the popular press 
when it overturns the conviction of a violent criminal on the grounds 
that the confession was obtained in violation of Fifth Amendment 
guarantees. 346 Critics concerned with the legitimacy of judicial re-
view, however, seem most concerned when courts, by rendering con-
stitutional decisions, interfere with, invalidate, or overturn broader 
societal choices. 347 Examples are the questions of whether to prohibit 
abortion or to engage in segregation. 
Precisely when judicial lawsaying is at issue, however, is the fallacy 
of judicial :finality most evident. Critics of judicial interference with 
popular will tend to see constitutional decisions as roadblocks to 
majoritarian action. Because the Constitution trumps all other legal 
(read legitimate) decisionmaking, a judicial decision, if final, would 
frustrate majority will. 348 But judicial decisions do not necessarily 
have that effect.349 
Admittedly, authoritative judicial opinions seem to claim this sort 
of :finality. Perhaps the most notable such statement is Cooper v. 
Aaron, 350 in which the Supreme Court appeared to deem itself the "ul-
343. Robert A. Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455 
(1984), discusses the role of adjudication when this possibility of noncompliance is present. Burt 
argues that judicial decisions, despite their inability to coerce compliance, may serve to impose "a 
course of dialogic engagement," id. at 487, in which parties are forced to listen to one another 
and respond. 
344. Ann Althouse gets credit for this excellent term. See Ann Althouse, Standing, In Fluffy 
Slippers, 77 VA. L. REv. 1177, 1182 n.22 (1991) ("[T]he word 'lawsaying' ••• [is] derived from 
Marbury v. Madison ..•• ") (citation omitted). 
345. "Lawsaying" and decision of a given case concededly are not two distinct things. "Judi-
cial acts enable subsequent claims to be made while also allowing formal and informal resistance 
to the very boundaries enunciated by the court." Minow, supra note 337, at 1886. 
346. Cf. Stuart Taylor Jr., Hinckley Cas11 and Suspects' Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1982, at 
A24 (questioning whether order to suppress statements John Hinckley made on the day of his 
arrest for shooting President Reagan "was a case of carrying a good principle a bit too far"). 
347. Thus, the inevitable topics are school desegregation, abortion, the death penalty, and the 
like. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 14; BICKEL, PROGRESS, supra note 13; BURT, supra note 
189. 
348. See supra notes 53-54; see also Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OP 
RIGHTS 153 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984). 
349. For a strong view that political events often alter Supreme Court decisions, see Louis 
Fisher, The Curious Belie/in Judicial Supremacy, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 85, 87 (1991) ("For 
the most part, Court decisions are tentative and reversible like other political events."). 
350. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
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timate arbiter" of what the Constitution says.351 A strict reading of 
Cooper would seem to say that the Court is charged with determining 
what the Constitution says, and once the Court has spoken, those not 
even parties before the Court are bound. Alexander Bickel read 
Cooper this way, though he evidently questioned the sense of it.352 But 
Cooper in theory and Cooper in practice are two different things. 
First, as Bickel well knew, civil disobedience can and does under-
mine the finality of even the lawsaying function.353 Again, this is not 
to countenance widespread civil disobedience. But even the Supreme 
Court seems to have suggested, or perhaps acquiesced in, the obvious 
fact that some people will pay the price to be disobedient. 354 
Far more important, however, is the orderly, not infrequent, com-
pletely legitimate process of testing the finality of judicial lawmak-
ing. 355 In Roe v. Wade, 356 for example, the Court held that the right 
to choose abortion was a constitutionally protected fundamental right. 
That was in 1976. Now, a mere fifteen years later, the Supreme 
Court's decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey redefined the right, 357 
and at some time in the not-so-distant future the Court may overrule 
that constitutional protection. 358 Whether it does so or not, the right 
certainly has changed. This change did not occur as a result of action 
taken by the Court on its own. Rather, it was a function of state legis-
latures continually passing laws that slid around, sought to narrow, 
and even blatantly challenged Roe. 359 Each of those laws was liti-
gated. But there was no widespread cry that such challenges were 
unlawful. Rather, the law is changing in response to a somewhat ac-
351. See Burt, supra note 343, at 472-73; Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule 
of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 387. 
352. See BICKEL, supra note 2, at 265 (discussing Cooper and its aftermath; derisively speak-
ing of the "decisive issue •.. going beyond the fictions of Marbury v. Madison"). 
353. See id. at 264-65 (noting that Southerners narrowly missed succeeding in opposition to 
Brown v. Board of Education); BICKEL, CoNSENT, supra note 13, at 101-02, 106. A very good 
example is the area of school prayer, in which Supreme Court pronouncements have been widely 
disregarded. See BoBBrIT, supra note 5, at 196. 
354. See Friedman, supra note 156, at 766-67 (discussing Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 
265 (1990), in which the Court appeared to permit recalcitrant city council members to opt to 
pay judicial contempt fines that would bankrupt their city if they chose not to comply with a 
judicial decree). 
355. See ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 79 ("Neither Lincoln nor Douglas accepted Dred 
Scott as if it were the last word."); Burt, supra note 343, at 477 (pointing out that the Cooper 
principle certainly does not bind new Justices). 
356. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
357. 112 s. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
358. See 112 S. Ct. at 2844 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting) (expressing his "fear 
for the darkness as four Justices anxiously await the single vote necessary to extinguish the 
light"). 
359. See infra note 433 and accompanying text. 
648 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:577 
cepted process of political testing. 360 
Plenty of arguments can be mounted against this description, but 
none of them seriously undermines it. For example, one might point 
out that Roe was final for a time or that Roe would not have been 
eroded absent a change in judicial membership. But the Supreme 
Court has changed its mind even without a significant change in mem-
bership, as the shift from Gobitis36t to Bamette362 suggests.363 More-
over, those cases show how quickly the law can change, as do the 
recent cases regarding victim impact statements in death penalty 
cases. 364 To say that judicial decisions frustrate the will of the major-
ity is simply too simple. 365 The populace certainly feels the impact of 
judicial decisions; but, as I will argue presently, the converse also is 
true. That is why there is dialogue. 
b. Contrast: the twin ideas of spaciousness and dynamism. Finality 
is neither likely achievable nor necessarily desirable. It is human na-
ture to challenge that with which we do not agree. We make mistakes 
and want to correct them or see them corrected. Thus, agreement on 
a rule of :finality is virtually impossible to imagine. Yet, absent agree-
360. I confess some ambivalence about this, as do my students when we discuss Cooper v. 
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). There is a very real tension between finality and results we can live 
with. Students invariably think decisions such as Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 
should not have been met with recalcitrance and subjected to repeated challenge. But their cer-
tainty begins to slip away with Roe, and fritters away completely when we discuss enforcement of 
fugitive slave laws and state resistance. Ideally, I suppose, our moral compasses could reflect 
which decisions would, over time, gain widespread popular approval; but then, the ability to see 
into the future would be useful in many ways. Charles Black discusses this very problem and 
appears to adopt a "good faith" test: 
The Court itself has since declared that it does not see anything wrong in such action by 
Congress, and this seems to be the common-sense solution, with the caveat that such action, 
if taken without reason to believe it could succeed, and merely for the purpose of harassing 
individuals and embarrassing the courts, would obviously lack the ingredient of good faith. 
BLACK, supra note 260, at 21. 
361. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
362. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
363. See Gerhardt, supra note 104, at 99 (discussing how changes in Court membership acted 
as a catalyst to overrule Gobitis); Sager, supra note 28, at 930 (discussing change in popular 
opinion between Gobitis and Barnette); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OP JURIS· 
PRUDENCE 152 (1990) (arguing that Barnette represented change in "outlook" rather than re-
sponse to new information). 
364. Compare Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 
U.S. 805 (1989) with Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991). See Gerhardt, supra note 104, 
at 80 (discussing use of certiorari to reshape law in victim impact cases). 
365. Undoubtedly the Court does frustrate popular will in some instances, and sometimes for 
a fair amount of time. See Robert H. Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEX. L. REV. 
383, 390 (noting that people can overturn Supreme Court decisions, although "it may take de-
cades to accomplish the reversal of a single decision"). But evidence suggests such frustration is 
rare, and it is particularly rare that the Court frustrates majority will for a prolonged period of 
time. See DAHL, supra note 48, at 186-92 (stating that congressional policy usually prevails if 
majority sentiment supports it and that protracted disagreement is rare). 
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ment, finality will not occur.366 The Court can say its word is final.367 
There might even be some benefit to pretending the Court's word is 
final. 368 But people will ignore judicial decisions, or challenge judicial 
decisions with which they disagree, or evade judicial decisions. Cooper 
v. Aaron again is instructive. Cooper hardly was the last word on 
school segregation for Little Rock, let alone the rest. of the nation. 
Schools everywhere remained (and remain) segregated, and still there 
is resistance. 369 · 
This lack of finality seems the inevitable result of the general inde-
terminacy of the Constitution's text. One need neither agree with nor 
even rely upon much of the extended debate about the general deter-
minacy of language and the reading of texts370 to accept the argument 
of constitutional indeterminacy.371 The debate about indeterminacy of 
language is a difficult one that many people find deeply troubling. But 
the Constitution, ironically, presents an easy case on which there is 
widespread agreement.372 Nor is the indeterminacy of much of the 
Constitution's language a problem: the very idea of a living Constitu-
tion requires that its language be spacious, accommodating varying 
interpretations over time. 373 The spaciousness of the Constitution pro-
366. See F'IsHER, supra note 108, at 233 ("No decision by the Court is ever final if the nation 
remains unsettled and seriously divided over a constitutional issue.") 
367. See Burt, supra note 343, at 482 (arguing that the Court is "not obliged to admit" the 
possibility of noncompliance). Burt makes the interesting point that pretending that the Court's 
decision is the last word may be useful to someone who wishes an excuse to follow the Court's 
lead. See id. at 475' (questioning whether this description fits President Eisenhower's view of 
Brown v. Board of Education). 
368. After listening to some of these ideas for a semester, a student left me this on the cover 
of a bluebook: 
Leo, you don't hold elected office; you only run this town because people think you run 
it. And the minute they stop thinking it, you stop running it. 
-Gabriel Byrne, from "Miller's Crossing" 
Having never seen the movie, I cannot vouch for the correctness of the quote. 
369. James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "All-Out" School Desegregation Explained, 
90 CoLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1465-79 (1990). 
370. See STANLEY FlsH, Is THERE A Tuxr IN THis CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF INTER-
PRETIVE CoMMUNITIES (1980); see also JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow (1985). White 
makes the extended argument that the "questions about determinable meanings and intention are 
••. false ones." Id. at 82. He denies that texts have concrete, certain meanings but nonetheless 
believes "shared understandings" of texts are possible. Id. 
371. See Seidman, supra note 59, at 1580. 
372. See Carter, supra note 15, at 847 ("The problem, all agree, is constitutional adjudication 
based on a text charitably described as indeterminate."); Erwin Chemerinsky, Wrong Questions 
Get Wrong Answers: An Analysis of Professor Carter's Approach to Judicial Review, 66 B.U. L. 
REv. 47, 56 (1986) (arguing that "the Constitution is silent or ambiguous" regarding important 
structural issues). Even Frederick Schauer admits that "[t]he text of the Constitution is not, by 
itself, going to provide answers to hard constitutional questions •.•. [A]nyone with any sense 
knows that." Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 439 (1985). 
373. Philip Bobbitt thus offers a "prudential" argument: "[C]onstitutional argument which 
is accentuated by the political and economic circumstances surrounding the decision" arises from 
the fact that "[i]n constitutional questions, competing texts can almost always be found." BOB-
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vides flexibility, so that the document can grow and change along with 
the society it governs.374 Without flexibility, every material in the uni-
verse breaks under pressure. There is no reason to believe a constitu-
tion is different, as others' experiences with their own constitutions 
confirm. 37s Despite this tremendous pressure of two hundred years of 
history, our Constitution has endured. 
The amendment process of Article V has hardly provided the flexi-
bility needed to preserve our Constitution.376 Over one third of the 
amendments practically came with the document. A huge percentage 
of the remainder deal solely with the franchise. The remaining 
Brrr, supra note S, at 6().61; see also id. at 177 ("The particular Bill of Rights we have serves, and 
seems chosen to serve, as more than a text for exegesis. It acts to give us a constitutional motif, a 
cadence of our rights, so that once heard we can supply the rest on our own."). But see NAGEL, 
supra note 27, at 17 ("The Constitution was written down so that its words would provide rea· 
sonably certain and permanent constraints."). 
374. See Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1372-73 (1990) 
(comparing the Constitution to a long-term contract, which requires either formal amendment or 
flexible interpretation to adjust to altered circumstances). See generally Sanford Levinson, Ac· 
counting for Constitutional Change, 8 CoNST. CoMMENTARY 409, 417-28 (1991) (discussing ex· 
plicit textual change as opposed to numerous interpretive changes to the Constitution and 
questioning whether some or all of the latter are "amendments"); NAGEL, supra note 27, at 11-12 
("[W]hat is surprising is not the role of judicial interpretation in altering 'permanent' constitu· 
tional principles but the contrasting notion that the Constitution might have plain, durable con· 
tent."). 
Chief Justice Rehnquist agrees that the Framers often used "majestic generalities" in drafting 
constitutional language and that "general language" gives "latitude to those who would interpret 
the instrument to make that language applicable to cases that the Framers might not have fore· 
seen." William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEXAS L. REV. 693, 694 
(1976). Nonetheless, Rehnquist eschews the notion of a "living Constitution" and urges 
unelected judges not to make decisions in reliance upon the constitutional text simply to address 
areas the political branches are not addressing, such as prison conditions. Id. at 695. There is 
obviously some tension between these two positions, one that Rehnquist plainly resolves against 
judicial action simply because his underlying vision of the Constitution is majoritarian. 
375. France has had 16 constitutions and draft constitutions. See Louis Henkin, Revolutions 
and Constitutions, 49 LA. L. REv. 1023, 1024 (1989). Venezuela has had 25 constitutions. Gis· 
bert H. Flanz, Venezuela, in CoNSTITUTIONS OF THE CoUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 1-14 (Supp. 
1983) (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds.). 
376. There is a vibrant literature about the legitimacy for amending the Constitution outside 
of Article V. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 201; Ackerman, supra note 3, at 1016; David R. Dow, 
When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case of Article V. 16 IOWA L. REV. 1, 4 
(1990). Some of the commentators endorse the concept that Article V is nonexclusive and that 
sufficient evidence of popular sovereignty can "amend" the Constitution. See Ackerman, supra 
note 3; Amar, supra note 201. Others' claims are absolute and, to say the least, extravagant. See 
Dow, supra, at 4 ("My thesis is that the only way to amend the Constitution is in accordance 
with the mechauism outlined in [A]rticle V. My further claim is that the mechanism outlined in 
[A]rticle V is clear, exclusive, and that it means what it says."). My own view, consistent with 
the descriptive theme of this Article and my notion that the never-ending search for legitimacy is 
unproductive, is that the Constitution so often has been amended outside of Article V, at least by 
judicial decision, that the question itself is of questionable utility. More profitable is the question 
of when a formal amendment ought to be required. See Levinson, supra note 374; see also Sager, 
supra note 28, at 933-34 (distinguishing between decisions about the Constitution, which "are 
closed, at least comparatively," and decisions authorized by the Constitution; the former are 
defined as decided by the Constitution, which is "broadly understood" to include the judiciary's 
interpretation of the Constitution). 
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amendments - largely taxes, alcohol, and Presidential succession -
do not describe the extent of change our Constitution has had to un-
dergo. 377 The Constitution has evolved far more outside Article V 
than within it. 378 Interpretations of constitutional clauses have under-
gone sea changes from generation to generation, far outstripping the 
consequence of many explicitly worded amendments. Obvious exam-
ples abound: the Commerce Clause, the Contracts Clause, the Fourth 
Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and so on. 379 One seriously 
wonders if the Constitution would have endured absent language spa-
cious enough to accommodate such change. 
Because the Constitution is spacious, no single offered interpreta-
tion of the text is likely to be accepted as correct now and for all 
time. 380 The Court is free to change its mind. The people are free to 
disagree with the Court. The Court is free to disagree with the people. 
The members of the Court are free to, and usually do, disagree with 
one another. As disagreement occurs, the document will take on new 
meanings.381 
377. None of this, of course, undermines the significance of the explicit amendments, such as 
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. But much of the significance of those 
amendments also is the product of judicial interpretation. In addition, those amendments were 
the product of a Civil War, obviously the least desirable method of constitutional change. 
378. See Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 19 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1041-50 
(1981). Indeed, the more interesting question may be why the relatively few amendments we 
have were even necessary. A likely answer, suggested by the theory I am discussing, is that the 
amendment process actually picks up the slack when other dialogue fails. If the Court or other 
branches of government cannot be convinced to come around, then the amendment process kicks 
in, as the people's last dialogic resort. This suggests in turn that the vast majority of discussion 
about amending outside Article V emphasizes the wrong subject. 
379. See Sager, supra note 28, at 895 (stating that the Constitution has been "refurbished 
from time to time through the judiciary's interpretation of its provisions"); see also NAGEL, supra 
note 27, at 11 ("Specifics cannot capture the scope of the alterations accomplished by interpreta-
tion over the years."); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 1689, 1729 (1984) (explaining how shift in attitude toward property had impact on inter-
pretation of key constitutional phrases); Winter, supra note 24, at 1508 (discussing change in 
Fourth Amendment's interpretation over time). 
380. Judge Posner makes this point exceedingly well, taking into account as he does the 
intensity of the interpreters' views: 
If the only constraints on constitutional decisionmaking are good arguments, the embarrass-
ment is the number and strength of good arguments on both sides - on many sides - of 
the hot issues. 
Heat is important here. If you're indifferent to the outcome of a dispute, you'll weigh up 
the arguments on both sides and give the nod to the side that has the stronger arguments, 
even if the weaker side has good arguments too. But if you have a strong emotional commit-
ment to one side or another, it would be not only unnatural, but imprudent, to abandon 
your commitment on the basis of a slight, or even not so slight, preponderance of arguments 
against your side. Our deepest commitments are not so weakly held. Hence there can be 
practical indeterminacy about an issue even if a disinterested observer would not think the 
competing arguments evenly balanced. 
Richard A. Posner, Legal Reasoning from the Top Down and From the Bottom Up: The Question 
of Unenumerated Constitutional Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 433, 445-46 (1992) (citing POSNER, 
supra note 363, at 124-25). 
381. Thus, Philip Bobbitt maintains that we have a "participatory Constitution," BOBBI1T, 
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Nor is the lack of finality necessarily a bad thing. Change both is 
healthy and inevitable.382 In reality, the process of constitutional in-
terpretation is dynamic, not static.383 Perhaps Martha Minow, in her 
searching response to Robert Cover, puts this best: 
Even beyond the particular right granted by the Supreme Court •.. the 
claim of any right initiates a form of communal dialogue. A claimant 
asserts a right and thereby secures the attention of the community 
through the procedures the community has designated for hearing such 
claims. The legal authority responds, and though this response is tempo-
rary and of limited scope, it provides the occasion for the next claim. 
Legal rights, then, should be understood as the language of a continuing 
process rather than . . . fixed rules. Rights discourse reaches temporary 
resting points from which new claims can be made. 384 
Moreover, such dynamism is critical to the success of the venture. 
Judges too are ,human, and judges get things wrong. For example, 
judicial decisions may be too broad, and experience will suggest tailor-
ing. Judicial decisions are experiments, and experiments rarely are 
completely successful. Sometimes they are dismal failures. 38S 
Finality would curtail the evolution of our Constitution; dynamism 
encourages it. Constitutional meaning changes because people disa-
gree about what the text means. Dynamism is to be encouraged, for 
the dynamic process helps formulate the interpretation of our funda-
mental charter. 386 Of course, there is a balance to be struck between 
dynamism and finality. Just as evolution and change is valuable, the 
rule of law is essential to a stable society. To stress "finality" may 
even be beneficial, because it corrects for the human tendency to edge 
too enthusiastically toward dynamism. But dynamic the system is. 
Under the countermajoritarian difficulty, legitimacy rests on find-
ing some normative set of constraints on judges. But no such "exter-
nal" constraint presents itself. The alternative is to recognize that 
ours is a dynamic system of interpretation, with a Constitution spa-
cious enough to permit interpretive disagreement. This disagreement 
supra note 5, at 238, and insists that all constitutional actors play their part in interpreting the 
document. Id. at 185-86. 
382. See ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 34 ("[T]he Constitution is more than an idea. It is an 
evolving historical practice, constituted by generations of Americans as they mobilized •••• "), 
383. See Chemerinsky, supra note 73, at 1256-57 (arguing that the "evolving" nature of the 
Constitution was resolved as early as Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415, 427 (1819)). 
384. Minow, supra note 337, at 1875-76 (footnote omitted). 
385. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 
How.) 393 (1856). 
386. The First Amendment metaphor of a marketplace of ideas seems apt here. Judicial 
pronouncements are speech containing ideas, just like any other speech. There is no reason such 
ideas would not benefit from a process of reconsideration and modification. 
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leads to a dialogue about interpretation. In this dialogue the courts 
have a voice - an essential voice as I soon will explain - but it is not 
a voice that pretends to shout out the crowd. 
Ill. FROM "DIFFICULTY" TO "DIALOGUE": THE JUDICIAL ROLE 
IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
The challenge now is to define a judicial role in our constitutional 
system that sidesteps the faulty premises of the countermajoritarian 
difficulty and integrates the triple virtues of spaciousness, dynamism, 
and constituency representation. Many the0ries of judicial review are 
by their own terms ideals,· these theories are constructed with an 
"ought" in mind. "Oughts" are important, but reality often falls short 
of such normative first principles. 387 The alternative is to. describe 
rather than define. My goal here is to describe the manner in which 
courts actually operate in society. This description should resonate 
with readers for the simple reason that it actually describes the world 
in which we live. 
I call the process of judicial review that actually occurs in the 
workaday world dialogue. 388 The term emphasizes that judicial re-
view is significantly more interdependent and interactive than gener-
ally described. The Constitution is not interpreted by aloof judges 
imposing their will on the people. Rather, constitutional interpreta-
tion is an elaborate discussion between judges and the body politic. 389 
387. Cf. Epstein, supra note 323, at 1633 (describing how normative vision of republicanism 
falls short as a descriptive matter). 
388. I am not the first to observe this dialogue, or to use the term. See ACKERMAN, supra 
note 14, at 5; BICKEL, CoNSENT, supra note 13, at 111 (discussing "conversation" the Supreme 
Court has with society, lower courts, and so forth); Stephen L. Carter, The Morgan ''Power" and 
the Forced Reconsideration of Constitutional Decisions, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 819, 851-59 (1986); 
Michelman, supra note 330, at 60; see also Gerhardt, supra note 104 (arguing for greater candor 
and elaboration on the value of judicial precedents in order to facilitate dialogue on the stability 
of constitutional law). Dialogic theories come in many shapes and ~izes, and I have been influ-
enced by many of them. I also have tried to develop the idea of dialogue significantly more than 
others, many of whom simply allude to it. See Epstein, supra note 323, at 1633 ("While both 
men [Sunstein and Michelman] praise the virtues of deliberation, they do not give us any gui-
dance as to the form that deliberation should take or the ends that it should seek."). One notable 
exception is Robert Burt's new book. See BURT, supra note 189. 
389. Robert Nagel advances the novel perspective that less dialogue is better. In his recent 
book, Nagel implies that too muchjudicial interpretation of the Constitution creates uncertainty 
and upsets shared meanings. See NAGEL, supra note 27, at 7-12. Nagel argues that an "uninter-
preted constitution,'' in which the Constitution gets its meaning "from practice rather than from 
interpretation,'' id. at 12, would be superior to the process of dialogue. I agree with some of 
Nagel's central points, for example that certain constitutional issues are better left unresolved. 
See Friedman, supra note 173, at 56-58 (arguing that uncertainty is a virtue regarding Congress' 
power to control federal jurisdiction). Nonetheless, Nagel seems to overstate the extent to which 
judicial interpretation can or should be avoided. This article demonstrates that judicial partici-
pation, while not contributing to settled meaning, can play a vital role in national debate regard-
ing the meaning of the Constitution. 
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The American body politic consists of numerous constituencies 
clamoring to be heard and striving to prevail on any given issue. Gov-
ernment's task is to reconcile the views of these constituencies, find 
consensus when possible, reach a compromise, and move forward. 390 
Courts play a vital part in this task. Constitutional courts adjudi-
cate claims of right and challenges to government action that purport-
edly trench upon mandated institutional arrangements. Courts 
resolve these disputes by participating in and fostering debate about 
the proper course of government. When government seeks to act, con-
stituencies will object, claiming that the action violates established 
rights, or tramples on a constitutionally mandated structural arrange-
ment. The Constitution's spacious text permits divergence on these 
questions. It provides a framework for constituencies to disagree and 
struggle over the document's meaning. The Court, like all other insti-
tutions, speaks to the meaning of the text. In this sense, the Court is, 
like all other branches of government,391 an active participant in the 
debate over the Constitution's meaning. In another sense, however, 
the Court is able to do much more. The Court facilitates and shapes 
the constitutional debate. The Court sparks discussion as to what the 
text should mean by siding with one constituency's interpretation, or 
synthesizing several, as to what our norms should be. The Court dic-
tates how the dialogue will proceed by choosing one interpretation. 
The process of reaching an interpretative consensus on the text is dy-
namic. 392 The Court may offer an interpretation that is operative for a 
time, but the Court's opinions lead debate on a path that often ulti-
mately changes that interpretation.393 Not coincidentally, the ac-
cepted interpretation shifts and changes as constituencies shift and 
grow in strength. 
This process of constitutional interpretation hardly pits the Court 
against the people. Rather, the Court mediates the views of various 
people. 394 The process is interactive, like all mediation, and the ulti-
390. Robert Burt describes similar arguments about the function of government in The Con-
stitution in Conflict. BURT, supra note 189, at 96-99. This notion also comports with both Burt's 
and my own description of how judicial review operates. See id. at 99, 102 (describing Lincoln's 
view of the Dred Scott decision and suggesting "the possibilities for rekindling this Lincolnian 
ideal"). 
391. See, e.g., BURT, supra note 189, at 99 (describing Madison's view that the Court is but 
one interpreter of the Constitution). 
392. Philip Bobbitt offers an elegant expression of this idea. He describes a "mutually affect-
ing reaction between a society and its law" in which "all constitutional actors" interpret the 
constitutional text and "participate in creating constitutional decisions of principally expressive 
significance." BOBBrrr, supra note 5, at 184-85. 
393. When an interpretation remains constant for some time it accretes legitimacy. See BOB· 
Brrr, supra note 5, at 236 (describing how holdings become "true" over time). 
394. Bickel himself seemed to recognize this, at least early on, when he said that the Court's 
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mate result depends upon participation by all interested parties. Sim-
ply put, our process of constitutional interpretation is a dialogue. 
A. The System of Dialogue 
This section tells the story of how constitutional dialogue occurs. 
Because the dialogue is ongoing, this story could begin at any point. 
Moreover, telling the story in all its complexity would require far 
greater exposition than is possible here. A complete narrative would 
require writing in several directions at one time, in order to track the 
contours of the interpretive dialogue itself. We think and write in a 
linear mode, however; my narrative therefore follows our method of 
thinking. This description of American constitutionalism deviates 
from the account offered by the countermajoritarian difficulty; the nar-
rative thus implicitly asks the question which description provides a 
better portrait of how constitutional interpretation actually occurs. 
This story begins with governmental action. Such action may be 
taken by what we deem a majority - through the legislature - but 
this need not be true. It may not even be the norm. A significant 
portion of government action that affects individuals is taken by offi-
cials or by collectives of officials that represent the "majority" in only 
the most theoretical and questionable manner.395 But this narrative 
starts with some governmental action that affects an individual. 
The individual balks. He believes that the government has over-
stepped its bounds. "I have a right," he asserts. (Individuals also may 
assert violations of structural guarantees, but this description will fo-
cus on claims of right.) The individual's claim is adjudicated 
(although adjudication is not the only way to resolve a claim of right). 
Evidence and arguments are mustered. The adversarial process pro-
duces some answer as to whether the individual's right was violated. 
A single judge resolves the claim in the first instance. 
Of course one judge rarely settles the dispute. Her decision inevi-
tably is appealed to another tribunal. The more important the issue, 
the likelier more judges will participate .. If the governmental action 
affected a number of individuals, a number of separate adjudications 
may ensue. There may be conflicting decisions. 396 Several jurisdic-
judgment on an issue likely will reflect popular will through the Court's "continuing colloquy 
with the political institutions and with society at large ..•. " BICKEL, supra note 2, at 240; see 
also BURT, supra note 189, at 23. 
395. See supra text accompanying notes 280-81. 
396. See Sunstein, supra note 309, at 1562 ("[D]isagreement can be a creative force. Na-
tional institutions were set up so as to ensure a measure of competition and dialogue; the federal 
systems would produce both experimentation and mutual controls."). 
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tions and many judges will be involved. 397 
H the issue is of general importance the Supreme Court may hear 
the case. At this point in the. process, an issue, not just a case, is 
clearly being debated. The Court will hear argument about the issue, 
which will have been tailored throughout the litigation by the process 
of winnowing and synthesizing. Groups that might be affected will file 
their own briefs and will offer help to the parties. Debate is sharpened. 
The Court issues its decision. The Supreme Court is important, 
like the President, or Congress: it is the "last" judicial voice, at least 
for this round.398 The public notices when the Supreme Court de-
cides. 399 Reporters cover the cases the Court will hear - generating 
interest - and the decisions, which generate debate.400 Some people 
agree with the Court; others are outraged. People discuss the decision 
in formal meetings, or in informal gatherings, or they act alone. Arti-
cles are written commenting on the Court's decision. More lawsuits 
are brought, some formulated specifically to test the bounds of the 
Court's decision.401 Town councils act. School boards act. Legisla-
tures act at every level of government. 402 
This cycle of action creates more media attention. Some issues be-
come more important than others. The Court has made some previ-
ously dormant issues important. People take sides.403 They formulate 
397. A certain amount of redundancy inheres in the system, apparently pursuant to the 
Framers' desire to limit government power. TusHNET, supra note 162, at 9-10. On such dialogic 
redundancy in specific contexts, see Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikolf, Dialectical 
Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1048-50 (1977) (describing fed-
eral-state dialogue in the context of habeas corpus litigation); Jack M. Beermann, Government 
Official Torts and the Takings Clause: Federalism and State Sovereign Immunity, 68 B.U. L. 
REv. 277, 335 & nn.230-32 (1988) (describing dialogue in governmental tort litigation); Judith 
A. Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 837, 882 (1984) (describing federal-state dialogue in context 
of habeas corpus litigation). 
398. On the special role of the Supreme Court, see Friedman, supra note 173, at 10-28. 
399. Robert Cover found this uniqueness '~urispathic." In Cover's view, law is created by 
various communities, but the hierarchy of decision leads courts, and particularly the Supreme 
Court, to suppress one law in favor of another. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term 
- Foreword: Nomos and Na"ative, 97 HARv. L. REv. 4, 40-44 (1983). Cover's thesis, while 
true in a sense, places too much weight on the finality of judicial decisions. A court's choice of 
one law may ultimately lead to communal adoption of quite another law. 
400. Martha Minow suggested to me that the role of the media is yet another important 
structural part of our system of self-governance that may not operate precisely as the Framers 
intended but nonetheless bears the seeds of their thinking. In this regard it is interesting to 
compare Gerald Rosenberg's conclusion that courts have not had a great impact on the women's 
rights movement, ROSENBERG, supra note 147, at 226-27, with his own reports of the media's 
strongly worded comments to the contrary. See id. at 173 (citing, for example, a news story 
referring to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), as "a landmark decision"). I, perhaps more than 
Rosenberg, tend to think that, if the media says it enough, it gains some truth. 
401. Or any court's decision; the Supreme Court is not the only catalyst, merely the most 
visible one. 
402. Michelman's description, quoted supra note 330, is appropriately vibrant. 
403. In so doing, people participate in writing the story about the Constitution's meaning. 
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opinions. They listen as others speak, and thus they change their opin-
ions. They vote, or mail in a check to an organization, or write their 
representative in the legislature. A political campaign ensues. 
Promises are made. Candidates are elected, including Presidents and 
senators. These candidates have views, shaped throughout the debate, 
on judicial candidates.404 New judges are appointed. The judges have 
views similar to those of the officials who appointed them.405 Cases 
come to these new judges. 406 The judges observe legislative action and 
note the "unworkability" of prior decisions. 407 They work around the 
prior decisions. They confront the prior decisions. New Justices also 
are appointed to the Supreme Court,408 or perhaps the Supreme Court 
finally "hears" the people. The people dig in; the Court bails out. The 
Constitution is re interpreted, and its meaning changes. 
So it goes in infinite progress. 409 This is only a tiny glimpse at an 
Despite my great respect for much of Frank Michelman's work, I thus disagree with him in one 
very fundamental respect. ''To be precise," Michelman writes, "we do not write the story unless 
we happen to be Justices." Michelman, supra note 330, at 65. To the contrary, people write the 
story every day. The story is written when police officers conduct illegal searches, when teachers 
invite students to engage in prayer despite Supreme Court pronouncements, and when legisla-
tures refrain from adopting restrictive abortion laws despite Court invitations to do so. 
404. "On a larger scale, over time, the Court's decisions on many important issues have a 
strong effect on politics; politics aff'ect·elections; elections aff'ect who is appointed to the Court, 
which aff'ects the Court's decision; and so on." Glenn H. Reynolds, Chaos and the Court, 91 
CoLUM. L. REV. 110, 114 (1991). 
405. Gerhardt, supra note 104, at 100-01 (discussing how appointments to the Court fulfilled 
President Reagan's and President Bush's campaign promises to be tougher on criminals); Strauss 
& Sunstein, supra note 177, at 1506 (When the President has criticized the Court, "the Presi-
dent's appointments can be counted on to reflect his own commitments."); see also Elhauge, 
supra note 182, at 81-83 (discussing role of interest groups in judicial appointments); Mark Sil-
verstein, The People, the Senate and the Court: The Democratization of the Judicial Confirmation 
System. 9 CoNsr. CoMMENTARY 41 (1992) (the title of which says it all); Sager, supra note 28, at 
931 (suggesting that judges are a part of the society that surrounds them). 
406. In Constitutional Dialogues, Louis Fisher discusses the view of private organizations, 
which see litigation as simply another "political process" in which to become involved. FlsHER, 
supra note 108, at 15-24. 
407. The doctrine of stare decisis is in tension with this notion, although the doctrine suppos-
edly has less weight in constitutional cases for precisely this reason. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michi-
gan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2686 (1991) (stating that "stare decisis is less rigid in its application to 
constitutional precedents"). In their joint opinion announcing the Supreme Court's decision in 
Planned Parenthood v. Cosey, however, Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy spelled out at 
length a "reliance" model of stare decisis that could be read as chilling this transformative pro-
cess. 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808..()9 (1992). On the other hand, the joint opinion may well restrain 
attempts by new appointees to transform constitutional law quickly. 
408. In the context of another point Cover puts it best, referring to "the extraordinary capac-
ity of small shifts in membership of the Supreme Court to transform not only the decisional law 
of that Court, but also the strategic significance of the entire federal judiciary •... " Cover, supra 
note 399, at 58. For a good critique of the "transformative" power of judicial appointments, see 
ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 52-54. 
409. My conception of the process of constitutional interpretation thus diverges from Bruce 
Ackerman's "dualist" description of democracy. In Ackerman's view the Court's job is to up-
hold the work of "ordinary politics" unless a course of action runs afoul of "higher lawmaking." 
Higher lawmaking represents decisions made by the people during moments of extraordinary 
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intricate, involved, robust process. Yet the description serves its pur-
pose, primarily because readers know the process so well. This pro-
cess of interpreting the Constitution is interactive. It is dialogic. 
Courts play a prominent role, but theirs is assuredly not the only voice 
in the dialogue.410 
B. An Example: The Dialogue About Abortion 
Thus far my account has been somewhat abstract. The following 
discussion gives content to the concept through a dialogic tour of one 
of the most controversial issues facing the judiciary and the people 
today, the issue of abortion.411 
consensus. These periods may be embodied in explicit constitutional amendments, but courts 
also can discern other periods of extraordinary change. For Ackerman, there have been only 
three such periods. See ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 58. As my description of dialogue makes 
clear, I believe dialogue consistently is transformative of political life. 
Ackerman presents a railroad metaphor of democracy, with judges sitting in the back, always 
synthesizing the past in order to discern and interpret higher law. See ACKERMAN, supra note 
14, at 98-99. Steve Winter rightfully critiques Ackerman's metaphor as "too quaint and Euro-
pean for a modem, mobile America." Winter suggests that judges are not simply synthesizing 
our past: judges are "always on the freeway and always looking forward, backward, and side-to-
side at all the other drivers." Winter, supra note 24, at 1522; see also Winter, Judicial Review, 
supra note 40, at 685 (arguing that interpretation can come from bottom (people) up (to court)); 
Frank I. Michelman, Law~ Republic, 91 YALE L.J. 1493, 1521-24 (1988) (criticizing Ackerman's 
characterization of the law as authoritarian); Sager, supra note 28, at 931 (criticizing Ackerman's 
dualist regime). 
While I agree that Ackerman's thesis does not mirror reality, in that it limits too severely the 
transformative role of dialogue, Winter's own conception of dialogue also seems to me too one-
sided. In Winter's dialogue judges synthesize popular views and then hand down law. But Win-
ter takes inadequate account of the converse. People also listen to what judges say and change 
their political views. Thus, people not only influence courts, but courts influence people. I envi-
sion constitutional interpretation as a highly interactive dialogue, in which both sides are influen-
tial. See Michelman, supra, at 1523. Ackerman seems to appreciate this at times: 
By dramatizing the fundamental constitutional principles raised by the New Deal, the Old 
Court contributed to a more focused, and democratic, transformation of constitutional iden-
tity than might otherwise have occurred. By holding up a mirror to the American people 
that re-presented the fundamental principles of the middle republic, the Old Court made it 
easier, not harder, for the citizenry of the 1930's to clarify what they found wanting in the 
traditional structure ••.. 
ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 104. 
410. This is the central thesis in Louis Fisher's Constitutional Dialogues. Fisher develops a 
theory of "coordinate construction" in which "the executive and legislative branches necessarily 
share with the judiciary a major role in interpreting the Constitution." Fisher makes the point 
wonderfully, by offering telling examples. FISHER, supra note 108, at 231; see also Fisher, supra 
note 349. I differ with - or move a step past - Fisher in that I believe that all branches 
facilitate a dialogue in which the people give content to the constitutional text. 
411. As I embark on this discussion, one piece of work on the role of the Supreme Court 
deserves special mention, perhaps because I struggled for a long time to understand exactly what 
I could or should say about it. That piece of work is Professor Gerald Rosenberg's intriguing 
study of the Supreme Court's role in social reform, The Hollow Hope. ROSENBERG, supra note 
147. In The Hollow Hope Rosenberg ultimately concludes that courts are not very good engines 
of social reform, in large part because of the constraints courts face in implementing a social 
reform agenda. See id. at 336-43. I have little quarrel with this proposition in general terms. As 
I argue throughout, courts tend to achieve results when there is majoritarian support for what 
they decide, and courts tend to decide in ways for which there is majoritarian support. Thus, I 
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Roe v. Wade 412 is one of the most criticized decisions of the 
Supreme Court.413 From the perspective of the countermajoritarian 
difficulty, this makes sense. Commentators regularly level the charge 
that Roe represents judicial fiat rather than constitutional "law."414 
Roe is, for these commentators, the epitome of the problem with an 
unconstrained judiciary: without sound basis in the Constitution 
judges have interfered with the majority's right to regulate abortion. 
The story that must be told about Roe, to be consistent with the 
countermajoritarian difficulty, is highly contestable, however. The 
first premise of the countermajoritarian difficulty insists that state laws 
regulating abortion represented majority will. Roe, which struck 
down those laws, thus ostensibly thwarted majority will. Polling data 
suggest just the opposite, however. A majority, or at least a strong 
plurality, of the population has supported Roe since the time of deci-
am little surprised by the data Rosenberg offers consistently showing that major social reform 
efforts already were underway by the time the Court acted. See, e.g., id. at 241 ("I will highlight 
the simple point that the women's movement was moving full blast before Court decisions on 
behalf of women's rights came to be."). 
Nonetheless, I am left with the sense that Rosenberg seriously understates the impact of 
courts, perhaps because his focus is on a slightly different question than mine. With regard to the 
Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), for example, Rosenberg gener-
ally concludes that progress toward abortion rights was steady before Roe, and that the Roe 
decision was at best partially successful in aiding the availability of abortion. ROSENBERG, supra 
note 147, at 178-80. But Rosenberg also observes that, "in the years after 1973, opposition to 
abortion strengthened and grew." Id. at 182. Rosenberg's conclusion with regard to abortion 
and the role of the Court seems quite ambivalent; any change that occurred is attributed to 
outside factors, such as political support, that enabled the Court to proceed. Id. at 201. 
Because he is looking primarily for "social change," id. at 1, or "social reform,'' id. at 5, and 
because he looks in areas in which the liberal agenda is said to have been furthered by Court 
action, Rosenberg tends to miss the impact of Court decisions that are reactive or, as I would say, 
dialogic. As my own telling of the abortion story will suggest, much of Roe's impact, at least 
initially, was to mobilize the antichoice forces. This mobilization had an enormous impact, yet 
Rosenberg (although acknowledging this reaction) counts it little in his assessment of the role of 
the Court. I believe this impact is significant in terms of the societal dialogue. 
By the same token, Rosenberg does not lend particular effort to assessing the extent to which 
judicial anti-"reform" or "change" decisions had a positive impact. Yet, as I suggest elsewhere, 
it could be, for example, that the Supreme Court's opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986), had the impact of further mobilizing the gay community toward broader societal accept-
ance of their arguments. See infra note 475. 
Finally, none of this should be read to suggest that the only impact I see of Supreme Court 
decisions is "negative reaction." Despite, or perhaps reading around, Rosenberg's evidence, I 
nonetheless believe judicial decisions can have the effect of crystalizing developing public 
opinion. 
412. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
413. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABsOLUTES 79 (1990). 
414. See, e.g., Boru.::, supra note 238: 
In the years since 1973, no one, however pro-abortion, has ever thought of an argument that 
even remotely begins to justify Roe v. Wade as a constitutional decision .•.. There is no 
room for argument about the conclusion that the decision was the assumption of illegitimate 
judicial power and a usurpation of the democratic authority of the American people. 
Id. at 115-16; see also John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 
82'YALE L.J. 920, 947 (1973) ("[Roe] is bad because it is bad constitutional law, or rather be-
cause it is not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be."). 
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sion.415 By the same token, the countermajoritarian difficulty must 
view Roe as the end of the story.416 Roe is depicted as thwarting ma-
jority will in some way that precluded further popular action. In real-
ity, however, Roe is at best a beginning.417 Relating the story of the 
abortion debate emphasizes the dialogic nature of judicial review. 
Actually, the modem story of abortion rights begins well before 
Roe. 418 Just as Roe has proved a catalyst for the abortion debate, Roe 
also was a product of political activity that preceded the decision.419 
Why abortion rights moved to center stage in the early 1970s is diffi-
cult to say, beyond the broad influence of changing societal views on 
sexuality and personal privacy. What is evident is that Roe was the 
product of a push for social change that had become difficult, by 1973, 
for the Court to ignore.420 As early as 1959 the American Law Insti-
tute had recommended more permissive abortion laws,421 and in 1967 
the American Medical Association endorsed the ALI position. 422 
Some states had liberalized their abortion policies in the years between 
1960 and Roe. 423 The battle for liberalization was fought largely by 
women's groups, including the newly formed National Association for 
Repeal of Abortion Laws (NARAL) and the National Organization 
for Women (NOW).424 
415. See supra text accompanying notes 147-49. 
416. Even Robert Burt, who talks of constitutional dialogue in sophisticated and sensible 
terms, sees Roe as final and thus condemns the decision in the context of his preference for 
egalitarian interpretation. BURT, supra note 189, at 357-59. I believe Burt wrongly emphasizes 
the finality of Roe and thus overlooks the complicated, dialogic story told in this section. 
417. In addition to the following discussion, see TuSHNET, supra note 162, at 153, and 
Carter, supra note 388, at 821, both of whom see Roe as a beginning, of sorts, of a dialogue. 
418. See generally TRIBE, supra note 413, at 35-51 (tracing the history of abortion in 
America from the 1950s to 1973). 
419. See, e.g., id.; Nancy Stearns, Roe v. Wade: Our Struggle Continues, 4 BERKELEY Wo-
MBN'S L.J. 1, 5-6 (1988-89) ("We must never forget that Roe v. Wade did not just 'happen.' That 
decision came only after the short but intense political and legal efforts of women across the 
country."). 
420. Robert Burt argues with some persuasive force that the Roe Court should not have 
addressed the merits but should have utilized "the passive virtues" to permit the societal dialogue 
to continue unimpeded. See BURT, supra note 189, at 348-51. 
421. TRIBE, supra note 413, at 36. The 1959 proposal would have amended the American 
Law lnstitute's Model Penal Code to allow abortion where: (1) "continuation of the pregnancy 
'would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the mother'"; (2) the "child was likely to 
be born with 'grave physical or mental defects' "; or (3) "the pregnancy resulted from rape or 
incest." Id. 
422. Id. at 38. 
423. Nineteen states reformed their abortion laws between 1967 and 1973. See TRIBE, supra 
note 413, at 49. Most of these reforms resembled the ALi's 1957 proposal. See id. at 42. Four 
states, however, left the abortion decision completely to the pregnant woman, at least during the 
first 20 weeks of pregnancy. See id. at 51. 
424. Although women's groups had not initially been major participants in the movement to 
reform criminal abortion laws, by 1973 they "almost universally supported complete repeal" of 
such laws. TRIBE, supra note 413, at 43. 
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Quite sensibly, the battle for liberalization was fought in courts as 
well as legislatures. For organized. groups with limited resources con-
cerned. with societal change, courts are a logical place to turn. As 
compared. with trying to force change in the legislative arena, courts 
are relatively accessible. Judicial actions require far fewer resources 
than legislative challenges. Inertia is more easily overcome in the 
courts. Thus, a number of court actions had been brought before 
1973, with varying results.42s 
The Supreme Court's own decisions had in fact been partly respon-
sible for the forces that brought Roe to the Court. The 1966 decision 
in Griswold v. Connecticut, 426 permitting married couples to use con-
traceptives, certainly fueled the hope that the Court would extend the 
privacy right to the abortion context. Following Griswold, however, 
the Court ducked the abortion question about as often as it could427 
before deciding to hear and address the issue in Roe. 
The decision in Roe, legalizing abortion under certain conditions, 
served as a catalyst for political and legislative action. Although 
hardly the beginning of the debate, Roe certainly signaled a new era in 
thinking about abortion. In fact, one might say the Court began a 
process of requiring the citizenry to think about abortion. With legis-
lative inertia on the side of those who cared about and opposed abor-
tion, and with the prochoice movement still relatively nascent, the 
number of Americans that had given serious thought to the question 
before Roe is unclear. Almost twenty years later, one reasonably can 
guess that most Americans have a view on the question and have given 
the question some thought. 42s 
425. See Steams, supra note 419, at 4-5 (discussing pre-Roe legal challenges to state abortion 
laws brought by large groups of women plaintiffs in New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Penn-
sylvania, Massachusetts, Tennessee, and Rhode Island); Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. 
Conn. 1972) (holding that Connecticut's abortion law violated women's rights to liberty and 
privacy), vacated, 410 U.S. 951 (1973). 
426. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
427. Roe was the second Supreme Court ·decision concerning abortion. BURT, supra note 
189, at 344. The first was United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971), in which the Court upheld 
a statute prohibiting abortions based on its conclusion that statutes should always be construed 
to uphold their constitutionality and thereby avoided consideration of the abortion issue. 
428. There is some support for this in the increasing number of single-issue voters on abor-
tion, a fairly rare phenomenon 15 years ago. See Bush's No-No on Abortion, TIME, Nov. 6, 1989, 
at 30 (citing a TIME/CNN Poll finding that 54% of adult women believe that "abortion is one of 
the most important issues facing the country today"). Justice Thomas' statement during his 
confirmation hearings that he had not given the matter serious thought or reached a conclusion 
on the subject is thus somewhat remarkable. See Tony Mauro, Thomas Lets Conservative Vote 
Do the Talking, U,.S.A. TODAY, June 30, 1992, at 2A. One suspects that Thomas recognized that 
any candidate with a public opinion on the question was unlikely to be confirmed, especially if 
the opinion stood against abortion rights. See A Blank Slate, TIME, Aug. 6, 1990, at 16 (citing a 
TIME/CNN poll showing that 59% of Americans "oppose a Supreme Court nominee who would 
vote to overturn Roe v. Wade"). 
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Roe most immediately served to motivate the antiabortion 
forces.429 Fueled by a Vatican statement that Roe was morally mon-
strous, the Catholic Church largely was behind early efforts to restrict 
abortion rights despite Roe. 430 Although the movement quickly secu-
larized, abortion nonetheless remained a primary issue of the religious 
right. In addition, Roe likely was one of a number of decisions that 
gave rise to increasing political movement in the 1980s by the evangel-
ical right.431 
After Roe the focus of the dialogue shifted to state legislatures. 
Unlike many Supreme Court decisions that provoke and permit a 
lower level of defiant activism, such as continuing to pray in public 
school classrooms despite pronouncements forbidding the conduct, 
challenging Roe effectively called for a legislative response. 432 Roe was 
followed by an onslaught of legislation aimed at abortion rights, run-
ning the gamut from open challenge to optimistic subterfuge. Some 
states enacted restrictive laws that could not possibly have been 
thought constitutional in light of Roe. Others erected roadblocks to 
abortion by restricting its availability under differing circumstances or 
by imposing requirements that raised the cost of the procedure.433 
429. See TRIBE, supra note 413, at 16 (''The main consequence of the decision in Roe •• • was 
to galvanize a right-to-life movement ••.. "). 
430. See id. at 139, 143, 145-47. "[I]t is widely believed that the Catholic Church either 
supported or quietly ran most right-to-life organizations during the years immediately following 
Roe." Id. at 145-46. In 1975, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops unveiled a "compre-
hensive pastoral plan for pro-life political activities." Id. at 146. 
431. See id. at 147 ("By 1976 opposition to abortion was on its way to becoming a main 
vehicle for the rise in political influence of Protestant fundamentalism in the United States."). 
432. Actually, some defiant action occurred in the form of abortion clinic bombings. See id. 
at 172 (noting that between 1977 and 1990, antiabortion extremists "bombed or set fire to at least 
117 clinics and threatened 250 others"). 
433. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Ameris:an College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 
747 (1986) (invalidating extreme reporting and informational requirements as well as require-
ment that physicians exercise due care to preserve the life of a viable fetus when possible at no 
additional risk to the woman's health), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. 
Ct. 2791 (1992); Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (upholding Mis-
souri requirements (i) that two physicians be present at all postviability abortions and (ii) that a 
pathologist perform a tissue sample analysis in all abortions); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for 
Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (invalidating city requirements that (i) all post 
first-term abortions be performed in hospitals, (ii) all minors under age 15 obtain parental con-
sent, (iii) physicians provide information designed to influence a woman's informed decision, and 
(iv) women wait for a fixed period between seeking and obtaining an abortion), overruled in part 
by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) 
(upholding a Utah parental notification law); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding 
denial of Medicaid funds even for some medically necessary abortions); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 
U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion) (holding that a state cannot require a minor to obtain paren-
tal consent before obtaining an abortion without providing a bypass procedure); Colautti v. 
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (invalidating a Pennsylvania law imposing a special duty of care 
on physicians to preserve fetal life when they had sufficient reason to believe that the fetus might 
be viable); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding Connecticut regulation preventing use 
of state Medicaid funding for nontherapeutic abortions); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 
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Legislative response to Roe also occurred at the national level. Roe 
has spawned numerous proposed constitutional amendments directed 
at overturning it. 434 Congress also has considered a host of legislative 
proposals, ranging from attempts to restrict the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts435 to curtailment of federal funding for abortion.436 
The decision in Roe - not just the judgment but the Court's opin-
ion - was a vital force in shaping the challenges mounted by abortion 
opponents. Prolife forces tailored their responses to language in the 
Roe opinion, as well as to the bases for the Roe decision. The Court's 
suggestions in Roe regarding permissible areas for state regulation led 
to complicated regulatory schemes quite obviously designed to limit 
abortions. Language in the Roe decision indicating that the Constitu-
tion's references to "life" did not include the unborn fetus led to efforts 
to define life in constitutional or legislative terms. 437 Roe therefore 
generated a highly interactive process of legislative enactment-federal 
court response, tailoring the areas in which states could regulate the 
abortion process. For example, parental consent laws early on pro-
vided one area in which the Court was willing to sanction state regula-
tion. 438 A cycle of state law-court decision-state law evolved, with 
legislatures ultimately passing laws the Court approved. This process 
can hardly be described exclusively as the Court speaking and legisla-
tures listening. The Court undoubtedly was educated along the way, 
as to both the types of regulation that might occur and the intensity of 
popular opinion. 
Indeed, popular opinion plays an important role in the abortion 
dialogue, though the discussion of legislative action somewhat ob-
U.S. 52 (1976) (invalidating a Missouri law that required women to obtain the written consent of 
their spouses before having first-term abortions and prohibited saline amniocentesis after the first 
trimester, but upholding state requirements that (i) women certify in writing that their consent to 
an abortion is informed and voluntary and (ii) detailed records of all abortions be kept). See 
generally ROSENBERG, supra note 147, at 176-77; Albert M. Pearson & Paul M. Kurtz, The 
Abortion Controversy: A Study in Law and Politics, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 427 (1985). 
434. See Pearson & Kurtz, supra note 433, at 446-55 (discussing the numerous attempts to 
overturn Roe by constitutional amendment). In 1982, the Hatch Amendment, which would have 
overturned Roe's constitutional protection of abortion rights and allowed the states or Congress 
to determine the legality of abortion, was defeated in the Republican Senate by a vote of 50 to 49. 
TRIBE, supra note 413, at 162-65. 
435. See Pearson & Kurtz, supra note 433, at 456-59 (discussing congressional attempts to 
restrict lower federal court jurisdiction and Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over abortion 
issues). 
436. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding the Hyde Amendment, which 
limited to cases of rape, incest, and danger to the mother's life the use of federal funds to pay for 
abortions). 
437. The Human Life Bill, for example, would have defined human life as beginning at con-
ception. See Pearson & Kurtz, supra note 433, at 460-63. 
438. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (upholding a pa-
rental consent requirement). 
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scures it. Public opinion consistently has provided more support 
for judicial action liberalizing abortion laws than for legislation re-
stricting those rights.439 But, interestingly, public opinion also tends 
to support parental consent laws.440 Perhaps not coincidentally, the 
Court was more sympathetic to parental notification and consent even 
at the height of the hegemony of Roe. 441 For all the talk of 
countermajoritarian courts, the Supreme Court may well have voiced 
the predominant view when it decided Roe. 
Roe also served to draw countless interested groups into the debate 
about abortion, informing and shaping the debate. Organized religion 
obviously long has been concerned with abortion. The Roe Court's 
opinion acknowledged and referred to this. Over time religious groups 
increasingly became active not only in public debate but also in filing 
amicus briefs before the Court in abortion cases. Likewise with the 
medical profession. The Court consistently has referred to and relied 
upon medical evidence in shaping abortion rules. This, in turn, has led 
the medical profession to speak on the issue and assert its influence 
over the debate. 
While Roe spurred a great deal of activity, the decision also had a 
chilling effect on some political activity.442 While Roe energized those 
opposed to abortion, the decision simultaneously slowed the activity of 
those who favor abortion rights by assu.rin:g them that the right was 
439. The public has generally supported the decision in Roe. See supra note 148. The public 
also disfavors laws that would drastically restrict the availability of abortions. See GALLUP, 
supra note 155, at 45 (showing that, in 1990 only 42% favored a proposed Idaho law that would 
have restricted the availability of abortions to cases of rape, incest, fetal deformity, and danger to 
the life of the mother, while 52% opposed the law); GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL: 
PUBLIC OPINION 1989, at 165 (1990) (showing that in 1989 36% favored and 59% opposed 
passing laws and regulations that would make it difficult for women's clinics that perform abor-
tions to continue to operate). 
However, considerable public support exists for less drastic restrictions on abortion. See Id. 
at 169-70 (showing that in 1989 (1) 54% favored and 43% opposed laws forbidding abortions in 
public hospitals except when necessary to save the life of the mother; (2) 52% favored and 41% 
opposed laws requiring that women who are five months pregnant take a test to determine if the 
fetus might survive outside the womb before having an abortion; and (3) 67% favored and 29% 
opposed laws requiring that women under eighteen years of age obtain parental consent before 
having an abortion). 
440. See GALLUP, supra note 439, at 165 (showing that in 1989, 67% favored and 29% 
opposed laws requiring that women under 18 years of age obtain parental consent before having 
an abortion). 
441. See Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (upholding parental consent requirement); Bellotti v. Baird, 
443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979) (plurality opinion) (approving parental notice so long as the state pro-
vides a judicial bypass procedure). 
442. Thus, my friends remind me that dialogue can be both beneficial and harmful. Ann 
Althouse chided me concerning my description of the abortion controversy because the Court, 
while spurring some political activity, chilled other activity. See also infra text accompanying 
note 443. For a related view, see Spann, supra note 20, arguing that the Court's supposed affinity 
for aiding minorities, and decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education, may actually chill 
minority political activity, which in the long run might be more fruitful. 
February 1993] Dialogue and Judicial Review 665 
protected. 443 As history demonstrated, hasty regrouping was required 
to reactivate the abortion rights energy in state legislatures as the 
Supreme Court ceded more and more regulatory authority over abor-
tion to the states during the 1980s. 
Nonetheless, Roe and its progeny have had an enormous impact in 
motivating the public on the issue of abortion. Although polls suggest 
that much of the public for some time did not place abortion rights 
near the top of the political agenda,444 those who cared have managed 
to find their voice with political candidates. As antiabortion activity 
rose in fervor, from increased bombings of abortion clinics445 to more 
vigorous political activity on the right, the issue began to take on 
greater importance in elective politics.446 The number· of single-issue 
voters against abortion rights expanded.447 Candidates for President 
had to respond to these voices, and they did so by promising and ap-
pointing Supreme Court Justices, and federal judges, who were pur-
portedly far more hostile to abortion rights.448 Eventually Roe 
reached a critical moment in the Supreme Court. First came expres-
sions of dissatisfaction from new, conservative members of the 
Court.449 More new Justices then joined them.450 Roe was suddenly 
in serious danger. 
The climate surrounding the Court's decision in Webster 451 tells. 
one of the most dramatic parts of the story regarding political debate 
and abortion rights. In April of 1989, on the eve of oral arguments in 
Webster, some 400,000 people marched on the nation's c~pitol in favor 
443. Thus, Robert Burt criticizes the Court for favoring one side of the debate in Roe, frus-
trating even discussion. See BURT, supra note 189, at 348. 
444. See TRIBE, supra note 413, at 150 (following the 1976 presidential election, "[v]oters 
asked to rank the importance of fifteen issues ranked abortion fifteenth"). 
445. See id. at 172 (noting that, between 1977 and 1990, antiabortion extremists "bombed or 
set fire to at least 117 clinics and threatened 250 others"). 
446. See Bush's No-No on Abortion, supra note 428, at 30 (citing a TIME-CNN Poll finding 
that 54% consider abortion "one of the most important issues facing the country today"). 
447. See Margaret Carlson, The Battle Over Abortion, TIME, July 17, 1989, at 63 (citing a 
July 1989 poll by Yankelovich Clancy Shulman finding that 24% are so opposed to abortion that 
they would never support a candidate who favored abortion regardless of the candidate's views 
on other issues). 
448. President Reagan appointed over half of the federal bench and three Supreme Court 
Justices. TRIBE, supra note 413, at 17. 
449. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 
452-61 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (questioning soundness of Roe's analytic framework) .. 
450. See TRIBE, supra note 413, at 17-20 (noting that the appointments of Justice Sandra 
Day O'Connor in 1981, Justice Antonin Scalia in 1986, and Justice Anthony Kennedy in 1987 
reduced the number of Justices that had previously supported the constitutional protection of 
abortion rights to four). 
451. Webster·v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
666 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:577 
of abortion rights.452 The march represented a tremendous mobiliza-
tion of prochoice forces that had been spurred to movement by the 
changing tenor of judicial decisions.453 Webster itself was momentous. 
The Bush administration asked the Court to overrule Roe. 454 Seventy-
seven other groups participated in the case as amici.455 The Webster 
Court declined to overrule Roe, 456 but it did loosen the fetters on an-
tiabortion state legislatures.457 In Webster, Justice Scalia commented 
specifically on the political activity designed to influence the Court.458 
Webster spurred the prochoice movement just as Roe had embold-
ened the antiabortion movement.459 After Webster, NOW and 
NARAL each reported over 50,000 new members,460 and NARAL 
raised over a million dollars in a single month.461 Abortion rights ad-
vocates vowed to carry the fight wherever they had to and apparently 
scored some early victories, "knocking off" political candidates that 
opposed abortion.462 Meanwhile, the number of voters who declared 
themselves "single-issue" on the proabortion rights side of the debate 
increased dramatically. 463 
Abortion quickly became one of the central issues in political de-
bate. Some state legislatures enacted laws directly challenging Roe. 464 
Some state courts located the right to abortion in state constitu-
tions. 465 The Republican Party, long antiabortion, toned down its 
452. See Ethan Bronner, Throngs Rally in D.C to Keep Abortion Legal, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Apr. 19, 1989, at 1. 
453. See id. 
454. Kathryn Kolbert, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services: Reproductive Freedom 
Hanging By a Thread, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 153, 155 (1989) (noting that the Attorney 
General filed an amicus brief urging the Court to use the Webster case to overrule Roe). 
455. Id. at 153. 
456. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 521. 
457. See 492 U.S. at 520-21 (''There is no doubt that our holding today will allow some 
governmental regulation of abortion that would have been prohibited under the language of 
[prior] cases."). 
458. See, e.g., 492 U.S. at 535 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
459. See Margaret Carlson, Can Pro-Choicers Prevail?, TIME, Aug. 14, 1989, at 28. 
460. Id. 
461. Id. 
462. See Robin Toner, Divisive Abortion Politics Bring Iowa Democrats' Primary to a Boil, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1990, at Al (discussing post-Webster elections where proabortion rights 
candidates defeated those who opposed abortion rights). 
463. See Carlson, supra note 447, at 63 (citing a July 1989 poll by Yankelovich Clancy Shul-
·man finding that 32% would never vote for a candidate who supported restricting a woman's 
right to abortion). 
464. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 912 
(1990). 
465. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Operation Rescue, 550 N.E.2d 1361, 
1365 (Mass. 1990); Doe v. Director of Dept. of Social Servs., 468 N.W.2d 862, 868-69 (Mich. 
App. 1991); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
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rhetoric, finding room under its "big tent" for many voices. 466 Candi-
dates could clearly rise or fall on the abortion issue. 
In the face of all this came the Supreme Court's dramatic decision 
last term in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 467 In Casey a splintered 
Court upheld the basic right in Roe while modifying the Roe frame-
work substantially. The Court held that, although a woman has the 
right to choose abortion until the fetus is viable, the states may enact 
laws substantially affecting that choice, including requiring informa-
tion to be provided to the woman in an attempt to persuade her not to 
choose abortion.468 Not surprisingly, Casey followed news media re-
ports showing a growing public consensus on abortion: Americans 
largely support choice in the first trimester but grow increasingly un-
comfortable with abortion as the fetus matures. 469 One can only spec-
ulate whether Roe shaped public opinion or whether public opinion 
has shaped judicial decisions. Similarly, one can only speculate on 
where the abortion debate would be absent judicial participation. 
Speculation is somewhat pointless, however, because the Court's 
·role in American politics generally and in this debate in particular is 
so pervasive. Throughout the debate the Court has been a vital, but by 
no means dispositive, participant. What seems apparent, however, is 
that the story of the abortion rights debate does not support the prem-
ises of the countermajoritarian difficulty.470 Rather, that story demon-
466. See Eleanor Clift, Abortion Contortions, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 5, 1990, at 18 ("Today the 
[GOP] party platform continues to oppose abortion .•.. But GOP party Chairman Lee Atwater 
recently said the GOP is 'a big tent' with room for different views.''). By 1992 the pendulum had 
swung again: the Republican Party adopted an inflexible antiabortion plank. See Myron S. 
Waldman, Disenchantment in the Delegation. NEWSDAY, Aug. 21, 1992, at 38. 
467. 112 s. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
468. 112 S. Ct. at 2818. 
469. See Carlson, supra note 447, at 63. 
470. The danger of using one specific example to illustrate the concept of dialogue is that 
skeptics might charge that this particular example is uniquely dialogic. Lest there be any doubt, 
dialogue is everywhere. Once one is attuned to looking at judicial review in dialogic terms, the 
prevalence of dialogue becomes apparent. Indeed, I regularly experience this phenomenon 
through the eyes of my students. 
I have written about dialogue in other contexts. Dialogue is extremely common in the fash-
ioning of jurisdictional doctrines. See Friedman, supra note 173. The process of remediation 
involving violations of constitutional rights is dialogic as well. See Friedman, supra note 156. 
The dialogic process I have described is common in other areas involving constitutional 
rights. A good example is the death penalty. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), over-
turned the death penalties of many states. Although the Furman Court was extremely frag-
mented, Furman highlighted the problem with broad sentencer discretion and suggested that in 
order to have a constitutionally valid death penalty states must limit jury discretion. E.g., 408 
U.S. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring). In response states enacted varying laws. Some, which 
imposed mandatory death penalties, were subsequently invalidated. See, e.g., Roberts v. Louisi-
ana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). By the same token, statutes that severely limited sentencer discretion 
by enumerating specific aggravating and mitigating circumstances to be weighed also ran into 
trouble when the Supreme Court subsequently decided that legislatures could not limit the miti-
gating circumstances defendants could offer to avoid the death penalty. See, e.g., Lockett v. 
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strates a vibrant public dialogue over the issue. Courts have had an 
important voice in this dialogue, particularly in facilitating it, but 
theirs is not the final or only voice. 
C. The Role of Courts 
I now focus more closely on what courts actually do in our consti-
tutional system. Courts play two roles in the dialogue: the role of 
speaker and the role of shaper or facilitator.47 1 
The role of speaker requires less exploration, as this role closely 
parallels how courts are viewed under the traditional formulation of 
the countermajoritarian difficulty. Under the traditional view, courts 
are seen as speaker, but also as enforcer: courts declare rights, but 
those declarations are expected to take effect. As my discussions of 
judicial :finality and of the abortion controversy have demonstrated, 
this grossly overstates the case. In some instances the courts declare a 
right, accompanied by a clear and simple mandate, and the mandate is 
carried out. But in other cases the judicial decision is filtered and 
watered down, evaded, and avoided; or, over time, the public voice 
engenders a judicial change. 
Far less obvious is the role of courts as facilitators and shapers of 
constitutional debate. Facilitation is to some extent a natural part of 
the declaration of constitutional meaning; as the foregoing description 
suggests, the process is dynamic because pronouncements spark activ-
ity. But some facilitation appears more deliberate. The courts' role in 
the dialogue over the meaning of the Constitution is highly interactive. 
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). This development in turn led to a real tension between sentencing 
discretion and unlimited mitigation. See Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling 
Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. RBv. 1147 
(1991). Eventually the Supreme Court also loosened the rules regarding aggravating circum-
stances, upholding death penalties in instances in which the jury or court had considered aggra· 
vating circumstances that were beyond the purview of the statute or were invalid. See, e.g., 
Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983). This tightening and loosening of sentencing discretion 
- the essence of Furman - also was reflected in the Court's hasty turnabout on the use of 
victim impact information in capital sentencing. See supra note 364. Finally, an undercurrent of 
Furman was a concern about racial discrimination in sentencing, as well as disparate treatment 
based upon economic status. See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 366 (Marshall, J., concurring). In 
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), when faced with evidence of such discrimination, 
however, the Court nonetheless upheld the Georgia death penalty. 
Dialogue at one obvious level is occurring here. As states test out new statutes and the Court 
evaluates them, a natural evolution unfolds. But the evolution mirrors what is occurring in 
society at large. As noted earlier, Furman was decided at a time when society's approval of the 
death penalty was near its low point. See, e.g., James Patterson & Peter Kim, A Strong Show of 
Support for Capital Punishment, SEATILE TIMES, Aug. 7, 1991, at G 1; see also supra note 162. If 
one matches up Supreme Court decisions with the tide of public opinion, the dialogic give and 
take is obvious. 
471. See Gerhardt, supra note 104, at 84 ("[T]he Court is a critical interpreter of and player 
in historical events .••• "). 
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Courts act as go-betweens in the dialogue, synthesizing the views of 
society and then offering the synthesis to society for further discus-
sion. 472 Courts serve as society's tennis partner, always volleying the 
ball back. 473 This interactive process points to certain roles for courts. 
Courts synthesize society's views on constitutional meaning. Given 
the spacious constitution and the views of the many constituencies, a 
collection of constitutional interpretations often exists. Courts collect 
these views and consolidate them, striving for a common norm.474 
This distillation resembles a legislative debate begun with a multiplic-
ity of viewpoints and ultimately presented as a binary choice. 
Courts also focus debate. As courts synthesize, they inevitably 
choose. Courts accept one interpretation and reject others. The deci-
sion is not final, but it is sharp and immediate. Thus, a debate that 
might have proceeded without clear direction now has focus. 
Similarly, court decisions may act as a catalyst, causing society to 
debate issues that might not otherwise have stood at the top of the 
472. Professor Paul Brest argues that constitutional interpretation ought to shift from what 
he perceives as the primary focus in the courts to legislatures and to the people. See Paul Brest, 
Constitutional Citizenship, 34 Cl.EV. ST. L. REV. 175, 180-81 (1986). As this article makes clear, 
I generally disagree with the premise that constitutional interpretation currently occurs primarily 
in courts. 
Professor Robin West offers an intriguing rejoinder to Brest. She argues that interpretation 
occurs primarily in courts, and perhaps ought to, because contemporary interpretation primarily 
is amoral, adhering to an authoritarian view of the Constitution. Robin L. West, 17te Authorita-
rian Impulse in Constitutional Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 531, 532 (1988). West proceeds to 
argue that the people ought only to concern themselves with constitutional interpretation if the 
· interpretive act is seen as normative, rather than simply an exercise in determining what we are 
compelled or permitted to do. West cites as examples of the authoritarian strain the decisions in 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 140 (1986), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See West, 
supra, at 532-33. 
West's argument is worthy of serious thought. I differ with her in one significant and note-
worthy respect, however. I believe that decisions such as Bowers and Roe parade around in 
authoritarian language but that even their authors recognize the moral dimension of the deci-
sions. Thus, the interesting question is why we address moral questions in legalistic terms. 
473. I disagree in this respect with Professor Carter. In a series of articles, Carter discusses a 
dialogic form of judicial review not unlike that I describe here. See Carter, supra note 15; Ste-
phen L. Carter, 17te Right Questions in the Creation of Constitutional Meaning, 66 B.U. L. REV. 
71 (1986); Carter, supra note 388. Carter describes a relatively two-sided dialogue, each side 
yammering at one another, but with serious limits on how far dialogue will go to effect change. 
See, e.g., Carter, supra note 15, at 851 (arguing that the Court can guide policy choices but rarely 
initiates them; the Court usually can be circumvented by the legislature); Carter, supra note 388, 
at 855 ("[T]he Justices, if they possess sufficient fortitude, will nearly always win - at least for 
the near term."). I, on the other hand, see a constant process of mutual influence and acco=o-
dation, with ultimate results as much a product of compromise as a tug-of-war. My vision of the 
role of courts is far more cooperative, interactive, and intertwined than Carter's. 
474. See Alfred Hill, 17te Political Dimension of Constitutional Adjudication, 63 S. CAL. L. 
REv. 1237, 1251 (1990) (arguing that in cases such as Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the 
Court cannot be called countermajoritarian; it is "essentially catching up in an area where a 
changed consensus has already won wide recognition"); cf. TuSHNET, supra note 162, at 154 
("Certainly courts - even appellate courts - are places where, sometimes, co=unity and 
shared values can be brought into being."). 
670 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:577 
agenda.475 Sometimes judicial decisions address a topic that is timely 
and pressing. But judicial decisions also can come out of relative ob-
scurity, provoking intense debate over an issue over which debate had 
only occurred at a lower level of interest. Judicial decisions can upset 
the status quo, requiring societal response and thus fostering societal 
consideration. 476 
Further, courts shape the debate over constitutional meaning. Ju-
dicial decisions essentially are policy papers on the interpretation of 
the Constitution. Opinion writing collects and organizes thoughts. 
This organization tends to give body to loosely held views. 
Courts also give voice and body to the dialogue. Courts can take an 
unusual or uncredited position and move it to the center. Courts can 
interrupt societal patterns of thought, presenting wholly new or inade-
quately considered views, whether the views are welcome or not. 
Moreover, by deciding to confront an issue themselves or by defer-
ring to other decisionmakers, courts can prod other institutions to 
speak. Thus, the Supreme Court often attributes intent to Congress 
even in instances where Congress may not have had an intent, placing 
the ball in Congress' court.477 In effect, at times the Court asks other 
actors to speak. 
·Finally, and in an entirely separate vein, courts moderate and tend 
the debate, largely by protecting the institutions that participate in the 
dialogue. Vital debate over constitutional meaning depends upon an 
open and vigorous political process. The Framers' system imagines 
voices from every level of government, filtered through various sys-
tems of representation. Judicial decisions maintain (or disrupt) bal-
ance in the system of separation of powers and federalism, and - to 
475. Frank Michelman, for example, criticizes the Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 
478 U.S. 186 (1986), from a republican perspective. Michelman argues that Court decisions 
must bring groups like gay people into "full and effective participation in the various arenas of 
public life." Michelman, supra note 409, at 1533. 
My difficulty with this conclusion is that, although I am sympathetic to Michelman's value· 
laden outcome, from a dialogic standpoint the decision in Bowers v. Hardwick at least might have 
been more transformative than a decision in favor of Hardwick. The Court's decision, by keep-
ing an active group on the fringe, may have served as a catalyst for more dynamic civic action. 
For a fuller description of the notion of "Court as catalyst," albeit a view its author generally 
rejects, see ROSENBERG, supra note 147, at 25-26. 
476. See Gerhardt, supra note 104, at 86 (suggesting that "the Court's decisions inform the 
choices or agendas of the other branches"). As Louis Fisher points out, the Court can invite 
response, thus fostering dialogue. See FISHER, supra note 108, at 247. I have identified the 
Court's decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), as just such an 
invitation. See Friedman, supra note 156, at 770. 
477. See BOBBITI, supra note 5, at 192-93 (noting that courts often offer a "cue" to other 
branches); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear State-
ment Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking. 45 V AND. L. REV. 593 (1992) (arguing that the Court 
uses statutory construction rules to force Congress to consider constitutional issues); see also 
Friedman, supra note 156, at 751-52 (discussing Bivens line of cases as such a cue). 
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quote John Hart Ely - "clear[] the channels of political change."478 
All this is apparent in the debate over abortion. The Supreme 
Court has spoken time and again on the nature of the abortion right. 
But by the same token, the Court galvanized public opinion through a 
lengthy process of dialogue. 479 And the Court in turn was genuinely 
influenced by that dialogue. This discussion is not intended to exhibit 
a Panglossian view of courts. As indicated, courts can hamper or chill 
dialogue as well as provoke it. 430 But as a descriptive matter the dia-
logic role of courts cannot be ignored. Approaching the question in 
dialogic terms, rather than in terms of the countermajoritarian diffi-
culty, should inspire a discussion of how to make the dialogue more 
open, more vibrant, and more effective. 
D. Dialogu.e and Constraint 
The dialogic role presented here differs significantly from norma-
tive theories of judicial review. Other theories prescribe what judges 
should do and measure the work of judges against the theory. The 
dialogic view simply accepts what judges do. The dialogic view thus is 
subject to inevitable challenge on the grounds that it permits judges to 
"do anything." Commentators might rightly inquire as to whether 
limitations exist on what courts properly can do pursuant to dialogue. 
I have been asked whether, under a dialogic theory, courts would be 
constrained to accept a situation like Nazi Germany.481 Underlying 
such questions are quite reasonable concerns about constraint and le-
gitimacy. We perceive courts as more remote than legislative and ex-
ecutive officials. Moreover, the subject with which courts deal - our 
rights and liberties - understandably arouses jealousies. That is why 
academics struggle to define the parameters of judicial action and to 
ensure that judges will stay within some bounds. 
The dialogue described here does constrain judges. Rather than 
relying on a normative theory easily and often ignored by judges, 4 82 
however, the constraint in dialogue is inherent and systemic: judges 
478. ELY, supra note 5, at 105; see also Seidman, supra note 59, at 158 ("[T]o the extent that 
there are nonmajoritarian 'defects' in the political process, an independent judiciary can actually 
play a pro-democratic role by eliminating the defects."). CommentarY is mixed, of course, as to 
whether the Supreme Court's intervention to protect politics always is well advised. See John 
Moeller, The Supreme Court's Quest for Fair Politics, 1 CoNST. CoMMENTARY 203 (1984). 
479. See supra notes 429-31 and accompanying text. 
480. See supra notes 442-43 and accompanying text. 
481. As Professor Carter puts it, "[i]f judicial review really proceeds in this manner - so the 
standard question runs - then what could a court do to stop the Holocaust?" Carter, supra note 
473, at 90. 
482. In addition, as Philip Bobbitt observes, adoption of a normative theory would "lead to 
the superimposition of a single convention on the Constitution." BoBBITr, supra note 5, at 238. 
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are constrained by the system of government in which they operate.483 
This section at least preliminarily describes how internal constraints 
operate upon the judiciary. 
One obvious constraining force is found in the sources of judicial 
decisionmaking. As I argued earlier, the bases for judicial decision-
making are firmly grounded in the norms of society.484 The clearest 
example is the practice in many cases of "polling" state legislative 
practice in order to determine whether a right is generally recognized 
and should be accorded constitutional status. 485 But this is not the 
only example. Many references to sources supporting constitutional 
judgments are an appeal to the values of the people. 486 
Whether reference to judicial decisions reveals what judges actu-
ally rely upon in deciding cases is irrelevant. Judges may rely upon 
their gut instinct (which I would argue is "majoritarian"), whim, or 
what they had for breakfast. What is important is that judges find it 
necessary to, and can, support their conclusions with sources that ap-
pear to reflect the sentiment of the people. Thus, one properly might 
question the entire notion that courts enforce norms contrary to popu-
lar will. Because judges are chosen from and live among "the people," 
their decisions naturally reflect popular will to some degree. 487 The 
following discussion of systemic constraints explains how this system 
continues to reflect popular will even as judges are appointed to sup-
posedly insular, life-tenured positions. 
In his excellent article "Ambivalence and Accountability," Profes-
sor Louis Michael Seidman examines the paradox of judicial review in 
a majoritarian system. Seidman's task, like many before him, is to 
search for a way of reconciling our adherence to judicial review with 
483. In discussing Alexander Bickel's philosophy, Professor Kronman calls this constraint 
external, as opposed to an internal theory such as a normative theory of rights. See Kronman, 
supra note 12, at 1579-80. Professor Chemerinsky, on the other hand, uses the notions of "inter-
nal" and "external" constraint quite differently. Chemerinsky defines "internal" constraints as 
"norms of proper Court behavior that the Justices feel obligated to follow." Chemerinsky, supra 
note 73, at 1251-53. Examples of these are the need to adhere to or distinguish precedents and 
the need to write reasoned decisions. Id. at 1251-52. "External" constraints "arise from the 
interaction of the Court with other branches of government," id. at 1252, including the need for 
enforcement of judicial orders and the control exercised when Presidents appoint new Justices. 
Id. at 1252-53; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 101 & n.236. 
484. See supra text accompanying notes 61-114; see also FlsHER, supra note 108, at 13·14; 
MARsHALL, supra note 235, at 31-36 (discussing evidence of Supreme Court reliance on public 
opinion in deciding cases); Winter, Upside/Down, supra note 40, at 1920-21 ("[M]uch of what the 
Court does necessarily employs mainstream conceptions that already preclude or impair minor-
ity concerns .•.• "). But see id. at 1925-26 ("[D]ominant conceptions are not the same thing as 
majority decisions."). 
485. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text; Winter, Judicial Review, supra note 40. 
486. See supra text accompanying notes 61-139. 
487. See supra text accompanying notes 61-139. 
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our devotion to majoritarian government. Unlike most others before 
him, however, Seidman concludes "[t]he search for a normative justifi-
cation for judicial nonaccountability is ... bound to be both fruitless 
and pointless."488 
Seidman's reasoning is as important as his conclusion. After trac-
ing the contradiction inherent in a system where judicial review stands 
side by side with majoritarianism, and concluding that the contradic-
tion cannot be reconciled, Seidman argues that the attempt to recon-
cile the two is misguided. Seidman relies on an analogy to a patient 
who must undergo a life-saving amputation without anesthesia. The 
patient precommits to the operation, instructing the physician to ig-
nore any plea during the operation to terminate the procedure. Then, 
during the procedure, the patient (now in great pain) begs the doctor 
to stop, yet when the doctor does so the patient later asks why the 
doctor disregarded the earlier order.489 "What are we to make of this 
sort of intertemporal conflict?"490 Seidman asks, dra~g the obvious 
analogy between his story and the precommitment to judicial re-
view. 491 Seidman concludes that we are deeply ambivalent about judi-
cial review: the process of judicial review represents the body politic's 
taking its medicine. Thus, even the fact that judicial decisions will not 
always reflect popular choices is in a sense a popular choice. We are, 
intellectually, going in two directions at once, thereby "continually 
redefin[ing] ourselves and our community."492 
There is much to commend in Seidman's frank and certain recog-
nition of our inability to legitimize judicial review by reconciling it 
with what we call majoritarianism. Seidman's question about inter-
temporal conflict speaks volumes about our system. Intertemporal 
conflict is not merely accidental; it is in a sense the built-in mechanism 
that makes our system run while simultaneously constraining the sys-
tem's actors. 
Another analogy reflects the day-to-day system of American con-
488. Seidman, supra note 59, at 1599. 
489. Id. at 1588, 1590. 
490. Id. at 1591. 
491. Other commentators have produced significant work on this "intertemporal conflict." 
See Ackerman, supra note 3, at 1045-46; Amar, supra note 201, at 1076-79. 
492. Seidman, supra note 59, at 1600; see also Welch, supra note 68. Welch examines in-
stances in which legislation is struck down by courts applying low-level scrutiny, in an attempt to 
determine the extent to which community morality - standing alone - can justify legislation. 
Welch concludes that the due process arena entertains conflicts in community morality that are 
played out in constitutional cases. Manuscript at 88-90. On the one hand, governmental moral 
choices - such as bans on nude dancing - are legitimate. On the other hand, equally a part of 
our community morality, is the concept that "liberty ••• limits the scope of government." Id. at 
89. Constitutional adjudication thus is the process of reconciling these conflicting moralities. 
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stitutionalism. Picture an oscilloscope, with three sine waves running 
across its screen, all at varying frequencies. Label one line the Execu-
tive, one the Congress, and one the Judiciary. The peaks and troughs 
represent deviations from the views of each branch's constituency. 
Thus, each branch moves in and out of sync with its electorate or 
constituency. To pick the simplest example, the Executive may well 
be at its peak when newly elected to a first term; by the end of the 
second term the congruence may be substantially reduced. 
One condition endemic to our system is that the branches rarely 
will be equally in sync with their constituencies at the same time. 
Rather, the waves run on at different intervals, perhaps not entirely 
independent of one another, but not on the same track either. This 
pattern was not accidental: the Framers designed the system so that 
the varying terms of senators and representatives would give rise to 
long-term or short-term views more or less in sync with the will of the 
people.493 
Like the description of the dialogue itself, this description is over-
simplified. At the least, one probably would want two waves for the 
legislature, one representing the Senate, the other the House of Repre-
sentatives. But an accurate picture of American constitutionalism 
might require countless more lines: state legislatures, state governors, 
town councils, school boards, and so forth. The list is long if not 
endless. 
An inquiry into what the line representing the judiciary would 
look like and the consequences of the line-drawing exercise in general 
is enlightening. Discussions of the countermajoritarian difficulty ig-
nore the subtlety of this system, because the difficulty assumes that the 
judiciary is out of sync with the majority. The truth of this assump-
tion, however, varies at different times. The times when it is true, es-
pecially vis-a-vis the peaks and troughs of the other branches, teach a 
good deal about the protections of our constitutional system.494 
Considering when the actions of the nonjudicial branches generally 
will mirror the views of their constituencies provides a useful start. At 
some level this is subject to happenstance; the lines will not really be as 
493. Mark Tushnet, The Politics of Constitutional Law, in THE PoLmcs OP LAW: A PRO-
GRESSIVE CRITIQUE 219, 223-24 (David Kairys ed., 2d ed. 1990) (describing different election 
terms and methods offederal branches to foster different constituencies). For more on the repre-
sentative and institutional nature of the branches, including discussion on how our modern sys-
tem differs from the Framers' intent, see ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 67-70. 
494. See Reynolds, supra note 404, at 114 ("Despite this unpredictability, the actions of the 
Supreme Court are not random. Just as there is structure within chaos, so there is pattern of 
sorts within the actions of the Court ••.. "). 
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smooth as sine waves but will be spiked and somewhat chaotic,495 and 
there also may be tremendous variance from issue to issue. Nonethe-
less, the Framers did have a specific design. The Framers believed 
that each body would represent its constituents closest to election time 
because the representative would be most fully imbued with the electo-
rate's values following an election.496 Public choice theory suggests 
just the opposite: immediately prior to an election the representatives 
will be trying hardest to represent the electorate's views.497 In either 
case, the sine wave ought to be intersecting with public opinion around 
election time. 
This circumstance suggests two useful points about the elected_ 
branches. First, as I argued earlier with regard to the judiciary, it may 
be more instructive to measure the extent to which an institution rep-
resents the views of the public, rather than the extent to which an 
individual representative mirrors constituents' views. Government is 
likely to be representative of majority will at times when the most elec-
tive offices are up for grabs. Second, and perhaps more important, just 
as the Framers intended, the elective seats are not open at the same 
time. The Framers' concern with faction and over-accountability to 
the majority led them to construct a system in which some branches 
would have longer terms free of the electorate's most pressing desires 
(i.e., the Senate), and planned to have the branches on somewhat dif-
ferent election cycles. 498 
The next step is to compare the wave representing the judiciary to 
those of the elected branches. Because federal judges do not stand for 
election,499 the obvious question is whether there is any benchmark 
analogous to the election cycle for outlining the judicial wave. 
The likeliest time for judges as individuals to reflect the will of the 
populace is at the time of appointment. There are a number of reasons 
for this conclusion. First, Presidents select judges whose jdeologies 
495. But see Tushnet, supra note 493, at 230 ("The rhythm of politics in the Supreme Court 
and constitutional law is somewhat more sedate than that of politics elsewhere in government 
.... "). 
496. See REFLECTIONS ON THE CoNSTITUTION 58 (Richard Maidment & John Zvesper eds., 
1989). 
497. See FARBER & FluCKEY, supra note 28, at 22-23. 
498. See generally Tushnet, supra note 493,.at 223-25 (describing how constitutional struc-
ture defeats attempts of majority to gain control of all branches). As with other structural ele-
ments, this construct might not have come off precisely as the Framers intended. As Bruce 
Ackerman points out, the Framers did construct the branches differently both to represent differ-
ent constituencies and to lessen the possibility of factions' capturing government. But notions 
underlying their plan have not come quite to fruition. See ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 67-70. 
In particular, the House of Representatives was intended to be the nationalistic body, while the 
Senate was to represent parochial interests. Today just the opposite seems true. Id. at 69. 
499. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 1. 
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resemble their own. soo Second, this effect is enhanced to the extent 
that Presidents are elected in part on a platform representing some 
concern about judicial ideology. soi Third, the confirmation process is 
an exercise calculated not only to ensure as much as possible that a 
nominee's values represent mainstream thought but also to educate the 
nominee as to the concerns of the populace. s02 
To the extent this observation is correct (and even to an extent if it 
is not), the judicial wave likely will be considerably more chaotic than 
the waves of the elected branches. Professor Mark Tushnet has ob-
served that it takes roughly ten years for one party in charge of the 
judicial selection process to shape a judiciary in its image. so3 This 
alone may be a rare and random event. But the premise underlying 
the assessment also is unpredictable. Judicial attrition, unlike elec-
tions, does not occur on a fixed schedule. Judges and Justices are ap-
pointed at differing ages and serve for far differing terms. s04 Congress 
may create judgeships. sos Any number of factors have an impact on 
whether one President will have enough vacancies to work a substan-
tial change in the federal judiciary. 
A related point is that the judiciary is likely to be out of sync with 
the political branches quite often. s06 In part this fluctuation reflects 
the chaotic nature of the situation where the judicial wave runs along-
side the more predictable waves of the political branches. But the flux 
also reflects the time necessary for a President to name a large number 
500. Although this has not always been the case, Presidents certainly have chosen judges of 
similar philosophy in recent years. See Ely, supra note 28, at 842-54; Strauss & Sunstein, supra 
note 177, at 1506-07; cf. Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of 
U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. PoL. SCI. REv. 557 (1989) (measuring recent Justices' value 
preferences and voting records). A wealth ofliterature discusses the extent to which presidential 
appointees mirror the ideology of the President. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, Goo SA VB 
THis HONORABLE CoURT: How nm CHOICE OF SUPREME CoURT JUSTICES SHAPES OUR 
HlsTORY (1985); Ronald D. Rotunda, Predicting the Views of Supreme Court Nominees, TRIAL, 
Nov. 1990, at 42. 
501. Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 177, at 1506-07. 
502. See Nina Totenberg, The Confirmation Process and the Public: To Know or Not to 
Know, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1213, 1213 (1988) (characterizing the current confirmation process as 
the public's "last chance to affect the least accountable branch of government"). For a critical 
view of the confirmation process of late, see Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 177. 
503. TusHNBT, supra note 493, at 225. 
504. Justice Powell was 64 years old when President Nixon appointed him to the Supreme 
Court. BOB WOODWARD & Scorr ARMsTRONG, THE BRETHREN 160 (1979). In sharp con-
trast, Justice White was only 44 years old when President Kennedy appointed him to the Court. 
4 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME CoURT 1789-1969, at 2951 (Leon Friedman 
& Fred L. Israel eds., 1969). 
505. See, e.g., Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
452, § 2, 94 Stat. 1994 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1951)) (creating the Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit). 
506. See Reynolds, supra note 404, at 114-15 (discussing fluctuation in the judicial system). 
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of judges to the bench, matched up against the vicissitudes of ordinary 
politics. Politics tends to move in cycles; people will favor one ap-
proach and then, after a time, favor a change. Just as a President is 
gaining firm control over the judiciary, the people are likely to change 
political direction, leaving the judiciary and the political branches at 
odds. 
This is precisely the state of affairs that frustrates the majoritarian 
and leads to talk of the countermajoritarian difficulty. Judges often 
appear to be moving in a separate direction from the political 
branches. 507 Although this frustrates the majoritarian, the system that 
gives rise to that frustration was no accident. The time of a 
majoritarian's delight is precisely what the Framers feared most. The 
majoritarian will be most content when all sine waves are crossing 
their middle point and government - including the judiciary - is 
most sensitive to the will of the majority. But fear of tyranny of the 
majority is precisely what caused the Framers to erect our governmen-
tal structures in a way that seeks to minimize these instances. 5os 
The reality is that, despite the different cycling, times of congru-
ence do occur. There are times when all the branches will be highly 
representative of majority will. Often ·these are times of great political 
progress, such as the New Deal.509 But the Framers justifiably were 
concerned that if such states of affairs existed for too long people's 
rights would be trampled by zealous majorities. The important thing 
about the Framers' design is that the system does not stand still: the 
waves always are moving somewhat independently through peaks and 
troughs. 
Just as the system will have cycles in which all waves are crossing 
the middle point, the system also works to ensure that no wave will get 
too far out of cycle. The process of election and judicial appointment 
works to keep the lines somewhat responsive to one another and 
within the rough bounds of public opinion. Of course, this process 
sometimes fails, leading to constitutional crises. Dred Scott may well 
represent a time when the waves were far out of sync; the period of 
507. See Spann, supra note 20, at 2008-12 (discussing types of political preferences to which 
the Supreme Court will be uniquely responsive). 
508. See supra notes 189-200 and accompanying text. 
509. Intriguingly, the sine wave analogy may offer some support for Ackerman's notion of 
constitutional moments. Ackerman identifies three periods of high lawmaking, two of which 
followed, respectively, the Civil War (in part moved along by Dred Scott) and the Supreme 
Court's resistance to the New Deal. See ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 40. If these periods 
represent points when the waves were seriously out of sync, in their wake the period of adjust-
ment may have involved a point in time when all waves were in sync. 
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judicial opposition to the New Deal may signal another. But such 
periods have been mercifully rare. 
This tentative thinking suggests a picture of a judiciary that rarely 
is completely on target with the body politic but is never too far ahead 
or behind.510 The judiciary can be at times visionary, and at times 
reactionary, but never too much of either. When the judiciary slides 
toward either extreme a correction begins, moving the wave back in 
the other direction. One oft-studied example may be the progress of 
the Warren Court's expansion of constitutional rights. In the model of 
judicial behavior that arose from the Warren era, courts are supposed 
to protect minorities. The judiciary can pursue this role because its 
relative isolation from ordinary politics allows it to do unpopular 
things that the political branches cannot. Undoubtedly there is some 
truth to the model, but the sine wave analogy raises serious doubt 
about its descriptive accuracy.511 The question is whether judges, or 
the judiciary collectively, really do engage in such conduct, and how 
successfully. 512 
A description of the Warren era more in keeping with the sine 
wave analogy views the judicial wave as intersecting with popular 
opinion at that moment. There were probably substantial pockets of 
popular support for the actions taken by the Warren Court.513 The 
members of that Court hardly were radicals. More likely they tapped 
into a strong undercurrent of public sentiment about racial justice and 
rights for the underprivileged.514 Like Seidman's intertemporal con-
flict, the sine wave analogy shows how the judiciary can act as an "ap-
peal from John drunk to John sober."515 The Warren era may have 
resulted from a submerged sense of injustice regarding inaction by the 
political branches on civil rights. 
510. DAHL, supra note 48, at 190 ("[T]he views of a majority of the justices of the Supreme 
Court are never out of line for very long with the views prevailing among the lawmaking majori-
ties of the country."); FISHER, supra note 108, at 12; Sandalow, supra note 378, at 1039. 
511. See Spann, supra note 20, at 1990-2008 (arguing that courts are institutionally incapable 
of advancing minority interests in the face of majority opposition). 
512. This accords with a thought of Robert Cover's: "I favor federal courts taking a lead in 
reforming institutions when the other officials fail ..•• At times the federal courts have been our 
allies in those commitments. There is every reason to believe that such a convergence of interests 
was temporary and accidental .••. " ROBERT M. COVER ET AL., PROCEDURE 730 (1988), cited 
in Winter, Upside/Down, supra note 40, at 1890 n.31. 
513. See, e.g., Spann, supra note 20, at 2008-2018 (describing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483 (1954), as a decision that had majority support). 
514. See MARsHALL, supra note 235, at 87 (concluding that 61% of the Warren Court's 
decisions were "majoritarian"). 
515. Mark Tushnet, Justice Brennan, Equality, and Majority Rule, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1357, 
1370 (1991); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 83-84 (arguing that emphasis on majority 
rule gives too much weight to short-term goals rather than long-term values). 
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By the same token, the judiciary rode the wave of the Warren 
Court into a trough fairly quickly. Twenty-five years later the judici-
ary looks completely different. 516 When the next trough and peak oc-
curred is hard to isolate. My own suspicion is that the trough came 
fairly quickly after the Warren years, that the conservative Burger-
Rehnquist Court itself mirrored popular opinion for only a short time, 
and that the current very conservative bench rapidly is falling out of 
step with the mood of the country. That may be why what many ex-
pected to be the most conservative Term in a long while turned out not 
to be so.517 
By now the connection between the sine wave analogy and the dia-
logue should be clear. The sine waves that represent the system of 
government the Framers designed drive the dialogue. The judiciary is 
both visionary and reactionary simply because it is always somewhat 
out of sync with the waves of more political branches - always inch-
ing ahead or lagging behind. 518 The divergence between popular senti-
ment and the judiciary is what makes the dialogue work. 519 In this 
respect, judicial action may deserve greater credit than the 
countermajoritarian difficulty accords it. Judicial action creates the 
dynamic tension that moves the system of constitutional interpretation 
along.520 
The sine wave also represents the constraint against a judiciary 
completely out of step with the majority. Rather than spinning nor-
mative theories to constrain judges, we should see that the constraint 
is internal. Judges are constrained by the political system that sur-
rounds them. 521 When judges stray too far from the mark, pressures 
build - in judicial appointments and in political rhetoric - to bring 
them back into line. 522 The dialogic protection is that the judiciary -
516. See ELDER Wrrr, A DIFFERENT JUSTICE: REAGAN AND THE SUPREME COURT 52-56 
(1986) (discussing conservative alliance in Rehnquist Court). 
517. See, e.g., Kathleen Sullivan, Packing the Court Is Harder than It Appears, RECORDER, 
Aug. 7, 1992, at 9 (discussing the Court's surprising decision not to reverse Roe v. Wade). 
518. Cf. Sager, supra note 28, at 916. 
519. Some criticize the notion that the Court should lead society aggressively. For example, 
Robert Nagel differs with the notion that "the judiciary should routinely confront and reshape 
society." NAGEL, supra note 27, at 23. Judicial deference to or agreement with society avoids 
"the constitutional costs of a routinely pugnacious judiciary," id., and permits acceptance of 
societal practice as itself an interpretation of the Constitution. Id. at 23-24. 
520. See Reynolds, supra note 404, at 115 ("Politically, the fluidity of the Supreme Court's 
jurisprudence means that no coalition is set in stone over time, and that people are often pressed 
to become involved with politics in order to protect their interests .... "). 
521. See Symposium, Positive Political Theory and Public Law, 80 GEO. L.J. 457 (1992). 
522. The classic cite for this proposition is ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN 
SUPREME CoURT 224 (1960) ("[I]t is hard to find a single historical instance when the Court has 
stood firm for very long against a really clear wave of public demand."), followed by Robert A. 
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or the people - always are struggling to achieve convergence. 523 The 
constraint is inherent in the judicial process rather than external to it. 
The people will follow judicial decrees so long as the judges seem 
right. When the judges no longer appear to be correct, the people will 
press for judicial change. Intuitively, at least, the judges know this. 
This is not meant to diminish the value of normative theories of 
constitutional interpretation. To the contrary, the idea of dialogue en-
courages such theories, to be used as arguments in the dialogue itself. 
But rather than posing as ·"correct" because of divine adherence to 
some constitutional plan, such theories must rest, and persuade, based 
on their own value. 524 
Dialogue simply is inevitable. Wish as some might that constitu-
tional determinacy existed, the fact is that the Constitution is spacious 
and admits of diverse interpretations. Moreover, the reality of our sys-
tem is that the people speak to their judges, and the judges speak to 
the people. We should acknowledge the :flexibility of this system, and 
determine what we can make of it, rather than deny it. 
IV. CONCLUSION: THE LITILE PRINCE AND THE COURT 
Millions of adults and children alike have been moved by Antoine 
de Saint Exupery's story The Little Prince. 525 I happened to be read-
ing the book while working on this article, and one tale seemed such 
an apt parable for my entire point that I brought the book to school 
and read a chapter to my Federal Courts class. 526 
In Chapter Ten the Little Prince visits Asteroid 325, and there he 
meets a king. Tired from his journey, the little prince yawns, which 
evokes instant criticism from the king. 
"It is contrary to etiquette to yawn in the presence of a king," the mon-
arch said to him. "I forbid you to do so." 
"I can't help it. I can't stop myself," replied the little prince, thor-
Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. 
Pus. L. 279 (1957). Compare Dahl's more recent statement: 
Jurists known to be sharply at odds with the basic outlook of the president or a majority of 
senators are not nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate. Thus the views of 
a majority of justices of the Supreme Court are never out of line for very long with the views 
prevailing among the lawmaking majorities of the country. 
DAHL, supra note 48, at 190; see also Ely, supra note 28, at 842-54 (discussing politicization of 
the judicial appointment process and its impact upon appointments). 
523. See TuSHNET, supra note 162, at 169-70 ("[C]ourts are unlikely to remain substantially 
out of line with the majority's views for very long."). 
524. Carter, supra note 473, at 87 (decrying tendency to equate question of whether case was 
"wrongly decided" with question of whether decision is "beyond the power" of the Court); see 
also Carter, supra note 388, at 846-47. 
525. SAINT EXUPERY, supra note 35. 
526. The following discussion and quotation all refers to id. at 41-47. 
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oughly embarrassed. "I have come on a long journey, and I have had no 
sleep ... " 
"Ah, then," the king said. "I order you to yawn. It is years since I 
have seen anyone yawning. Yawns, to me are objects of curiosity. 
Come, now! Yawn again! It is an order." 
''That frightens me ... I cannot, anymore ... " murmured the little 
prince, now completely abashed. 
"Hum! Hum!" replied the king. "Then I - I order you sometimes to 
yawn and sometimes to -" 
He sputtered a little, and seemed vexed. 
For what the king fundamentally insisted upon was that his authority 
should be respected. He tolerated no disobedience. 527 He was an abso-
lute monarch. But, because he was a very good man, he made his orders 
reasonable. 528 
And so the little prince and the king entered into a discussion, in 
which the king explained that he was entitled to command absolute 
authority because his orders were always objectively reasonable. "Ac-
cepted authority rests first of all on reason. If you ordered your people 
to go and throw themselves into the sea, they would rise up in revolu-
tion. I have the right to require obedience because my orders are 
reasonable."529 
The king, of course, is our Supreme Court, and the prince one of 
the Supreme Court's subjects. Despite the Court's insistence on its 
absolute authority, the Court's authority clearly rests on reasonable-
ness - on popular acceptance of the premises of a judicial order. 
But the parallel does not end there. I began with Bickel. Perhaps 
the most controversial aspect of The Least Dangerous Branch was 
Bickel's discussion of The Passive Virtues, by which Bickel advocated 
the Court's use of justiciability doctrines to ensure that the Court only 
ordered something when the time was right, when acceptance could be 
anticipated. 530 
This point did not escape the king's notice. Given the king's abso-
lute dominion, the little prince requested a sunset. 
"You shall have your sunset. I shall command it. But, according to my 
science of government, I shall wait until conditions are favorable." 
"When will that be?" inquired the little prince. 
"Hurni Hum!" replied the king; and before saying anything else he 
consulted a bulky almanac. "Hum! Hum! That will be about - about 
- that will be this evening about twenty minutes to eight. And you will 
527. Cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17-20 (1958). 
528. SAINT EXUPERY, supra note 35, at 41-42. 
529. Id. at 45. 
530. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 111-98. 
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see how well I am obeyed!"531 
Well, of course, as society has caught on to our Court, the little 
prince caught on to the king. The little prince wished to go. The king 
said "No." "'If your Majesty wishes to be promptly obeyed,' [the 
little prince] said, 'he should be able to give me a reasonable order. He 
should be able, for example, to order me to be gone by the end of one 
minute. It seems to me that conditions are favorable . . . .' "532 
When the king failed to answer, the little prince ("with a sigh") 
took his leave. Never to be out of step, the king responded. " 'I make 
you my Ambassador,' the king called out, hastily. He had a magnifi-
cent air of authority."533 
This analogy, for all its resonance, may seem to provide an unduly 
cynical and greatly understated view of the Court's authority. I do not 
intend to paint such a picture. But remember, this article responds to 
what I view as a great error leaning in the other direction, the error of 
the countermajoritarian difficulty. The problem with the 
countermajoritarian difficulty is that it overstates the role of courts and 
thus understates society's responsibility. My point is that we should 
neither understate nor overstate the role of courts; we must account 
accurately for the critical role of the rest of society, the people. One of 
my favorite thoughts in this regard comes from Judge Learned Hand: 
Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no con-
stitution, no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court 
can even do much to help it. While it lies there it needs no constitution, 
no law, no court to save it. 534 
531. SAINT EXUPERY, supra note 35, at 45. 
532. Id. at 47 (emphasis added). 
533. Id. 
534. LEARNED HAND, The Spirit of Liberty, in THE SPIRIT OP LIBERTY 189, 190 (3d ed. 
1960). 
